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ABSTRACT
MESSIANIC LIGHT: UTOPIAN DISCOURSE IN THE WORK OF
THEODOR W. ADORNO, LUCE IRIGARAY AND GIORGIO AGAMBEN
Heather A. Thiessen
December 15, 2010
What is the idea that "utopia" names? How can discourse
represent that idea? Setting aside temporarily deeper problems
with the idea of representation, and focusing on how a complex
philosophical discourse might approach the problem of conveying
or representing a large, only fairly precise, and important idea
is the question of this dissertation. It ultimately answers that
question obliquely, by focusing on the way the utopian discourse
present in the work of three late 20 th century philosophers,
Theodor W. Adorno, Luce Irigaray, and Giorgio Agamben, addresses
a subject position that can be named a "subject of possibility."
How this subject of possibility might relate to the possibilities
for transcendence located in the material world that is the stage
for utopian imagination is another area of the study's
investigation.
The dissertation introduces the question with a look at the
problems associated with utopia. It considers utopian discourse
in select works of each of these thinkers, paying attention to
dystopian context, identification of style and language, subjectobject considerations, and the discursive treatment of space and
time.

In particular, it traces the theme of messianic expectation,

v

in a loose secular sense, through this discourse. Finally, it
links the way the messianic theme provides content to the idea of
utopia present in this discourse. It claims that the messianic
idea thematizes a materialist interpretation of transcendence and
metaphysical experience that is developed in the work of each of
these authors. That is, these authors locate the metaphysical
moment necessary for the idea of utopia in the transcendent
relation of the material subject to the subject of language and
thought; in its concrete difference from that subject. This
materialist moment provides a base for a non-representational and
trans formative approach to utopian imagination and perhaps even
utopian practice, by linking the idea of "utopia" to a nonlinguistic understanding of the negation of suffering.
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CHAPTER I
MISE-EN-SCENE

The Flavor of Utopia
In 1948, Marcia Brown's retelling of an old European folk tale
earned her the first of her many Caldecott citations and medals. As she
tells the story, three weary, hungry soldiers returning from war and
still far from home trudge into a little town; their pleas for
hospitality are denied by the self-interested villagers. The soldiers
then ask for the use of a pot, some water, and three stones - to make
stone soup. Little by little, they persuade the curious and unbelieving
villagers to contribute a bit of this and a bit of that:

a couple of

carrots, a head of cabbage, even some meat. At last, they share the
tasty and plentiful stone soup, occasioning a general festival; the
soldiers spend the night in the best beds in the village, and depart
the next morning to exclamations of gratitude. 1
Despite first appearances, the story of stone soup is not a story
of making something from nothing. It is more precisely a story of
making something from something: ordinary soup from the ordinary
ingredients of soup. The recipe for stone soup calls for mobilizing and
realizing present possibilities, albeit possibilities that are blocked
by the situation. Stone soup is possible soup that is, under the

1. Marcia Brown, Stone Soup (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947). It seems
unlikely that the story's Christian subtext, from the search for room and food
at the beginning to the naming of the three soldiers as "wise men" at the
conclusion of the tale, is entirely coincidental in this text composed by a
Baptist minister's daughter.
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circumstances, impossible. Its impossibility under the circumstances
makes its being something extraordinary the precondition for its being
anything, however ordinary, rather than nothing. The completely
possible, ordinary soup becomes possible, but only in the form of the
extraordinary, completely impossible stone soup. The soup's very
impossibility is the indispensable ingredient that produces its
possibility.
As a tale of impossible social felicity made possible, Stone Soup
has a utopian flavor. It smacks of the anticipatory utopian
consciousness that according to Ernst Bloch surfaces persistently in
every cultural medium, from dreams and innocent entertainments to
developed programs for radical structural change. 2 Its ingredients - art,
in the form of illustrated text; religion, condensed in symbols and
allusions; images of subjective agency and collective action - make it
an appetizing introduction to a longer rumination on utopian discourse.
That longer meditation concerns the works of another trio of
thoughtful practitioners of possibility: Theodor W. Adorno, Luce
Irigaray, and Giorgio Agamben. It finds in these thinkers' texts the
construction of a "subject of possibility" capable of utopian
imagination and striving. This subject of possibility differs from the
classical subject of the western humanities, but can nevertheless
assemble and be informed by fragments of utopian promise. This subject
can, moreover, undertake the practice of cultivating the consciousness
to which those fragments give rise, and of elaborating their promise.
The discursive appeal to and construction of this subject of
possibility constitutes a timely mode of utopian discourse. Whether

2. Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, Vol. 3, trans. Neville Plaice,
Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
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that discourse, in effect, promises to make something from something in
the manner of stone soup, is the ultimate question of this study.
This first chapter introduces and outlines a rationale for the
presentation that follows. It first discusses the way this text uses
the terminology of "utopia" and "utopian discourse," and identifies
some recurrent themes connected with the idea of utopia. It then
discusses reasons for undertaking an examination of utopian discourse,
and for considering these thinkers' utopian discourse in particular.
Finally, it outlines the plan of the subsequent work, and identifies
the key issues that will structure the consideration of the individual
thinkers' texts.
Terminology
"Discourse" - In General
For the purposes of this project, "discourse" designates text that
represents ideas, and that generates those ideas in the course of
representing them.
Walter Benjamin claimed that all philosophy is "a struggle for the
representation of ideas.,,3 "Discourse" appears here as the medium of
that struggle, and the form in which its contending representations
appear. This project thereby affirms the possibility and value of
treating discourse as a representational form in the utopian case,
despite the ongoing "crisis of representation" that qualifies
Benjamin's claim, and that affects the appropriation of discourse by
postmodern readers. 4

3. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne
(London: Verso, 1998) 37.
4. There is by now a vast literature treating issues around representation
raised by postmodern understandings of text. For the early attack on
representational theories, see Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans.
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). A useful summary
discussion of issues related to representation is Pauline Marie Rosenau, PostModernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads and Intrusions (Princeton:

3

The sense of "discourse" as relatively extensive textual treatment
of some subject matter has long been familiar to the humanities. s The
use of the term "discourse" here sets this project in that framework
first of all, in contrast to one or another of the methods of discourse
analysis that characterize linguistics or cultural studies. 6 It signals
the use of a method that consists of a reading of text oriented by a
motivating concern, in this case by the question "What do these texts
say about [the idea of] utopia?"
Nevertheless, this project also embodies an understanding of this
discourse as participating in a larger discourse, in the sense of a
larger body of enunciations, more or less loosely governed by rules of
expression, which actively accomplish effects in a social milieu. That
understanding of discourse takes as given the sense of discourse as
generative or effective, which analysts since Foucault have brought to
the usage of the term discourse. Thus, while this project looks most

Princeton University Press, 1992). Helpful discussions of the relationship of
representational issues to text and interpretation occur in Teresa L. Ebert,
"Review: The Crisis of Representation in Cultural Studies: Reading Postmodern
Texts" American Quarterly 38 (Winter, 1986) 894-902; Jeffrey T. Nealon,
"Thinking/Writing the Postmodern: Representation, End, Ground, Sending"
boundary 2 20(Spring, 1993) 221-241; Steven Ward, "The Revenge of the
Humanities: Reality, Rhetoric, and the Politics of Postmodernism" Sociological
Perspectives 38 (Summer, 1995) 109-128; Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism:
The Demands of Holocaust Representation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2000); George Hartley, The Abyss of Representation: Marxism and the
Postmodern Sublime (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).
5. For one relatively recent and illuminating example of this usage, see
Barbara Herrnstein Smith, "On the Margins of Discourse," Critical Inquiry 1, no.
4 (1975): 769-798.
6. A general introduction to discourse analysis as used in the field of
linguistics is Gillian Brown and George Yule, Discourse Analysis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), where it generally refers to the specialized
analysis of language in use, in contrast to the analysis of more formal
properties of language considered in the abstract. The specialized method of
critical discourse analysis, or CDA, which has been seen as a boon to cultural
studies, is outlined in a number of sources by Norman Fairclough and others,
including Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity:
Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1999). General introductions to discourse and discourse analysis which include
assessments of the contribution of Michel Foucault's influential methods, and
which emphasize the reading of texts prevalent in the humanities, include Diane
Macdonell, Theories of Discourse: An Introduction (London: B. Blackwell, 1986)
and Sara Mills, Discourse (New York: Routledge, 2004).
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closely at specific textual instances from the larger utopian discourse
of the late 20 th and early 21 st centuries, it accepts certain basic
understandings that stern from the perception of discourse as a socially
productive site of the operation of power.
These premises have been outlined with particular clarity and
concision by Samuel R. Delany in an article that also constitutes a
reflection on the content of utopia and on the relationship of that
content to language and desire,

Rhetoric of Sex, the Discourse of

~The

Desire.,,7 These premises identify discourse as fundamentally linguistic,
structured, constructive, directive, and pervasive. In particular, this
understanding of discourse takes seriously the view that people corne to
understand what is being discussed, and to become able to recognize it
as a phenomenon of their world, by reading about it, participating in
conversations about it, and drawing inferences about it on the grounds
of the statements made and not made in the discourse. Implicit rules
that govern what meanings a particular word can and cannot assume, how
a particular word can and cannot be used in utterances that remain
intelligible, and which other words a particular term can and cannot
intelligibly combine with, constitute part of the operation of
discourse. The idea that the operation of discourse is one of the
routes both for the constitution and the contestation of power, and one
of the vehicles for the exercise of power, is running in the background
throughout this project. s

7. Samuel R. Delany, "The Rhetoric of Sex, the Discourse of Desire," in
Tobin Siebers, ed., Heterotopia: Postrnodern Utopia and the Body Politic {Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994} 229-272.
8. The basic theory linking discourse to power sterns from the work of Michel
Foucault. Representative works would include the early The Order of Things
[{London: Routledge, 1989}], and the late History of Sexuality [Volume 1: An
Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley {New York: Vintage Books, 1990}]. Foucault's
early critics concentrated on the tendency of this understanding of discourse
to dissolve useful lines of meaning mapped on to terminology, seen as important
for the pursuit of political projects. See for instance Nancy Fraser, "Michel

5

Methodologically this project relies on a kind of hermeneutical
"coasting," in the metaphorically nautical sense. It proceeds by
staying within sight of the shoreline of the surface meaning of the
text, with occasional stops for some limited etymological or
philological exchange. It recognizes, in order to avoid, the deeper
discursive waters trolled by archaeological, genealogical, or
deconstructive methods. In essence, it presents something approaching a
motivated commentary - an antique creative form, associated with forms
of contemplative reading practices characteristic both of religious
communities and of modernist aesthetics - on these texts. 9
Nevertheless, this method takes seriously the perspective that
discourse is a form of text-making that directly and indirectly
produces the referents around which it fabricates its texts. In that
sense, discourse and the making of texts are related to textiles, and
to the arts or crafts of transforming fibrous raw materials into
substances with visible surfaces that sometimes have utilitarian
functions as well as specific aesthetic effects. Io One of the central

Foucault: A 'Young Conservative'?" Ethics 96, no. 1 (1985): 165-184, and Roger
Paden, "Foucault's Anti-Humanism" in Human Studies 10, no. 1 Foucault Memorial
Issue (1987): 123-141. From the standpoint of this project, however, Foucault's
importance lies in the insight that power operates impersonally and
discursively, and in the applicability of that insight to various fields of
discourse, such as "fine art" or "religion."
9. On commentary as a creative form, see Giorgio Agarnben, Infancy and
History: On the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso,
2007), 160. On the relationship of commentary to the practice of religious
reading, see Douglas Griffiths, Religious Reading: the Place of Reading in the
Practice of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). On contemporary
secular efforts to revive commentary as a creative form, see Glossator:
Practice and Theory of the Commentary 1 (Fall, 2009),
http://ojs.gc.cuny.edu/index.php/glossator/issue/view/37, and in particular
Nicola Masciandaro, "Introduction," Glossator l(Fall, 2009) i-ii,
http://ojs.gc.cuny.edu/index.php/glossator/article/viewFile!510!552 (accessed
May 16, 2010).
10. Etymologically, contemporary English terms "text" and "textile" both
derive from Latin texere, to weave. Until recently, a "textile" denoted that
type of "fabric" produced by weaving. "Fabric," which derives from the Latin
faber, workman, could be produced by any of a number of methods other than
weaving, such as knitting, felting, or crocheting. Contemporary usage, which

6

questions of this project concerns the qualities of the idea "utopia"
that emerges from these participants' discourse around utopia.
Furthermore, insofar as this dissertation extends and elaborates
the discourse it studies, it does so as a self-conscious participant in
that discourse. For that reason, this discussion of discourse may also
be the place to mention - more accurately to confess - the guilt borne
by this project, and its own form,

in relation to the works it analyzes.

All discourse has some particular, identifiable form,

form being one of

those things that cannot take place "in general," but only in some
particular or other. An integral feature of all the works being
considered here is a principled break with certain conventional forms
of totalizing discourse, embodied paradigmatically by the academic
treatise. Subjecting these works to a study presented in that form
resembles a prima facie admission to not even having learned the first
thing from them, if not a willful repudiation of their wisdom. Pointing
out that these thinkers' works have all already been subjected to more
than one full-length academic study only constitutes the preschooler's
defense of "They started it," which is inevitably met with the grownup's answer, "Then you could have ended it."ll The argument that the
linear treatise form is kinder to the reader, a fact amply documented
by the texts under consideration themselves, merely diffuses the guilt
without mitigating it.

makes "textile" and "fabric" functionally synonymous, suppresses the ancient
distinction of the "weaver" versus the all-embracing "worker."
11. See, for example, Susan Buck-Morss, The Origins of Negative Dialectics:
Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: The
Free Press, 1977); Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine
(London: Routledge, 1991); Penelope Deutscher, A Politics of Impossible
Difference (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Catherine Mills, The
Philosophy of Agamben (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2008); Leland
de la Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2009).
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What hope for forgiveness in this matter may remain rests in the
narrow topical delimitation on which the dissertation form takes its
stand. The form of a whole assumed by a dissertation normally
incorporates a tacit recognition of its strictly partial character with
respect to that elusive knowledge that might justly lay claim to
wholeness. It frequently constitutes, as it does in this particular
case, something preliminary as well, however ultimate it appears from
at least one standpoint. 12 The claim to totality being made here extends
only as far as the boundaries of the project, which have tried to
respect the spirit of Tolstoy's moral advice. 13 For that reason the
presentation here may, as will be hoped, constitute more a clumsy than
an iniquitous departure from its teachers' instruction, metaphorically
speaking.
Specifically Philosophical Discourse
The discourse to be considered here is specifically philosophical
discourse. This is not automatically the case in a study of utopian
discourse, and deserves a brief word.
Benjamin's insistence that philosophy concerns itself with the
representation of ideas implies that even philosophical discourse is
intrinsically, albeit highly abstractly, aesthetic. The philosophers
under consideration here would share this view. That common outlook is
one reason to devote attention to their presentational concerns and
strategies.
Philosophy is a refuge for utopian thinking in the late 20 th and
early 21 st centuries. One argument that resurfaces in this study is that
12. "Every new beginning comes from some other beginning's end." Dan Wilson,
"Closing Time," in Semisonic Feeling Strangely Fine, MCA UK ASIN B0000062XN.
13. Tolstoy gives a lot of moral advice. The reference here is to the advice
implicit in the dramatic meditation on the ultimate futility of overreaching,
"How Much Land Does a Man Need?" Leo Tolstoy, "How Much Land Does a Man Need?"
in How Much Land Does a Man Need? and Other Stories, trans. Ronald Wilks
(London: Penguin, 1993) 96-110.
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the dystopian challenges of the 20 th and 21 st centuries are consequences
of basic patterns of thought. Philosophy is not necessarily a
liberating practice. Nevertheless, the radical reformation of
dysfunctional basic thought may constitute a pro-utopian political
practice, particularly insofar as it creates space for engaged utopian
expectation or imagination. In this respect, philosophy is a discipline
much like architecture, all the more so because basic thought is
something frequently encountered in a distracted and routine state. 14
These philosophers are each engaged in investigations that have to do
with pushing the limits of what thoughts can be represented in the
philosophical representation of ideas, given the relationship of
philosophical discourse to its understanding as representation, or to
the way philosophical forms come to be translated into ideas by readers
of texts. In a sense, these are philosophical texts that deal with the
philosophical equivalent of architectural problems like spanning long
rivers or deep gorges or attaching habitable buildings to the sides of
hills. Agamben's assertion that "only in the burning house is the
fundamental architectural problem apparent for the first time" links
that architectural figure to the basic problem of art in modernity, but
the metaphor could apply to philosophy as well. ls

14. See Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction," Marxists.org, www.marxists.org/reference/
subject/philosophy/works/ge/benjamin.htm, xv. According to Benjamin,
architecture is appropriated in a state of distraction. Here we are looking
into the "architecture" of western thought. The metaphor of architectural
revision makes a radical - in the etymological sense - claim. The task is to
move the bearing walls of thought.
15. Giorgio Agamben, The Man Without Content, trans. Georgia Albert
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) 115. Adorno includes comments about
functionalism in modern architecture as illustrative of the basic problem of
locating truth in a balance of elements, when it sometimes requires a
heightening of extremities. See Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans.
Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneappolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 44.
Irigaray talks enough about architecture, particularly in the context of the
Heideggerian house of language, to have inspired architectural texts devoted to
her implications for architects. See Peg Rawes, Irigaray for Architects (Oxford:
Routledge, 2007).
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This focus on philosophical discourse affects the understanding of
utopia that appears in this study. Utopia is most often understood as a
fictional narrative form,

and is sometimes defined as SUCh.
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This study,

however, focuses specifically on the emergence of utopia in
philosophical discourse, what Irigaray calls "the discourse on
discourse."n
"Utopia"
The understanding of discourse outlined above informs the use of
the term "utopia" in this project. For the purposes of this text,
"utopia" names an idea. If, as Walter Benjamin claimed, philosophy is a
struggle over the representation of a certain number of words, or names
for ideas, "utopia" is the name under consideration here .18 Philosophers
and their allies have struggled over the definitive or dominant
representation of that idea at least since the word was introduced to
the English language by Thomas More in 1516.
While the representations of the idea named "utopia" vary, their
contents and descriptions typically cluster near one or another of the
twin rubrics given by the dictionary: either a "state, condition or
place of ideal perfection" or a "visionary, impractical scheme for
social improvement.,,19 The philosophical struggle over the
representation of the idea of "utopia" entails in particular the
discourse that positions the word closer to one of those poles than the
other, that attributes this or that determinate content or
characteristic to the state or condition named "utopia," that suggests

16. Krishan Kumar, Utopianism. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1991) .
17. Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter with
Carolyn Burke (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985) 74.
18. Walter Benjamin, ibid.
19. Funk & Wagnal1s Standard College Dictionary (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc., 1966).
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what might be entailed in bringing about its ultimate achievement, and
that says which attitudes towards that achievement would be appropriate.
Understanding "utopia" this way emphasizes its nominal character.
That emphasis postpones some problems of reference that arise when
utopia is considered differently. If "utopia" is taken to designate a
substantive, a "state, condition, or place," the question of its
ontological status can quickly take center stage. Utopia as an
existential or empirical entity can, however, appear only as a lack or
an absence, at best a phantasm, in any event "meaningless" or
oxymoronic from an analytical perspective, and disqualified a priori as
an object of knowledge or, even more controversially, truth. Asking
about the properties of such a non-entity would be incoherent; asking
whether those properties are desirable or not would be ludicrous. If
the emphasis rests on "utopia's" status as a place of "ideal
perfection," debates about the accuracy of that epithet, based on this
or that property, can derail a preliminary inventory of qualities. If
"utopia" purportedly designates some potentially realizable state or
condition, a number of other distracting questions, related to the
problem of passing from imaginary to actual, arise. Attention shifts to
whether "utopia" already actually exists in an alternative space, might
actually exist but does not exist at present, simply ought to exist, if
so where it exists, and so on.
Emphasizing "utopia's" nominal character only postpones, rather
than resolves, all these essential ontological, ethical, and political
problems, which lie beyond the scope of this study. Eventually, all the
questions return, as questions about the status of the object of
discursive representation, or about the relationship of discursive
representation to an actual or imaginary entity, or the criteria for
the defensibility of a given representation, or the relationship of
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some discursive treatment to this or that praxis. Before they do,
however, this study of some specific properties of a portion of the
discourse around utopia will, it is hoped, have had time enough to
glean its insights.
This text, then, avoids the general question of the relationship of
an image to an empirical model. It does not attempt to determine
whether a specific proposed arrangement does or would actually
constitute a realization of utopia, in the sense of a concrete state or
condition in which people are actually happy. It sets aside questions
related to the accurate assessment of utopian claims. Instead, it
confines itself to an examination of how three thinkers have treated
the idea of utopia, and in particular how they have constituted the
subject of utopian discourse and practice, in select works. 2o
The nominal treatment of utopia outlined here also constitutes a
departure from the study of utopia as a form of fictional narrative or
as a form of social experiment. An argument implicit in this project is
that the utopian idea can, and does, emerge in forms other than that of
narrative fiction or experimental enclave. It also surfaces as a vital
reference point in the philosopher's struggle to "think the break" with
the context of philosophy from within that context. 21

20. Avoiding the question of the assessment of utopian claims is not meant
to suggest that the question itself is not important. A good argument might be
made that it is perhaps the most important question related to utopian
discourse. It is not, however, the first question, nor the question this
dissertation sets out to answer.
21. Adorno claims dialectics is the effort to break out of the objective
context of delusion from within. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans.
E.B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1995), 406. Fredric Jameson argues that the
function of the utopian text, understood as a developed fictional form in
contrast to political exhortation or "great prophecy," is to force its readers
to "think the break" that constitutes the imaginable alternative to a closed
system of reference presented as having no other. Fredric Jameson,
Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science
Fictions (London: Verso, 2005), 231-232.
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Even this nominal treatment does, however, sometimes register a
second sense of the term "utopia." Normally, "utopia" in this text
names the idea, represented in discourse, of a state, condition, or
place with desirable properties, variously described. Occasionally,
however, "utopia" can designate a projected cultural achievement. That
cultural achievement typically takes the form of a pattern of social
relations, that is being pursued in light of some version of that idea.
This concession finally proved unavoidable. The idea named "utopia," as
represented in utopian discourse, frequently includes the element of
its own cultural or political achievement. From time to time, then, it
becomes necessary to mention the ineluctably related idea of people's
wanting or trying to achieve it, for instance by undertaking an
intentional utopian praxis, or by acting in the direction of "utopia."
In general, formulations like "utopian striving" or "utopian praxis"
refer to the pursuit of "utopia" as an achievement, one that takes the
form of a pattern of social relations. Making reference to that pursuit
does not automatically imply a conviction that any particular pursuit
of utopia could or would succeed, or that the particular version of
utopian achievement pursued is actually worth pursuing. It points out
that sometime, somewhere, someone might have some conviction like that,
and might do something about it.
While "utopia" names an idea, "utopian discourse" does not
necessarily invoke that name. This project has paid attention first of
all to these thinkers' explicit references to "utopia." Its goal has
been to situate those references within the context of each thinker's
project, and to discern the relationship of each thinker's treatment of
the idea of utopia to that project. In pursuing that goal, it has drawn
as well on texts that contribute to the communication of an idea that
might aptly be named "utopia," even where that idea appears incognito.
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Backstory - Established Features of Utopia
The notion that an idea can appear incognito only makes sense if
there are criteria for recognizing that "idea other than by name.
Criteria like that can arguably be provided by the idea's historical
associations, in the case of an idea with a history. The idea of utopia
does have a history, beginning with its appearance in Thomas More's
fictional Utopia. Some content has been assigned to the idea of utopia
in the course of that history, and constitutes a starting place for
developing something like a field guide to the utopian concept. That
guide to the utopian concept will help in discerning utopian themes as
they "flit through" the work of Adorno, Irigaray, and Agamben, or as
they come together to form a "legible constellation" that amounts to
utopian discourse in texts that avoid the name of utopia. 22
The field guide developed here emphasizes some aspects of the
utopian tradition more than others. This section provides some
additional background for the utopian features that play the largest
part in the reflections that follow. These include three features in
particular: the relationship of utopia to place and time; recurrent
themes in utopia's characteristic content; and the extent to which
utopia itself can become the object of representation. With respect to
the content of utopia specifically, the discussion focuses on the three
rubrics of

"happiness," "desire," and "the negation of the negative,"

or the idea of "suffering overcome."
Utopia as Place
Utopia is ineluctably associated with space and time, as "place."
The very name "utopia," as is widely known, derives from the Greek

topos (place), which compounded with the Greek negation ou (no, not)
22. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans.
E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1974) 87; Negative Dialectics, 407.

14

-

- -

----------

reads more or less literally "no-place.,,23 Thomas More himself announced
the play on words encoded in the Greek source of the name by voicing
the wish that this Utopia, no-place, might some time become a Eutopia,
good place. 24 Less often mentioned by commentators is another Greek
possibility, iou, a genitive signifying "of poison" or "of rust," which
could make of the yet-to-be-decided u-topia someplace even more
negative than no place at all.
The identification of utopia with a fictional place does not
resolve the question of the relationship of utopian place to that which
its audience inhabits, even when one takes into account "the well-known
shift in Utopias from space to time, from the accounts of exotic
travelers to the experiences of visitors to the future. ,,25 In particular,
the question perennially arises of whether utopia could coincide with
the place and time of "here and now" or "the real world.,,26 The problem
with every potential answer lies not only in the indeterminacy of
utopia. The place and time of the "here and now" or "real world" is at
least equally complicated by its discursive associations. Jameson has
asserted that utopia relates to the present as "disruption," in its
function of forcing an imaginative engagement with the rupture between
what appears to be a closed system of signification (the here .and now,
the ideologically-specified real world) and any utopian alternative. 27
The practical political question of the relationship of utopian space
23. The place name Utopia did not "literally" mean "no place" in the English
of its day, while in Greek u Torro~ is literally incomplete. Louis Marin reads
this nominal undecidability as different from ambiguity, which would apply to a
"univocal name," and as signifying the operation of the specifically utopian
form of neutrality. Louis Marin, Utopics: Spatial Play (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, Inc., 1984), 91.
24. Thomas More, Utopia, trans. Paul Turner (London: Penguin Classics, 1965)
27.
25. Jameson, ibid., 1-2.
26. See among others J.C. Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of
English Utopian Writing 1516-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983);
Marin, ibid.; Kumar, ibid., 25; Jameson, ibid.
27. Jameson, ibid., 231-2.
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and time to the place of what people popularly take to be the real is
evaded by a utopian "secession" that marks the utopian text's otherness,
and that permits - indeed, that forces - a "thinking of the break" that
would be effectively repressed within the dominant symbolic order if it
were to take another form.
Michael Rothberg argues that Adorno's use of the term "nach

Auschwitz," after Auschwitz, generates a new, specifically late modern
and potentially postmodern chronotope. That is, it constitutes the
"simultaneity of spatial and temporal articulations in cultural
practices" that was the essence of Mikhail Bakhtin's organizing concept
of chronotope. 28 A similar argument applies in the case of utopia. The
mention of "utopia" functions chronotopically, as a fusion of space and
time that establishes both an essential discontinuity and an essential
continuity. The discontinuity of the utopian with the "here and now,"
as being not-(here-and-now), highlights the contrast of utopia with the
space-time of the here-and-now. Nevertheless, utopia always entails an
essential and inescapable failure of discontinuity, because this
negation of the here-and-now is nevertheless known and knowable, and is
for that reason precisely not the full negation of the here-and-now. 29
Like a single character in a television farce impersonating another, so
that both characters cannot appear together in space and time without
catastrophic denouement, the utopian chronotope is constructed around a
removal from "real" space and time along at least one, if not both,
dimensions. This utopian removal, however, which presents itself as a
complete antithesis of the situation of its enunciation, always
28. Michael Rothberg, Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust
Representation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). On the
concept of the chronotope, see Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and the
Chronotope in the Novel: Notes Toward a Historical Poetics," in The Dialogic
Imagination: Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and
Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) 84-258.
29. Jameson, ibid., in particular 170-181.
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incorporates a specific relation of accessibility to this situation.
Its here-and-now audience can imagine itself there-and-then, by a
corresponding, determinate displacement - e.g., an earlier or later
birth date, or a trip to the distant location

that leaves its here-

and-now consciousness unaffected, but for its access to the utopian
scene. Utopia thereby depends upon its depiction as accessible to
inhabitants of the here-and-now, though exclusively in an imaginative
way.
The innate connection of utopia to place and time makes it
reasonable to check for the operation of utopian discourse in the way
issues of place and time surface in texts by Adorno, Irigaray, and
Agamben. And as will become clear, while these philosophers do not
address issues of space and time through the same narrative forms
identified in Louis Marin's and Fredric Jameson's analyses of fictional
utopian texts, these thinkers' utopian discourse reflects the
chronotopic nature of utopia by operating in part through their
treatment of the categories of space and time.
Utopia as the Place of Happiness
Since utopia as a chronotope is a place, a socially articulated corelation of time and space, the question arises as to what kind of
place utopia is. One emphatic touchstone of the utopian place is
happiness.
The specific association of the name utopia with the idea of a
place of happiness is as old as Thomas More's suggestion that the state
or condition that was "Utopia" or "No-place" actually qualified for the
epithet "Eutopia" or "Good place," "Happy place." More explicitly links
utopian happiness to the goals of the western philosophical and
theological traditions, through his inclusion of a Utopian verse which
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asserts the superiority of Utopia over Plato's Republic. 3o The happiness
associated with utopia is the very happiness or flourishing,

eudaemonia,

that has been the goal of proper ethical and political order in the
west since Plato's Republic and Aristotle's ethics. Utopia's claim to
superiority is here secured on grounds reminiscent of the medieval
theologian's ontological proof, the logic according to which the
greatest good imaginable must exist, since the greatness of what can be
thought apart from its existence is exceeded by the greatness of that
which can be thought of as having existence. 31 Since ultimately the
contemplation of the greatest imaginable good entails eternal bliss,
More's Utopia appears to point both to the philosophers' and the
theologians' greatest imaginable happiness. 32
Although some analysts of utopia emphasize the centrality of
elements other than happiness as definitive of the utopian condition,
happiness is a recurrent touchstone of the utopian. Fabulous hedonistic
utopias, like the Land of Cockaigne or the Big Rock Candy Mountain,
have their foundation in the unalloyed happiness that presumably
consists in the complete and effortless fulfillment of physical needs.
Ernst Bloch includes what he terms "French happiness," an intense state
30. Utopia priscis dicta ob infrequentiam / Nunc Civitatis aemula Platonicae,
/ Fortasse victrix (nam quod ilia literis / Denlinavit, hoc ego una praestiti,
/ Viris et opibus, optimisque legibus) / Eutopia merito sum vocanda nomine.
"The ancients called me Utopia or Nowhere because of my isolation. At present,
however, I am a rival of Plato's republic, perhaps even a victor over it. The
reason is that what he had delineated in words I alone have exhibited in men
and resources and laws of surpassing excellence. Deservedly ought I to be
called by the name of Eutopia or Happy-place." Thomas More, Complete Works (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), Vol. IV, 20-21; cited and translated in
Marin, ibid., 91.
31. Utopia's detailed literary existence also resonates with one of the
early objections to that logic. That objection, developed by an otherwise
obscure Benedictine monk, Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, depended on the absurdity of
thinking that the existence of a certain Lost Island, which came to be known as
Gaunilo's Island, was proved by its status as the "most excellent" island.
Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, "Pro Insipiente," in First Philosophy: Fundamental
Problems and Readings in Philosophy, Vol. III God, Mind and Freedom, ed. Andrew
Bailey (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press, 2004) 26-28.
32. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300)
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 303.

18

of the delight of the senses, and joy, the "aristocracy of happiness,"
as "images of the fulfilled moment" that describe the utopian
imagination. 33 Fredric Jameson cites the words of the doomed youth
Arthur in Roadside Picnic as a "brief glimpse" of the "impossible and
inexpressible Utopian impulse," albeit an impulse that cannot be
disentangled in its literary form from its various anti-utopian
complications:
UNSATISFIED!

"HAPPINESS FOR EVERYBODY, FREE, AND NO ONE WILL GO AWAY

"34

Happiness, in other words, acts as one familiar and well-attested
thematic marker of utopian discourse. Invocations of the realization of
happiness, its pursuit, and its difficulty of achievement may for that
reason signal the operation of utopian discourse. Examples would
include Adorno's reference to "complete happiness," and its denial, in
the concluding sections of Negative Dialectics, or Irigaray's
projection of "a felicity within history" as one goal of a political
praxis attentive to the implications of sexual difference. 35
Seen in this way, as the land of happiness, utopia emerges as the
end not only of influential currents in the western intellectual
tradition's ethical, political, and theological endeavors, but arguably
also in its artistic or aesthetic practices. Where Stendhal claims
beauty is only the promise of happiness, Adorno identifies that promise
as definitive of art generally.36 The happy utopian end of these

33. Bloch, ibid., 937.
34. Jameson, ibid., 295; Arkady and Boris Strugatsky, Roadside Picnic, trans.
Antonina W. Bouis, Cryptomaoist Editions, 126, http://www.cca.org/crn/ (accessed
May 21, 2009).
35. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 404; Luce Irigaray, I love to you: Sketch
of a Possible Felicity Within History, trans. Alison Martin (New York:
Routledge, 1996).
36. "Stendhal's dictum of art as the promesse du bonheur implies that art
does its part for existence by accentuating what in it prefigures utopia."
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 311. "Stendhal's dictum" is presumably the
frequently-quoted definition of beauty found in the work On Love (De l'amour)
by the 19 th -century writer Marie-Henri Beyle, pen-name Stendhal, namely "La
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endeavors embodies the dual sense of end as aim and as culmination and
conclusion.
That equation raises a concern about the identification of utopia
with happiness. With respect to art, for instance, Adorno claims "If
the utopia of art were fulfilled,

it would be art's temporal end. ,,37

Jameson notes that the putative "end of art" is part of the radical
depersonalization and detemporalization that gives rise to concerns
about Utopian boredom and "fear. ,,38 Whether the achievement of utopia
would really spell the end of all art, it seems likely to entail the
end of the novel.
The suspicion that happiness would put a stop to the effort, or
struggle, embodied in art and other reflective activities sterns from a
particular - modern and postmodern - understanding of happiness. That
understanding views happiness as the antithesis of alienation. For that
reason, the experience of happiness seems to be at odds with the selfconsciousness required for conceptualization and activity, including
the conceptualization of and the striving for utopia. Adorno, e.g.,
insists that the experience of happiness lies in the moment; it is
perceptible only in retrospect, as something irretrievably past, and
the "only relation of consciousness to happiness is gratitude: in which
lies its incomparable dignity.,,39 Happiness, in this account, is an
intrinsically unknowing experience that excludes what we think of as
"consciousness," with its structure of the knowing subject, the known
object, and the separation between them.
beaute n'est que la promesse du bonheur." (Beauty is only the promise of
happiness.) For a discussion of the slippage between Stendhal's "beauty" and
Adorno's "art" see James Gordon Finlayson, "The Work of Art and the Promise of
Happiness in Adorno," World Picture 3: Happiness, proceedings of the 2009 World
Picture Conference, October 23-24, 2009, Oklahoma State University,
http://www.okstate.edu/worldpicture/ (accessed March 22, 2010).
37. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 32.
38. Jameson, ibid., 182-184.
39. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 112.
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If Adorno is correct, and if utopia is taken to be a place of
happiness, it affects the chronotopic character of utopia. To the
extent that utopia is an experiential chronotope, an articulation of
space and time that supports experience, and if the experience it
supports specifically excludes "consciousness," the hallmark of the
epistemological subject, the subject of knowledge, than utopia can have
no knowing subject. From this perspective, that subject's relation to
utopia is of a perpetual contemplation of the interior of the candy
shop through the constitutive barrier of the shop window.
Moreover, when utopia is understood strictly as a place of
happiness, almost everything about utopia remains unspecified.
Consulting the conditions for happiness, as these are given by the
experience of happiness, provides a fragmentary and episodic account of
Bloch's "images of the fulfilled moment," rather than the detailed
specifications that are associated with utopia's familiar generic forms.
The systematic efforts that have been made to analyze the conditions
for happiness in the course of the elaboration of western ethics,
politics, art, and religion, in seeking to grasp the universal or
background conditions for a general happiness, miss the concrete,
conjunctural, even idiosyncratic qualities of the modern experience of
happiness.
The problem with happiness as the content of utopia is further
complicated by the particularity of its social and historical
determinants, again as seen from the vantage point of modernity. The
chief goal of most civilization has been to ensure that those who fail
to uphold the basic canons of commendable conduct will experience
misery in this life and fearfully expect additional and overwhelming
misery in whatever world may lie ahead. The thesis that civilization
rises on a foundation of renunciation and alienation, and that the
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abandonment of this renunciation and alienation would promote the
happiness or pleasure people associate with immediate gratification,
already contains the germ of the insight that only within a particular,
concrete social and historical conjuncture, private as well as public,
do people acquire the affective and symbolic equipment to experience
happiness as such.4o This history makes human happiness very largely if
not entirely contingent on what society and our learning of it, through
all available channels, has invested with the quality of being able to
produce happiness. All particular utopian discourse will prove, on this
argument, always already bound to the images of the fulfilled moment
provided and authorized by the larger discourse of which it is a moment.
Utopia as Desire
The understanding that happiness is conjunctural and historically
mediated has not always dominated discussions of happiness as it does
today.41 However, the contemporary understanding of happiness points
towards the need to consider desire, and its local determinants, in
relation to the content of utopia. That exploration resonates with more
recent thematizations of utopia as well.
Ruth Levitas proposed to define utopia as "an expression and
exploration of desire" in her now-classic work The Concept of Utopia. 42
In that work, Levitas argues the need for a definition that will
accommodate the various formal treatments of utopia, from detailed
utopian fiction to sociological analysis on the order of Mannheim's
Ideology and Utopia, and that will span the different possible emphases
evident in discussions of utopia. Earlier theorists had emphasized

40. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, trans. James Strachey
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1961).
41. Finlayson, ibid.
42. Ruth Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1990), 191.
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either form, content, or function; Levitas sought a definition that
would account for variations in these emphases across time. She
concluded with the assessment that:
Utopia expresses and explores what is desired; under certain
conditions it also contains the hope that these desires may be
met in reality, rather than merely in fantasy. The essential
element in utopia is not hope, but desire - the desire for a
better way of being. 43
Where Bloch had presented the principle of hope as the ubiquitous
utopian principle in human culture, Levitas was willing to identify the
expression of desire, even desire that knows itself to have no hope of
fulfillment,

as utopian.

Levitas' definition of utopia as desire, according to Fredric
Jameson, was instrumental in transforming utopian studies into a
coherent sub-discipline. 44 That effect surely carne, at least in part,
from the peculiar resonance it established between a definition that
made desire itself central and the postmodern preoccupation with desire
itself as an object of fascination and contemplation. This
preoccupation, in turn, sterns from the status of desire as a phenomenon
whose concept brings together Hegelian-dialectical roots, Lacaniandiscursive theoretical trajectories, and Debordian-spectacular,
consumerist actualizations and implications. 45 All contemporary
understandings of desire emphasize its discursive character. Some lend
credence to the position that postmodernity realizes the conditions for
a "meta-utopian" condition in which different, even incompatible,
utopian visions can be accommodated and pursued simultaneously.46

43. Ibid.
44. Jameson, Archaeologies, note p. 2-3.
45. Madan Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and
Postmodernism, 2 nd edition (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1993), 1726, 93-97.
46. See Leonard Harris, "Postmodernism and Utopia, an Unholy Alliance," in
Racism, the City, and the State, ed. Malcolm Cross and Michael Keith (London:
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An acute fictional commentary on the notion of the desire-defined
meta-utopia appears in Ursula K. LeGuin's "The Ones Who Walk Away From
Omelas."n In that story, "Ornelas" appears initially as a selfconsciously utopian and explicitly meta-utopian construct; while it is
almost impossible to describe, it is explicitly open to a variety of
imaginative constructions and to significant pluralism of desire, along
with its satisfaction. The problem with the meta-utopia of Ornelas,
however, is a single, central jarring element that vitiates its utopian
claim in the eyes of the people who walk away. That problem is the
society-wide conscious acceptance of a quantum of perpetual,
constitutional suffering imposed on a speechless and uncomprehending
other. The utopian solution in Ornelas fails, at least from the
perspective of the ones who walk away, precisely insofar as it founds
itself on this suffering. LeGuin's tale dramatizes another,

traditional,

theme associated with the idea of utopia, which will prove central to
the discourse studied here.
Utopia as the Negation of Suffering
Both the idea of utopia as a place of happiness and that of utopia
as an expression and exploration of desire presuppose and include the
idea of utopia as a place unmarred by suffering. This project, in
particular, finds the negation of suffering to be paradigmatic with
respect to the utopian discourse it explores. Sometimes, the idea of
the negation of suffering appears directly. Importantly, however,
insofar as utopia emerges as an image or representation of an idea
related to happiness or desire, these representations also incorporate

Routledge, 1993) 31-44; Patricia J. Huntington, Ecstatic Subjects, Utopia, and
Recognition: Kristeva, Heidegger, Irigaray (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).
47. Ursula K. LeGuin, "The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas," in The Wind's
Twelve Quarters (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) 275-284. The story was
originally published in 1973.
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the negation of suffering, presented under the aspect of the negation
of a negative as a positive. That is, utopian happiness, or utopian
expressions of desire, inevitably emerge as positively tinged visions
of the negation of suffering.
The negation of suffering itself in its utopian form, true to the
chronotopic character of utopia, predictably fuses a temporal dimension
with the site of utopia. Suffering may appear as "having been overcome
at last" or "never again to be" or even - in the case of those utopias
proj ected into the past - "not yet having been. "48 It is arguably the
temporal dimension ascribed to this negation, and in particular its
imaginable prospective character, that has made the association of
utopian imagination and ideas of "progress" or "revolution" as strong
as it has sometimes seemed. Fredric Jameson's analysis, which finds the
utopian form intrinsically non-programmatic or non-strategic, also
comments on the unparalleled political interest that attaches to the
utopian literary form. The persistent political relevance of utopia
seems to depend precisely on this non-programmatic and emphatic display
of an imaginable alternative to the "unspeakable world that is."49
Utopian negation of suffering stands in a clear relationship to the
satisfaction of desire, even though it is not identical to that
satisfaction. For that reason, recognizing utopia as the idea of the
negation of suffering extends rather than abandons Levitas's insight
into the desirous character of utopia. Desire has long been regarded as
a form of suffering by philosophers and theologians. 50 The etymological

48. For the notion of utopias projected into the past, see in particular
Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922).
49. Jameson, ibid., 232; Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 403.
50. Stoics, Epicureans, and Buddhists agree that desire fuels the fires of
suffering. See Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in
Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Susan R.
Garrett, No Ordinary Angel: Celestial Spirits and Christian Claims About Jesus
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derivation of passion in the Greek verb pathein, to suffer, is
reasonably well known. Utopia functions as the imaginative
transformation of that desirous suffering, such that the "expression
and exploration" of desire identified by Levitas amounts to giving a
positive form to the negation of suffering. Suffering appears, then, as
the

ma~erial

from which utopia takes its shape.

The material that is suffering has some peculiar characteristics,
especially when compared with the accounts of desire given in the
western theoretical tradition. Desire in that tradition arises from a
specific lack of a desired object; that is, desire in its structure
elaborates the relationship of sUbjectivity to absence. Most recently,
the relationship of desire and lack has been theorized in Lacanian
psychoanalytic thought. These theories, too, link desire to lack or
absence. 51 This original relationship gives rise to the question of
whether a positive desire, based on pleasure or happiness without the
mediation of suffering, is even possible.
By recognizing this relationship, the argument here is that issues
of desire necessarily arise in conjunction with experiences of
suffering, even if it is the awakening of desire itself that gives rise
to the awareness of suffering. The choice to focus on the aspect of
suffering and the involvement of suffering in the constitution of
utopian discourse, however, in preference to that of desire has some
important consequences. First, it responds explicitly to emphases
present in these theorists' works, which take up suffering as an

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Roger Corless, The Vision of Buddhism:
The Space Under the Tree (New York: Paragon House, 1990).
51. Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A feminist introduction (London:
Routledge, 1990); Darian Leader and Judy Groves, Introducing Lacan (Cambridge:
Icon Books, 2001); Jacques Lacan, My Teaching, trans. David Macey (London:
Verso, 2008).
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explicit theme. More importantly, however, it shifts the terms of the
question of the representation of utopia, and the concept of utopia.
The shift in terms is precisely that of a shift in what has to be
represented, and the presence of concrete content in that
representation. Desire, following Lacan, is a property of the symbolic
order. Its movements are motivated within a symbolic system that only
permits the operation of desire in an alienated and distorted way.
There is a permanent schism between desire and need, or the counterpart
of the Lacanian real, what would amount to the unthematized concrete.
What this means in the case of utopian representation is that
projections of the character or content of utopia themselves always
already presuppose a particular, socially-imposed or regulated,
systematization of what may be desired, what can appear as desirable.
This will officially fail to disrupt the system itself, with its
prohibitions and permissions. This will be true even, or perhaps
especially, when it is the organization of this symbolic order that
produces specific symptoms of suffering.
Suffering, on the other hand, anchors desire in the concrete and
objective. As Adorno says, "suffering is objectivity that weighs upon
the subj ect. ,,52 Thus, while utopia does indeed "appear abstract amidst
concrete things," its relationship to suffering invests this abstract
image with an intrinsic and inescapable concreteness. 53 Thus the very
idea of utopia participates in the name-like structure of Adorno's
"concept," or "thought," which contains in its innermost cell that
which is not thought, not abstraction. 54 This concrete cellular
character of utopia, which it stubbornly maintains in every guise in

52. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 83.
53. Ibid., 57.
54. Ibid., 408.
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spite of its imaginary and abstract mode of appearance, constitutes a

-

central feature of utopian discourse and remains at the center of the
analysis here.
Suffering and its enformation in utopia further renders utopia,
while abstract in its form as a negation of suffering, concrete in its
contents as a body of suffering which concrete human subjects cry out
to have negated. Following Ernst Bloch, and in contradistinction to
post- or anti-humanist trends, this project takes seriously concrete
individual human subjects, as sufferers, dreamers, and imaginers of
alternatives. 55 An underlying premise, which will be honored albeit
sometimes tacitly and implicitly, is that the materialistically and
pragmatically understood subject of the humanities, the human subject
of such things as lost car keys, mortgage payments, and reading a
bedtime story to a child, is deeply concerned in the prospects for
utopian discourse, and whatever conceivable and possible pro-utopian
activity. This concrete subject is neither, precisely, the universal
subject of enlightenment reason, nor a collective subject, but is
always whatever particular and concrete human subject, whose specific
predicates or qualities matter, though they mayor may not identify the
subject in a definitive way.56 More to the point, this outlook with
respect to the subject might be called a conventional understanding of
the everyday and popular-philosophical understanding of the human
subject. Difficulties with the theoretical formulation of this subject
notwithstanding, this understanding amounts to an assertion that
someone like this subject still has to be considered theoretically as
55. See in this regard Douglas Kellner, "Ernst Bloch, Utopia and Ideology
Critique," Illuminations, http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kelll.htm
(November 17, 2009).
56. The important subject of suffering, and of the concern with utopia, may
then coincide with Agamben's "whatever singularity" as discussed in The Coming
Community. Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
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well as practically, and still ultimately has to be at least one of the
actual subjects both of theory and of praxis.
utopia as Unrepresentable
Russell Jacoby identifies a stream of utopian thought he labels
"iconoclastic" utopianism that contrasts with what he terms "blueprint"
utopianism. Jacoby's blueprint utopians are those that, like Thomas
More, describe the utopian scene in minute detail. The iconoclastic
utopians, in contrast, avoid detailed images. Jacoby theorizes that
these utopians, deeply influenced by Jewish messianic thought and
schooled by the Torah's ban on images, developed their utopian
expressions in an anti-pictorial direction. He explicitly includes
Theodor Adorno as an iconoclastic utopian thinker. For such utopians,
the place of happiness is unrepresentable for reasons having to do with
the need to avoid falsifying the picture of utopia by fixing it in a
particular, static, and ultimately idolatrous form.

57

Utopia is arguably unrepresentable for reasons beyond Jacoby's
thesis, however. One argument is that utopia, to be different enough to
be worthwhile, must be so different that its representation would be
unintelligible. 58 The prohibition on images may have been reimposed for
historical and political reasons. On this argument, what can be
expressed in the idiom of the current symbolic structure is ipso facto
already reconciled to it and consequently offers no hope for its
radical redemption. So utopian discourse itself has to borrow a page
from Adorno's aesthetic theory: utopian discourse has to depend on
texts that are utopian without talking about utopia, texts that paint
the absence of the positive they want to evoke, or texts that explore

57. Russell Jacoby, Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian
Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
58. See Jameson, Archaeologies, 107-118.

29

new modes of communication which, because they cannot rely on easilyunderstood linguistic forms,

flirt with unintelligibility.

Utopian discourse for these philosophers constitutes and embodies a
response to the threat to happiness posed by a premature closure of the
world, a closure that results from fixation on prescribed and at some
level irrational ideas. The paramount question facing anyone who wants
to assert the possibility of utopian imagination becomes the
identification of a space, an imaginable potentially utopian space, and
a time, an imaginably potentially fruitful and productive time, to
which citizens, residents of the present, have access or might yet gain
entree. This space and time forms an alternative to the extant or
observable world. Some feel this space is widening in post-modern times,
perhaps as a consequence of Derridean indefinite deferral of
conclusiveness, of Foucauldian contention with respect to knowledge, or
of the proliferation of interstitial subject positions. Perhaps they
are right, and these developments are not superficial textual practices
with restricted substantive impacts on material lives. 59 If so, the
widening of the possibilities for utopian thinking may be the gift
post-modernity has given to the future. That gift, if it is a gift, has
come in the wake of some losses for those who have had to live through
post-modern times' deconstructive throes.
The Subject of Utopia
One of the most widely lamented casualties of these deconstructive
moments, as well as one of their most celebrated victories in other
camps, has been "the subject," with or without an index like Cartesian,
humanistic, or centered. The subject, as it appears in contemporary
literature, is a vague term with a wide scope; in a particular context,

59. See Huntington, Ecstatic Subjects.
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it might embrace anything from the Kantian transcendental subject of
knowledge to the decentered postmodern individual. This "inherent
ambiguity of the term goes some way to explaining its popularity and
productivity.

,,60

Its use in postmodern texts, however, almost inevitably

excludes, or explicitly challenges, the self-centered, self-aware,
rational and realistic subject of experience and autonomous agency
portrayed in rationalist philosophy, modern novels and economics
textbooks.

61

One sense, of particular relevance to a motivated reading

of texts, is that of the grammatical subject, the substantive that
performs the action of the verb. A subject of this kind undergoes the
experience of something, or bears the description of a predicate,
discursively. This grammatical and discursive subject can imply
distinct subject positions, which readers of texts may recognize, or
with which they may identify. From this perspective, the subject of
utopia - as if there might be only one such subject - would be the
substantive, and by extension, really or in imagination, the actual
site of the experience of utopia.
Considerations of the usage of "subject" in contemporary social
theory typically ignore or bypass another possible sense of the term,
one more familiar in the context of the humanities. "Subject" can be
used as in the sense of "subject matter," the thematic aspect of human
experience interpreted through the form and content of some work of

60. David Macey, The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory (London: Penguin
Books, 2000) 368-369.
61. For an overview of positions related to the "death of the subject" in
the social sciences and critical theory, and their implications for social
theory, see Rosenau, ibid., 42-61; Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postrnodern
Theory: Critical Interrogations (New York: Guilford Press, 1991) 283-294. For
one lengthy discussion of the development of understandings of subjectivity and
their relationship to concrete social forms, incorporating a recognition of
their utopian moment, see Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative
as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
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art. 62 This usage preserves an echo of the pre-modern philosophical
understanding of the term as "substance," present in the world, and
contrasted to the mental concept, or object, of that substance. The
"subject of utopia" in this sense would designate utopia considered as
something to discuss, to write about, or perhaps even to endeavor to
construct.
In the study that follows, "the subject," whether of utopia or of
something other than utopia, will most often refer to a soft-focus
superimposition of the discursive subject on the remnants of the kind
of substantives mentioned in connection with suffering, who are
protected by committees on research involving human subjects, and who
might from time to time read the kinds of texts being discussed here.
It takes as given that these subjects are collaborative, autopoietic
constructs of language and practice, who make themselves, and are made
by one another, individually and collectively, through complex and
ongoing practices. Whether these subjects have a chance of becoming
subjects of utopia is one of the questions utopian discourse might be
expected to address. How that question comes to be answered in these
writers' utopian discourse is one of the questions of this dissertation.
The question is whether utopia can be the object of conscious
experience. In other words, can utopia have a subject, either in the
sense of a consciousness that knows utopia as utopia, or in the looser
sense of a human subject living a happy life.
Utopian Discourse in the Theatre of the Humanities
The extended reflection on utopian discourse presented in this text
situates itself in the larger context of the western humanities. This
is true in spite of the "post-humanist" tenor of some of this discourse.
62. See F. David Martin and Lee A. Jacobus, The Humanities Through the Arts,
6 th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004) 35-36.
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In particular, the problems being addressed by these theorists
correspond to the anti- or post-humanistic tenor of the early 21 st
century. This circumstance, along with the circumstance that the text
serves a utilitarian purpose with respect to the humanities, call for a
few words outlining the relationship of this reflection to the context
of the humanities.
The images of utopia that are the central object of reflection in
this text, including the abstract verbal ones that discourse creates,
have specific properties of interest from the perspective of a more
encompassing relationship to the humanities. In particular, these
images of an "impossible place" or a topos outopos, a place that is
nowhere, bring together considerations from different corners of the
humanistic field. In the arrangement of these themes displayed in
images of utopia, it is sometimes possible to discern underlying
structural similarities and relationships among these different areas.
As images, the images of utopia considered here immediately
participate in the realm of art, or aesthetics, understood as a system
or systems of representation, in particular the representation of
beauty.63 Some utopian images are, at least arguably, presented as
images of beauty by their authors. Considerations relevant to the
analysis and understanding of art, particularly literary art, are
relevant to any reflection on utopian discourse as imagistic discourse
constructing a representation of an idea. The notion that aesthetic
criteria are inapplicable to a consideration of texts that have been

63. Bryan S. Turner, "Introduction," in Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque
Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Sage
Publications, 1994) 1-36; Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, "Introduction,"
in Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns, eds., Philosophies of Art and Beauty:
Selected Readings in Aesthetics From Plato to Heidegger (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1976) xiii-xix.
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categorized as philosophical is, moreover, challenged explicitly by
each of these authors.
As images that include suffering as their subject matter, in the
form of its negation, or in the temporalized form of its having-beennegated, this discourse demonstrates particularly clearly the
transformation of material that takes place in the process of producing
a particular aesthetic form.

64

This transformation characterizes the

working-out of the artistic idea in general. It is never foreign to the
working-out of ideas in textual form, which can be presented generally
as a poetic practice, whether or not the final form of the text can
qualify as poetry in the strict sense. The image that is utopia, as an
image of suffering transformed into happiness, constitutes an initial
and significant effort to come to terms with suffering in the concrete,
and to imagine its resolution. While this imaginative transformation
remains partial, questionable, and abstract from the standpoint of
discrete and concrete subjects of suffering, it is an indispensable
moment of any actual artistry involving suffering.
Utopias, as images that present the form of the having-beenovercome of suffering, participate in an ancient artistic project, that
of making real and present, or at least visible, discernible, and
tangible, the highest goOd. 65 These avowedly secular images of utopia
then qualify as the descendents of early art produced in the service of

64. The recognition of the intrinsic content of suffering in art is one of
the central holdings of Adorno's aesthetic theory. "All that art can do is to
grieve for the sacrifice it makes and which it itself, in its powerlessness,
is." Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 52.
65. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "The Philosophy of Fine Art," trans.
F.P.B. Osmaston, in Hofstadter and Kuhns, ibid., 378-445, 388; E.H. Gombrich,
The Story of Art (London: Phaidon Press, 2006) 37-47; James Elkins, On the
Strange Place of Religion in Contemporary Art (London: Routledge, 2004) 5-12.
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the sacred. Utopia qualifies as a secular treatment of a fundamentally
religious aesthetic program. 66
Because of the relationship of utopia, generally as image and
specifically as image of the highest good, to the western tradition and
in particular the Jewish tradition of aniconic monotheism, utopian
images themselves skirt the frontiers of idolatry, on one hand, and of
prophetic imagination and announcement on the other. The problem of
discernment posed by the enunciation of discrepant prophetic messages,
of how to know idolatrous false pronouncements as false and to know the
true word emanating from the holy as true, bedevils utopian images as
well, and poses problems for the assessment of these images. 67 The
problems associated with the discernment of the "rational" or
"reasonable" character of utopian imaginings relates to this problem of
warding off idolatry. However, the problem of making a fetish of
certain forms of rationality, which revert to irrationality and
barbarism, arises in the context of utopian images as well. 68
The images that are utopias embody aspirations towards epiphany as
part of their artistic concept. They have for their material the
concrete substance of human life; they depict its transformation as a
formal substitute for the alteration of that substance that is
concretely desired. The images that are utopias are situated peculiarly
at the conjunction of various modal (must, can, could, shall, should,
66. So the proximity of sacrifice to the aesthetic image, as referenced by
Hullot-Kentor in his introduction to Kierkegaard: Construction of the
Aesthetic, takes on a deeper significance. See Robert Hullot-Kentor, "Foreword:
Critique of the Organic," Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the
Aesthetic, trans. R. Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1989), x-xxiii.
67. A classic presentation of the problem in Biblical literature occurs in
Jeremiah 27-29.
68. See Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment:
Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) on the problem of rational
irrationality, its roots in mythic religious impulses, and its relationship to
the production of images and the reproduction of culture.
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might, will, would, imperative, subjunctive, positive, declarative,
interrogatory), temporal (now, once, later, sometime, never, again) and
spatial (here, there, elsewhere) possibilities for relating being, nonbeing, and becoming. The discussion of the relationship of being, nonbeing, and becoming constitutes the contemporary terminology of
epiphany - the "sudden appearance of the divine" - as the authentic
manifestation of presence or the alchemical transformation of base
existence into something altogether finer.
Relevance of Utopia in the Late 20 th Century
It makes sense to focus on the work of late 20 th century figures
because the late 20 th century period poses specific challenges for
utopian discourse, on all fronts. The image character of utopian
presentation becomes problematic. Whether a fundamentally metaphysical
idea like utopia can continue to be advanced in a "post-metaphysical"
age becomes questionable. The significance of the linguistic character
of utopian representations makes utopian imagination increasingly
vulnerable in an age in which the resistant quality of language and its
always already constitutive character make everything done with and in
language suspect. Ontological concerns call utopian imagination into
question as a refuge of metaphysics. Nominalist nihilism and pseudopragmatic positivism foreclose more and more avenues of access to a
plausible consciousness of potentiality. From the standpoint of the
possible rehabilitation of utopian discourse and a possible innervation
of pro-utopian praxis in the contemporary period, the discourse that
grapples with these challenges is the discourse that requires
understanding and comment.
Reasons for the Choice of These Thinkers
This project has come to revolve around the work of three
particular late-20 th -century philosophers, Theodor W. Adorno, Luce
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Irigaray, and Giorgio Agamben. These three philosophers together form a
satisfyingly complex and striking chord based on common key concerns
and chromatic variations in philosophical lineage, methodological
approach, and points of focus.
All are distinctly late modern or postmodern thinkers. This
historical proximity is relevant for at least two reasons. They are
acutely aware of the role of history in the formation of human
consciousness and, beyond that, of the subconscious, the wellspring of
desire. The idea that desire itself, the inner nature of the human
person or individual human subject, is affected by history, both
personal and social, is a given for these authors. Most moderns share
this idea. It makes the discussion of utopian possibilities even more
complicated than it already was for the early modern utopians, as
already noted.
All are also sensitive to and interested in the role of language in
the process of conceptualizing the object of desire. In this regard,
Adorno, though sometimes identified as the quintessential high
modernist, already points towards the "linguistic turn" that so
pervasively haunts the postmodern age. All these thinkers accept that
consciousness is shaped and given to us in and through language. All
also affirm that there is something that nevertheless escapes the net
of language. They each adopt the simple but vexing stance that language
communicates, or arises for the possibility of communicating, something
that differs from language that ,eludes representation within it. Their
refusal to abdicate this position unites all these thinkers, and impels
them to their ultimately utopian positions. All are committed to the
position that there is something people are trying to do with language
that relates to perceiving as well as to making the world. With due
respect for the ways language itself creates the world in which its

37

speakers and writers live, these thinkers refuse the position that what
we have access to through ordinary language exhausts relevant reality.
All would regard that quintessentially anti-utopian position as a form
of collusion with fundamentally oppressive forces. All would agree that
the human ability to imagine more desirable, even ideally desirable,
alternatives to the present is - at least possibly and at times - a
form of knowledge, as well as an indispensable condition of human
freedom.
Perhaps predictably, all of these thinkers struggle with issues of
essentialism, its possible and necessary limits and its possible and
desirable retention. Paul Tillich has argued that a certain irreducible
minimum of essentialism is a requirement for utopian thinking.69 These
thinkers endeavor to locate the liberating core of essentialism that at
the same time escapes the imprisonment of rigid necessity, that
exhibits possibility. All three thinkers draw in complex ways on the
Platonic notion of the ideas. All three thinkers engage with the ghost
of Heidegger. 7o All, as will become clear, devote significant energies
to aesthetic themes. All their texts are marked by a use of religious
imagery that might be surprising in the work of such resolutely secular
thinkers.
All three thinkers confront the basic dilemma of how much to rely
on human desire in formulating strategies for the desirable human world,
and in thinking about what that world would be. More precisely, perhaps,
all three struggle with how, precisely, to rely on desire. The project
of the negation of suffering must rely on desire. Nevertheless, desire
is known to be unreliable and potentially treacherous thanks to its
69. Paul
Expectation
70. This
negatively -

Tillich, "The Political Meaning of Utopia," in Political
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971) 137.
project will approach this troublesome Heideggerian connection
that is, by avoidance - whenever possible.
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historical and linguistic constitution. The degree to which and the
ways in which it is unreliable are hidden. Moreover, every response to
desire - reliance, suppression, repression, cultivation - has pitfalls.
The critical question is how to proceed in a way that takes both
dialectical moments, the one of the trust and the one of mistrust of
desire, equally seriously.

How might it be possible to desire

something like utopia, and simultaneously to temper desire by various
practices that also cannot simply be trusted? How, in other words,
might it be possible to cultivate something like "wisdom" with respect
to utopia?
These thinkers are primarily concerned with focal projects other
than utopia:

the theorization of the relationship of the

epistemological subject and object, the systematic interrogation of the
androcentrism of the western philosophical paradigm, elucidating the
root of bio-power-politics in the very notion of political sovereignty.
Nevertheless, their projects lead them into the territory of utopian
reflections. These reflections disclose the problematics of possibility.
Their efforts to resolve the difficulties associated with it, and in
the course of this resolution, to establish some reason to believe that
there might be hope for processes that could bring about a world that
does not yet exist, in which certain pressing problems are resolved,
engage all three thinkers in utopian discourse.
A critical comparison of Adorno, Agamben and Irigaray that focuses
specifically on the utopian dimensions of their work also makes sense
in the context of current scholarly interest on these thinkers. That
each of these thinkers displays utopian features is well-known. That
this utopian thinking crucially informs their projects is appreciated
to differing degrees, but deserves to be more widely and deeply
appreciated in each case. A comparison of these thinkers' approaches
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and insights in thinking about the possible human world does not yet
exist, and could be of genuine interest to scholars concerned with the
work of each of these thinkers individually, as well as to scholars
interested more generally in contemporary thought in the areas of
aesthetics and religion.
Adorno
Adorno invokes the category of utopia explicitly. Adorno's own
utopian thought has not attracted the full attention it deserves, and
has not become the subject of study in its own right. The relative
neglect of Adorno's utopian thinking among utopians may be the
consequence of a commensurate focus on other, more accessibly utopian,
German thinkers by scholars of utopia:

Marcuse, Adorno's fellow

Frankfurt School theorist, was for many years more accessible to
English-speaking readers, and posed a clearer case study in utopian
thinking, while Ernst Bloch could hardly be ignored as the central and
influential German Marxist theorist of utopia. 71 In spite of Bloch's
explicit and acknowledged influence on Adorno, and in spite of Adorno's
own significant reflections on utopia and his nuanced and precise
alternative to Marcuse, there has yet to be a dedicated focus on Adorno
as a utopian thinker.72
Adorno's own rhetoric is sufficiently pessimistic that early
readers identified him more as a dismal nay-sayer than a seeker after
hope. This, indeed, was Gillian Rose's guiding thesis in her study of
Adorno. For Rose, Adorno is driven to the study of philosophy not
71. Vincent Geoghegan, Utopianism and Marxism (London: Methuen, 1987); Ruth
Levitas, ibid.
72. Adorno himself identified Bloch's Spirit of Utopia as a lasting
influence on his own thought. See Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative
Dialectics (New York: The Free Press, 1977) 4. Fredric Jameson's treatments of
Adorno's utopianism occur as an element in the context of wider reflections on
utopian thought, or in the context of the extended treatment of Adorno's late
thought as a whole. Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence of
the Dialectic (London: Verso, 1990); Jameson, Archaeologies, 172-175.

40

because it offers deep and abiding hope for the future of humankind in
desperate times, but because it is the only possibility, and because
Adorno is looking for something that has the promise of effectiveness,
in spite of not finding it yet. 73 This is the Adorno remembered for
denying the possibility of poetry after Auschwitz.
But as the brilliant and dedicated Adorno scholar Lambert
Zuidervaart points out, this admittedly prominent side of Adorno's
social thought is not the only one. Zuidervaart cites rhetoric like
Adorno's stirring paean to the folly of art in the closing metaphysical
meditations of Negative Dialectics and insists that "[iJf the ongoing
assessment of Adorno's social philosophy does not address such passages,
it will not truly have begun. ,,74 Zuidervaart's wide-ranging and
comprehensive work, in fact, organizes central currents in recent
Adornian scholarship, from Menke's efforts to read Adorno's aesthetics
through the frame of Derridean deconstruction, through the gathering
critiques of Adorno's views on popular culture and the limits on his
wholesale dismissal of popular culture as oppressive, to a
consideration of Adorno's relationship to Heidegger on one hand and
Habermas on the other. 75 Most central for a consideration of Adorno as a
utopian thinker, however, is Zuidervaart's assessment of the efforts to
read Adorno as a postmetaphysical thinker and to recontextualize his
metaphysics as a dialectic of suffering and hope, as well as his
lengthy and (it must be suspected) theologically-motivated critique of

73. Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of
Theodor W. Adorno (New York: Macmillan, 1978).
74. Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy After Adorno (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 201. Zuidervaart cites Adorno's statement
that ~Folly is truth in the shape that human beings must accept whenever, amid
the untrue, they do not give up truth" (Negative Dialectics 404, as translated
by Zuidervaart)
75. For the discussion of Derrida, see Christopher Menke, The Sovereignty of
Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida, trans. Neil Solomon (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1998); Zuidervaart, ibid.
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Adorno's success in combining these elements in a philosophical
treatment of the late 20 th -century situation. 76
Zuidervaart's implicitly theological critique of Adorno's
metaphysics points to another aspect of contemporary scholarly
treatment of Adorno, which is less explicit in Zuidervaart, namely, the
identification of religious themes in Adorno's work, and the difficulty
of treating these themes. Brian O'Connor notes those, and is at pains
to distinguish between religious rhetoric and religious commitment in
Adorno's work. He notes that Adorno's use of religious thematics is
made more possible by his strictly secular philosophical commitments. 77
Rent de Vries somewhat similarly identifies Adorno as approaching the
limits, in the context of a secular philosophy, of the boundaries of
subject-object experience, which drives his philosophy in a theological
direction. 78
This latent and troublesome religious dimension in Adorno's work
has been noted before, in particular by Susan Buck-Morss in her early
work on Adorno's Negative Dialectic. There Buck-Morss traces the
influence of the "early Benjamin, " which "incorporated structural
elements from such seemingly remote sources as Jewish mysticism,
Kantianism, Platonism, and German Romanticism," on Adorno's mature

76. Zuidervaart, ibid., 48-76. Zuidervaart identifies one difficulty with
Adorno's thought as his provision of a strictly "negative utopia." In this he
echoes his contemporary critics as well, notably Siegfried Kracauer, who
faulted him for inadequately utopian thinking. See Lorenz Jager, Adorno: A
Political Biography, trans. Stewart Spencer (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004) .
77. Brian O'Connor, Adorno's Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the
Possibility of Critical Rationality (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), see
especially 165-173.
78. Hent de Vries, Minimal Theologies:
Critiques of Secular Reason in
Adorno & Levinas trans. Geoffrey Hale (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2005). For de Vries, this imperative is similarly evident in the thought
of Levinas, working with the same fundamental philosophical problem within a
different philosophical framework, phenemenology vs. dialectics.
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masterwork. 79 Martin Jay, however, goes further and attributes a direct
influence of rabbinical Judaism on Adorno's later philosophy.8o From the
standpoint of a consideration of the utopian dimensions of Adorno's
thought, in particular, this element of his thinking becomes
significant, as utopian theory itself is significantly thematized, at
least in western European culture, through the symbols and texts of
Judaism and Christianity, the thematics of the world to come and the
City of God. 81
More recently, a resurgence of interest in Adorno has focused most
intently on his aesthetics and his social thought. O'Connor, one of the
leading lights in this resurgence, attributes it to the new
availability of more reliable texts in translation, which has led a
rise in the popular reception of Adorno's work in the American academy.
O'Connor stresses the transcendental form of Adorno's philosophy, and
makes much of his affinities with, and at the same time, highly
specific differences from, Heidegger. 82 O'Connor's analysis presents
Adorno as addressing the same central philosophical problem as
Heidegger - that of the structure of experience - from the
epistemological rather than the fundamental ontological side. O'Connor
shares Adorno's conviction that the epistemological approach succeeds,
in the end, where Heidegger's ontological approach fails. 83 This
conclusion is significant for an assessment of Adorno's utopian
79. Buck-Morss, ibid., Xlll; see also S. Brent Plate, Walter Benjamin,
Religion, and Aesthetic: Rethinking Religion Through the Arts (New York:
Routledge, 2005), who attributes Adorno's "monadic" concept of the work of art
to Benjamin's theologically-influenced aesthetics.
SO. Martin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
Sl. Dorothy F. Donnelly, Patterns of Order and Utopia (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1998).
82. O'Connor, ibid.
83. This analysis, if correct, points to one possible source of the tensions
between Adorno and his erstwhile professor Paul Tillich, with whom he
nevertheless shares some significant insights and commitments, in particular
views about the centrality of the category of expectation and the role of "the
critique of idolatry."
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discourse, because it suggests that Adorno's utopian thought must be
understood as pointing towards praxological, world-trans formative
activity oriented towards arriving at understanding, rather than under
the rubric of a different mode of being ..
Adorno's aesthetics is another area in which his utopian leanings
are widely seen, but less widely analyzed. Robert Hullot-Kentor in
particular notes the utopian contour of Adorno's thought in Aesthetic
Theory, and links it to Adorno's sense of a clear value ordering with
respect to aesthetic works. According to Hullot-Kentor, Adorno's vision
of aesthetic order gives·us permission and motivation to ".

act on

the impulse to protect ourselves, or our imagination anyway, as the
power over possibility,

from what otherwise uses that power, second by

second almost, to break in on us and to defeat that possibility. ,,84
Agamben
The works of Giorgio Agamben, an Italian thinker, have only
relatively recently emerged in English. Scholarly commentaries in
English on Agamben's work are scarce, and those that exist outside the
periodical literature deal primarily with his later political works,
like Homo Sacer, rather than his earlier works on aesthetics. 8s It is
clear nevertheless that Agamben's work struggles with the same themes
as Adorno's: the nature of the relationship between subject and object;
the possibilities for metaphysical thinking in an allegedly postmetaphysical era; the aesthetic and theological legacies of Benjamin

84. Robert Hullot-Kentor, "Right Listening and a New Type of Human Being,"
in the Cambridge Companion to Adorno, ed. Tom Huhn (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 181-197, 196.
85. See Andrew Norris ed., Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on
Giorgio Agarnben's Homo Sacer (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005);
Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli, eds., Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and
Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Thomas Carl Wall, Radical
Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). The first
dedicated treatment of Agamben's aesthetics in English is William Watkin, The
Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis (New York: Continuum, 2010).
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and Heidegger; the possibility of a just politics; the contribution of
artists and thinkers to the pursuit of that politics. Adorno's position
vis-a-vis the linguistic turn might be questioned; Agamben's cannot be.
Agamben's project centers on the identification of philosophy, at least
since Plato, with the struggle to comprehend the elusive matter of the
unnamable creative possibility that seems to lie just back of or within
what goes by the name of language. 86 The comparison of Adorno's and
Agamben's modernist and decidedly postmodernist approaches to the
conceptualization of a possible world promises to be illuminating.
Commentators who have approached Agamben's work have generally
ignored its utopian dimensions. His treatment of sovereignty, and his
approach to passivity, have so far attracted most attention. This is
remarkable, however. In The Coming Community Agamben points to
possibilities for transformation of the political realm; that he is
attempting to work out an understanding of these possibilities that
preserves the diversity of their singular human subjects seems beyond
question.

87

Similarly, the persistent religious dimension of his thought,

from his treatment of Pauline messianism in The Time That Remains to
his invocation of Talmudic and Trinitarian thematics in the Coming
Community, failed to generate immediate comment. This is in spite of a
growing recognition of the phenomenon of "post-secular" thought, to
which Agamben clearly contributes. 88 An explication of Agamben's utopian
thinking, which proceeds in a profoundly negative and "iconoclastic"
way, is long overdue.

86. Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1999), in particular "The Thing Itself," 27-38 and
"The Idea of Language," 39-47.
87. Agamben, The Coming Community.
88. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to
the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey {Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005};
Philip Blond ed., Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology
{London and New York: Routledge, 1998}.
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Irigaray
Neither Adorno nor Agarnben devote sufficient attention to gender.
If for no other reason than the fundamental inadequacy of a
consideration of utopia, the horizon of human possibility, that fails
to consider the role of gender, it would be necessary to raise the
issue of gender vis-a-vis these thinkers. Beyond that consideration,
however, the work of Luce Irigaray bears significantly and prolifically
on precisely the matters being considered by both Adorno and Agarnben in
their different registers: the constitution of the subject, the
subject-object relationship, and the implications of the structure of
that experience for human knowledge - both of what is, and of what
might be or become; the role of language as the mediation of this
experience; and the possibilities for the reality, or realization, of a
better world of human experience. Significantly, Irigaray is explicit
in her inclusion of corporeality and desire in her work. Both of these
dimensions are unavoidable in the work of Adorno and Agarnben as well.
According to at least one reader, the consequences of this inclusion
are far-reaching. "Woman becomes visible in her absence, disrupting and
instigating the rereading of the whole discursive history of
subjectivity."e9 That would seem to make Irigaray required reading for
scholars interested in the utopian dimensions of thinking about the
relationship of subject and object.
Scholars repeatedly note Irigaray's utopianism. 90 Huntington, in
particular, draws on Irigaray specifically as a utopian thinker, with a

89. Simon Patrick Walter, "Situating Irigaray," in Philosophy and Desire, ed.
Hugh J. Silverman (London: Routledge, 2000), 111-124, 111.
90. See Whitford, ibid.; Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical
Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law (New York: Routledge, 1991); Patricia J.
Huntington, Ecstatic Subjects; Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, An Ethics of Dissensus:
Postmodernity, Feminism, and the Politics of Radical Democracy (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2001); Rachel Alsop, Annette Fitzsimmons, Kathleen
Lennon and Rosalind Minsky, Theorizing Gender (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002);
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significant debt to Heidegger, and argues that Irigaray "repeats .
two Heideggerian mistakes in attentuated form," namely, a lack of a
dialectical approach and a perpetuation of a model of transgression as
a "negation of what is.,,91 If she is correct, there is much to be gained
by setting Irigaray into dialogue with Adorno in particular.
Like Adorno and Agamben, Irigaray draws on religious and
theological resources in her work,

famously so; unlike them, she

celebrates the possibilities of re-conceptualizing the divine "in the
feminine gender" as an explicit dimension of her pro-utopian project. 92
In so doing,

Irigaray makes explicit the religious implications and

involvements of utopian discourse. The religious dimensions of
Irigaray's work are, again, commonplaces. Nevertheless, a sustained
consideration of the relationship of her religious thought to the
utopian content of her philosophy seems not to have been undertaken by
scholars, who seem more likely to be interested either in Irigaray's
possible relevance for secular politics, or for Irigaray's relationship
to feminist theology, but not the relationship between the two.
Critiques of Irigaray as essentialist and clandestinely
heteronormative may require tempering. 93 More appreciative readers
perceive Irigaray as pragmatically utopian and strategically hyperbolic
in her extravagant claims about feminine jouissance. 94 Tina Chanter and

Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
91. Huntington, ibid., xxx.
92. Serene Jones, "Divining Women: Irigaray and Feminist Theologians," Yale
French Studies 87 (1995) 42-67; Alison Ainley, "Luce Irigaray: Divine Spirit
and Feminine Space," in Post-Secular Philosophy: Between philosophy and
theology, ed. Phillip Blond (London: Routledge, 1998) 334-345; Morny Joy,
Kathleen O'Grady and Judith L. Poxon, French Feminists on Religion: A Reader
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
93. Alsop et al., Theorizing Gender; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism
and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999).
94. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation; Pheng Cheah, Elizabeth Grosz, Judith
Butler, Drucilla Cornell, "The Future of Sexual Difference: An Interview with
Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell," Diacritics 28:1 (Spring, 1998) 19-42;
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Margaret Whitford,

from different angles, insist that Irigaray's fabled

essentialism is more apparent than real, an artifact of literalist
misreading on the part of her second wave feminist critics. 95 More
recently, Penelope Deutscher has extended this line of reading to a
consideration of Irigaray's implications for multiculturalism, and the
politics of diversity, concluding that Irigaray's project involves the
effort to rethink egalitarian politics from the standpoint of
differences rather than sameness. 96 A critical comparison of utopian
discourse seems precisely the context in which to examine these claims
and possibilities.
As noted, there is arguably an irreducibly essentialist element to
any utopian thinking, which may speak to the purpose behind Irigaray's
apparent essentialism in treating sexual difference. 97 Nevertheless, it
is perilously possible to misspecify the human essence that underwrites
the arguable rationality of utopian thought. The perennial discourse
about the possibility of man's [sic] pursuit of the good life vividly
demonstrates the peril. Irigaray's frankly provocative work centering
on the philosophical, linguistic, poietic, religious, and political
implications of sexual difference counterbalances the neglect of gender
in the work of Adorno and Agamben.98 In short, the possibilities for
insight that emerge in bringing these deeply related and strategically

Dorothy Leland, "Irigaray's Discourse on Feminine Desire:
Literalist and
Strategic Readings," in Philosophy and Desire, Hugh J. Silverman, ed. (New York:
Routledge, 2000), 125-139; Alison Stone, "The Sex of Nature: A Reinterpretation
of Irigaray's Metaphysics and Political Thought," Hypatia 18:3 (Autumn, 2003)
60-84.
95. Whitford, ibid.; Tina Chanter, Ethics of Eros:
Irigaray's Rewriting of
the Philosophers (New York and London: Routledge, 1995).
96. Deutscher, ibid.
97. Tillich, ibid.
98. Gender is admittedly not the same category as sexual difference, and the
conflation of the two here is a dangerous - but at least partially alert convenience. See Alsop et al, Theorizing Gender; Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic
Subjects (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
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different thinkers together, focused on the practically as well as
theoretically important horizon of utopia, are promising.
Transcendence
Many of the discursive themes shared by these thinkers, including
those of utopia, religion, and art, are connected to one another by
their relationship to the idea of transcendence. In particular, these
themes touch on the question of whether and to what extent
transcendence or something like it is possible and intelligible. The
idea that people can know of and desire something that truly and
irreducibly arises in some meaningful sense "from elsewhere" or "from
outside" the world of everyday existence surfaces repeatedly in
religious consciousness, in artistic endeavor, and in the utopian
imagination. The same idea in its various guises plays a vital role for
these thinkers.
We might say that each thinker's work explores the question of how
to draw the mental map of a post-metaphysical epoch in such a way that
it could still include utopia. 99 Each of these thinkers, moreover,
locates a similar method for this mapping, appropriate to a revised
understanding of transcendence. This understanding takes shape in the
course of an exploration of the uncharted territory of the concrete,
material aspect of transcendence, impelled by an insistence that a
space for something like transcendence must be held open, as the space
of a possible "redemption" (Adorno), "outside" (Agamben), or creativity
(Irigaray). In effect, these thinkers focus on re-thinking the central

99. An apparent generic requirement for texts dealing with utopia is the
citation of Oscar Wilde's aphorism, penned in 1891, "A map of the world that
does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at," with or without the
rest of the sentence: " . . . for it leaves out the one country at which
Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and
seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias."
Oscar Wilde, "The Soul of Man Under Socialism," in The Soul of Man Under
Socialism and Selected Critical Prose (London: Penguin Classics, 2001) 141.
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relationship of transcendence to immanence that structures the legacy
of western metaphysics. 100
Utopian discourse takes place, in this context, as a special form
of the much older discourse on transcendence, being practiced under new
terms and on new terrain, but with similar imperatives and impediments.
As a result, it is subject to similar limitations. One of these is the
requirement that whatever discourse advances as descriptions of the
ideal not prevent a subsequent recognition of that ideal in radically
unanticipated concrete forms. Jacoby's insight into the "iconoclastic"
utopian tradition informed by messianic thought is relevant here.
The prohibition on images or Bilderverbot does not address the full
complexity of the situation facing this utopian discourse, however.
Another element of the complex problem of representation is the problem
of exclusion, as a linguistic and philosophical problem that is also a
looming pragmatic ethical and political problem. Human life that
relates to what differs from it by exclusion poses an ever-present
threat to life generally. For Adorno and for Agarnben, both of whom
situate themselves explicitly as "post-Auschwitz" thinkers, this everpresent threat of exclusion is symbolized acutely by Nazi anti-Semitic
totalitarianism and its lethal exclusion of the Jews. In Irigaray, what
is excluded constantly takes the as-yet-unrealized form of Woman, or
women-as-subjects; that exclusion, too, has lethal consequences, not
alone for Woman but for Humanity and Life. The problem of exclusion, as
well as of desire, connects by-now familiar conceptual outposts: the
subject and the subject's relation to its object or objects; nature and
its relationship to culture; language; death; time; space.

100. For one discussion of the relationship of transcendence to immanence in
western metaphysics, see Noelle Vahanian, Language, Desire, and Theology
(London: Routledge, 2003).
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The philosophical representation of the idea "utopia" names poses a
difficult and delicate task. The utopian image is not only prohibited,
it is necessary, ineluctable, and impossible. A simple non-dialectical
avoidance of representation will not suffice, even if it could be
sustained, which it cannot be. The feat to be performed includes the
ineluctable discursive representation, its critical self-awareness as
representation, its self-limitation or discipline as necessarily
partial and erroneous, and its self-assertion, both as forthright
critique of a dystopian and ideological context which effectively
nullifies such critical representations, and as perspicuous insight
into the situation's need and potential for change. The feat required
is more precise and more challenging than Adorno's remark that the
contemporary philosopher "must know how to wish. ,,101 It is like the tasks
assigned to the protagonists of fairy-tales, who must find the land
between sea and shore, for instance, or corne to the trial neither by
night nor by day. In the case of utopian thought, the task is to
understand the relationship of the inconceivable subject of utopian
happiness to the unimaginable object of utopian longing.
The Matter of Messianic Light
Theodor W. Adorno, in the conclusion to his exilic work Minima
Moralia, links an evocative image to the problem of utopian
representation:
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised [sic]
in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as
they would present themselves from the standpoint of
redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world
by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique.
Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the
world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as
indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the
messianic light. 102
101.
102.

Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 407.
Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247.
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Adorno's "messianic" language here does not indicate his anticipation
of a concrete liberator, whether the Messiah awaited by pious Jews,
Christians or Shi'ite Muslims, or the figure who, in the theologicalpolitical words of a young Walter Benjamin, alone "consummates all
history, in the sense that he alone redeems, completes, creates its
relation to the Messianic. "103 For Adorno, the concrete question of
whether that Messiah will one day arrive to usher in the redeemed world
is explicitly beside the point. The possibility that matters is that of
thinking what would be thought under the banner of the messianic. 104
That banner has an unabashed metaphysical provenance. A Messiah or
messiah can simply denote a liberator, particularly in the context of a
national political struggle. The term "messianic" may even be extended
to anyone or anything that effects a partial liberation or long-awaited
reform. That looser, extended use of messianic language, however, owes
its utility to the original development of the messianic idea within
the context of religious tradition. The sacred narratives and popular
elaborations, divine figures and interventions, and the expectation of
supernatural blessings, reversals of injustice, and restoration of loss
and damage that govern the strict usage of the term continue to color
its metaphorical use. Metaphorical Messiahs and loosely messianic
events may no longer have anything to do with anyone's God, and mayor
may not accomplish the end of human history. They do, however, continue
to have something to do with liberation, with the end of injustice and

103. Walter Benjamin, "Theologico-Political Fragment" cited in Jacob Taubes,
The Political Theology of Paul, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2004) 70. Taubes goes on to emphasize the distance between
Benjamin's early, earnest treatment of "the Messiah" and Adorno's standpoint in
the passage from Minima Moralia, which Taubes identifies with German Idealist
aestheticism.
104. "But beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the
reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters." Adorno, Minima
Moralia, 247.
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the achievement of happiness and peace, and with the perfection of the
world in which people find themselves living together as members of a
single community. Moreover, just as the faithful of whatever religious
tradition expected the Messiah to come from the neighborhood of the
divine, the weaker modern "messianic" still seems to bring its new age
from somewhere outside the closed system of this one. Messianic light
retains a tinge of something metaphysical.
Even loosely messianic expectation is an expectation of something
new, something strictly speaking unexpected. Penelope Deutscher, in The
Politics of Impossible Difference, discusses the contradiction involved
in this expectation. On one hand, people know what to expect when they
expect liberation or a better world. On the other, because what they
are awaiting is something new, they cannot possibly know what to expect.
Even when people have an idea of something like the results they hope
to enjoy, an idea of the injustices they hope no longer to see, and so
forth, even then they cannot have a perfectly clear and distinct idea
of what is to be expected from radical change. This contradiction is
what makes the situation of messianic expectation "impossible" in
Deutscher's terms. It also differs, in her analysis, from what she
distinguishes as "messianism," a political movement that identifies the
messiah with a particular figure or program. Such messianism, according
to Deutscher, instead of acknowledging its own impossibility, disavows
it. That disavowal makes messianism dangerous, in a way that selfconsciously impossible messianic expectation is not. lOS
Deutscher's analysis of the messianic parallels Fredric Jameson's
assessment of the impossibility of utopian expectation in Archaeologies
of the Future. Utopian imagination, too, faces the specific

105. Deutscher, ibid., 105.
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impossibility associated with the inability to imagine something that
would amount to fundamental change. The more fundamental and complete
the difference between the current situation and its utopian
alternative, the less accessible that alternative becomes to
imagination and contemplation. In fact, there is a chance that the
present contemplating a utopian future, or the immediate context
contemplating an alternative utopian location, cannot identify
genuinely beneficial alternatives as pleasant or desirable. The
predicaments facing messianic expectation and utopian imagination
parallel one another.
The parallel may help explain the deep affinity between these two
strains of thought, which historically and culturally have sometimes
coincided powerfully. Ample evidence supports the historical link
between more traditional messianic expectation and utopian theories and
programs, particularly in 19 th century Europe .106 The utopian discourse
of these three late 20 th century philosophers is another occasion in
which messianic language expresses utopian themes.
Adorno is not the only one of this trio of thinkers whose thought
sometimes takes up messianic language. Agamben engages with the
language of the messianic explicitly and extensively, as for instance
in his search for the possibility of "something like a messianic
communi ty" in his analysis of the Epistle to the Romans. 107 Durantaye
calls Agamben's enigmatic treatment of the "messianic" the central idea
of Agamben's philosophy of potentiality. 108 While Irigaray does not
invoke "the messianic" explicitly, her readers repeatedly spot
messianic themes in her work. Penelope Deutscher, for instance, invokes
106. Michael Lowy, Redemption and Utopia: Libertarian Judaism in Central
Europe, trans. Hope Heany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).
107. Agamben, Time That Remains, 2.
108. Durantaye, ibid., 366.
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the notion of "the messianic" in her analysis of Irigaray's politics,
while Margaret Whitford sees a "'messianic' Coming" along with other
terms drawn from the language of religion coding her call for a "new
era" in An Ethics of Sexual Difference. 109
The loosening of messianic usage, and the parallels apparent
between this looser usage and the classic dilemmas of utopianism,
encourage the effort to treat this link between messianic and utopian
discourse seriously. The language of "messianic light" not only
resonates with the thinking of each of these thinkers, it incorporates
common themes that bring their individual contributions to utopian
discourse into conversation with one another. Aside from the longstanding connection of messianic themes and utopian discourse, and
aside from the privileged use of light as a metaphor for understanding,
questionable as that usage is, "messianic light" has additional
interesting properties. It is matter; it captures the material emphasis
these thinkers share. It is SUbjective; it retains a connotation of an
agent of the anticipated change. It is imagistic, but its image is,
paradoxically, absent.
The messianic light Adorno invokes is a figure for the object of
desire that animates the philosophy, and philosophers, whose despair
would be that of meeting the demands imposed by late modern and postmodern dystopia. It is light that reaches a suffering world and its
suffering inhabitants from an impossible place and time: from some
place outside the world that is, from a time that permits entry from
the present without being determined by its past. The continuing
question before this study of utopian discourse is how the metaphor of
109. Deutscher, ibid., 106; Margaret Whitford, "Irigaray, Utopia and the
Death Drive," in Engaging with Irigaray: Feminist Philosophy and Modern
European Thought, eds. Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor, and Margaret Whitford (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 379-399, 385.
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messianic light relates to the idea of utopia being discussed along the
way of these writers' works.
Plan of the Work and Key Issues
Towards that end, the text develops ·along the following lines.
Chapters two, three and four devote extended consideration to each of
the thinkers under consideration. Chapter two focuses on Adorno's
utopian discourse, with particular emphasis on his commitment to an
unfolding of dialectical method, as well as consideration of his
advocacy of "micrology" as a method. Chapter three turns to Irigaray's
utopian discourse, with particular emphasis on her later work, which
focuses on the requirements and processes of dyadic interaction and the
cultivation of relationship between differing subjectivities, expressed
as relations of sexual difference. Chapter four then treats Agamben's
utopian discourse, with particular emphasis on Agamben's concept of
messianic time and his championship of Benjamin's concept of the
"dialectic at a standstill."
Each of these chapters treats a restricted number of key thematic
issues according to a single pattern of organization, which facilitates
a final critical comparison of the different discourses. The discussion
opens with a consideration of the specific dystopian vision that
informs the author's overall project, and that vision's demand for a
revision of basic concepts and a use of novel textual form. This
discussion of dystopian vision and basic response contextualizes a
review of the author's overall project, and prepares for a more
detailed discussion of the treatment of utopia within it. The
discussion then turns to a more pointed examination of the author's
engagement with three common and structurally key issues. These are:
the critique of language in relation to the reader as subject; the
treatment of the subject-object problem in relation to the problem of
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domination and the subject's potential for transformative action; and
the representation of space and time in relation to the promise of
utopia.
Chapter five then does two things by way of conclusion. First, it
spells out the critical comparisons that emerge from the discussion of
each author's utopian discourse. This comparative exercise demonstrates
that Adorno, Irigaray and Agamben share a discursive structure that
incorporates prophetic elements along with elements more typical of
philosophical truth-telling. 11o This discourse addresses itself to a
"subject of utopian possibility" that is an available and
transformative response to their texts. Utopian discourse of this form
works to call into action a "subject of utopian possibility" that can
undertake the ongoing task of utopian imagination and perhaps even
utopian striving. The comparative focus then shifts to a consideration
of the significance of this common structure as a form of utopian
discourse. That discussion concludes that the prophetic elements of
this discourse are not merely incidental to the utopian project; they
emerge from these authors' effort to propose a source of metaphysical
experience that is both adequate to and tenable in a radically postmetaphysical context. Their refusal of other key elements of prophetic
discourse, in particular the element of utopian representation,
functions to potentiate this metaphysical content, as it works to block
the potentially toxic effects of metaphysical images.

110. This argument draws to an extent on Michel Foucault's typology of
"modes of veridiction" in the ancient world. See Michel Foucault, Le courage de
la verite: Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II: Cours au College de France
(1983-1984), ed. Frederic Gros, A. Gallimard (Paris: Seuil, 2009) and Michel
Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001).
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CHAPTER II
REFLECTION

Theodor

w.

Adorno is best known as a significant, perhaps the most

significant, theorist of the Frankfurt School. Between 1920 and his
death in 1969 he authored works spanning metaphysical meditations to
musicology, which run to 20 volumes of collected writings. Overshadowed
in the US in the 1960s by his more accessible colleague Herbert Marcuse,
the reception of his works hampered by inadequate translations, Adorno
also became known for being a "mandarin aesthete" with an apolitically
intellectual approach to critical theory and a bleak outlook.l More
recently, his early and careful discussions of the materiality of
language and his critique of phenomenology have intrigued students of
post-structuralism and deconstruction, and Fredric Jameson has dubbed
his particular brand of Marxism perhaps "just what we need today."2
Despite his well-earned reputation as a pessimist, Adorno also
qualifies as a significantly utopian thinker. His thought takes
especially seriously the pressing need to locate and theorize the
intellectual prerequisites for utopian consciousness. Russell Jacoby
portrays Adorno's approach as emblematic of the "iconoclastic utopian"

1. See Henry W. Pickford, "Preface," in Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models:
Interventions and Catchwords, translated by Henry W. Pickford (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998) vii-xii; Martin Jay, "Adorno in America," New
German Critique No. 31 (Winter, 1984) 157-182.
2. Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno or the Persistence of the Dialectic
(London: Verso, 2007), first published 1990. See also Jay, ibid.; de Vries,
ibid.
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thought he champions. 3 Moreover, Adorno's utopian thought remains
tenaciously though minimally, hopeful. Lambert Zuidervaart notes that
Adorno's "own alternative to both traditional metaphysics and more
recent antimetaphysics" achieves expression "in passages that juxtapose
resolute self-criticism and impassioned hope," and insists that if "the
ongoing assessment of Adorno's philosophy does not address such
passages, it will not truly have begun."4 That assessment speaks to the
depth of the utopian element discernible in Adorno's work.
Adorno's explicit references to utopia are limited in number, but
revealing. Adorno's well-known rejection of systems, "totality," and
positive philosophical resolutions stems from his determination to
safeguard the horizon of possibility required by utopian imagination;
his overall project appears from that standpoint to have this object
consistently in view. His work persistently traces the requirements of
a tenable and truthful thought capable of understanding and
articulating that possibility. The truth in the characterization of
Adorno as a pessimistic thinker is his uncompromising delineation of
the stringency of those requirements. The philosopher who said that
"metaphysics must know how to wish" explicitly disdained wishful
thinking; his self-appointed task was to see whether, and how, rigorous
thought might arrive at or near the conclusions demanded by the "need
in thinking. "5
This task is made at once "the simplest of all things" and "the
utterly impossible thing" by the problematic possibility of reflection.
In his conclusion to Minima Moralia, Adorno insists that the
perspective sought by thought from "messianic light" ought already to

3. Jacoby, ibid.
4. Lambert Zuidervaart, "Theodor W. Adorno," Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/adorno, (accessed August 3,
5. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 407-408.
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be available in the present as if by a simple kind of reflection, "
because consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the
mirror image of its opposite."6 Unfortunately, making use of that
reflection
. presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a
hair's breadth, from the scope of existence, whereas we well
know that any possible knowledge must not only be first
wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also
marked for this very reason, by the same distortion and
indigence which it seeks to escape. 7
Thus, while "[n]o light falls on men and things without reflecting
transcendence," the problem with that indispensable and promising
knowledge is that along with transcendence it reflects the glare of an
inextricable involvement. 8 The self-same reflection of transcendence
that sheds light also blinds "the eye that does not want the colors of
the world to fade" to their source in something different from the
known world. "The inextinguishable color comes from non-being."9 Thought
- the reflection that might yet understand this - will only serve this
source of transcendence when it takes its own distance, and its own
ultimate inadequacy, seriously.
The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for
the sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so
calamitously, it is delivered up to the world. Even its own
impossibility it must at last comprehend for the sake of the
possible. 1o
Thus, Adorno is no utopian thinker, but his thought turns persistently
towards utopia; ignoring his utopian aspirations distorts his work.
Presenting this side of Adorno's thought, and drawing out its
implications for contemporary utopian discourse, is the aim of this
chapter.

6. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247.
7. Ibid.
8. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 404.
9. Ibid., 57.
10. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247.
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The discussion of Adorno that follows first reviews the dystopian
perceptions catalogued in Adorno's work. Next, there is a brief review
of the direction of his overall philosophical aims. This context serves
as background for the detailed consideration of the appearance and
place of utopian themes in that work. From this examination, the
following sections look at Adorno's commitment to conceptual work, the
role of textual form in its execution, his treatment of the subjectobject problem, its relationship to his critique of language, and
finally his incorporation of space and time as arenas for the operation
of the subject.
The Universal Guilt Context
Adorno may not regard the world as radically evil, as has been
claimed. 11 His work certainly depicts the world as characterized by a
relentlessly oppressive and totalizing, socially created reality that
operates to suppress even imaginative resistance to it, let alone
direct active resistance. This suppression occurs before consciousness
even registers the possibility of such resistance. All of Adorno's work
attests to his perception of the radically undesirable and dangerous
quality of this increasingly ubiquitous reality. Its classic
formulation, however, is to be found in Dialectic of Enlightenment, a
collaboration with Max Horkheimer, and a work roughly contemporaneous
with the more personal, and mordant, observations of his own Minima
Moralia.
Dialectic of Enlightenment begins with the assertion that
enlightenment, an "advance of thought" that "has always aimed at

11. James Gordon Finlayson, "Adorno On the Ethical and The Ineffable,"
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/jgf21/research/AEI.rtf. (accessed March 1, 2010).
J.M. Bernstein argues by contrast that Adorno identifies a "fugitive" ethical
experience that provides glimpses of the good within an otherwise universal
guilt context. J.M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters," has
proved a miserable failure:
radiant with triumphant calamity.

the wholly enlightened earth is
"12

In this sentiment, however, readers

will hear a chorus of modern agreement. The paradigmatic bourgeois
sociologist Max Weber famously identified the form of social and
economic life that, in his reading, grew out of Protestant asceticism
and that manifested itself in capitalist instrumental bureaucratic
rationality in similar terms. Modernity is an inescapable structure,
exerting "an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives
of men [sic] as at no previous period in history.

"13

Weber saw the

United States as the epitome of the exclusive pursuit of wealth,
"stripped of its religious and ethical meaning," and divorced from any
serious rational justification, which was the ultimate legacy of a
religious movement that, like all significant change in any part of an
interpretively lived economic and social system, had its seismic impact
on every part. 14
Weber himself exemplified and defended the terrorizing rationality
of the modern face of the European enlightenment in his principled
refusal to pronounce in public the value judgments he seemed to hold
privately. 15 In "Science as a Vocation," he insists on the ultimate

12. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed.
Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trasns. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2002), 1. The work was first published in 1944, and reissued with
substantial additions, notably a chapter by Adorno on anti-Semitism, in 1947.
13. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated
by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958) 181. Weber's essay
dates originally from lectures given in 1904 and 1905, and initially appeared
in English translation in 1930. Although final credit for the famous image of
the "iron cage" apparently belongs to Weber's translator, Talcott Parsons,
Weber clearly did describe the bureaucratically organized and rationally
legitimated economic and social formation of Protestant capitalism as
imprisoning, and as leaving little scope for ethical resistance. See Stephen A.
Kent, "Weber, Goethe, and the Nietzschean Allusion: Capturing the Source of the
'Iron Cage' Metaphor," Sociological Analysis 44:4 (Winter, 1983) 297-319.
14. Weber, ibid., 182.
15. See, for example, his conclusion to Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism: "But this brings us to the world of judgments of value and of faith,
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irreconcilability of the separated value spheres, and draws the
conclusion that

. it is necessary to make a decisive choice" on

the basis of value commitments about which "nothing can be said in the
classroom. ,,16 What could be said in the classroom, however, was that
. the genuine official.

. will not engage in politics. Rather,

he should engage in impartial 'administration'" as a matter of honor.17
The fully "administered world," to which Adorno referred with a shudder
appears here already in full view. 18 Its dutiful functionaries already
can be seen to act mechanically and rationally in accordance with the
dictates of the administrative apparatus to which they swear fealty,
rendering ineffective if not entirely irrelevant whatever independent
ethical reasoning they might still be capable of in such a world.
More than one line of reasoning indicated that the extent of that
independent ethical reasoning might be frighteningly limited. Adorno's
"arch-enemy, Martin Heidegger," for instance, could bewail the
increasing dominance of an alienated technology, as instrumentality and
as human subjugation of nature, in his text on "The Question Concerning
Technology," which appeared shortly after Dialectic of Enlightenment. 19
There, Heidegger draws out a view of the essence of technology as a
with which this purely historical discussion need not be burdened." Weber,
ibid., 182.
16. Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology Translated, edited and with an introduction by H.H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 129-156, p. 152.
17. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, Translated, edited and with an introduction by H.H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 77-128. Weber's
distinction between politics and administration entailed that "The honor of the
civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of
the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own
conviction. This holds even if the order appears wrong to him and if, despite
the civil servant's remonstrances, the authority insists on the order. Without
this moral discipline and self-denial, in the highest sense, the whole
apparatus would fall to pieces." (p. 95) Weber, perhaps characteristically,
does not discuss the relative merits of honor and other competing values in
"Politics as a Vocation."
18. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 448.
19. Jameson, Late Marxism, 9. Jameson reminds us here that Adorno assessed
Heidegger's philosophy as "fascist to its innermost cells." Heidegger's essay
on technology appeared in 1954.
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particular mode of man's relating to the world as it comes forward to
reveal itself to man. 20 In that mode, which "enframes" or stands outside
its objects and encounters them exclusively as items of inventory
["standing-reserve"] for this or that presupposed task, "[man] comes to
the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. "21
At the same time, it seems increasingly clear to man that he
"everywhere and always encounters only himself. "22 The extreme danger
this situation represents makes it increasingly possible, although not
necessary or inevitable, that human beings will utterly fail to
encounter themselves in any other way than as items of inventory for
pre-assigned tasks, and completely fail to encounter the world in any
other mode of "unconcealing," leading to any other historical destiny
for humanity and its world. 23
Heidegger sees the power of art, as an alternative "revealing," as
something which might heighten the ambiguity of technology and prompt
the "rising of the saving power" in the face of it.24 His ontological
analysis incorporates no constitutive analysis of the sociological
arrangements under which both technology and art have so far unfolded.
These are for him explicitly not of the essence. 25
A radically different method leads Max Horkheimer and Theodor
Adorno to their superficially similar, but fundamentally opposed,
conclusions in The Dialectic of Enlightenment. For them, the apotheosis
of what they call instrumental reason eventuates in the triumph of
irrationality and barbarism. This reason proves in its results not

20. Heidegger's English translator uses the term "man." In light of
Irigaray's subsequent critique (see Ch. III, this work) the choice seems apt.
21. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Basic
Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (London: HarperPerennial, 2008) 311-341, 332.
22. Ibid., 332.
23. Ibid., 338-339.
24. Ibid., 339-340.
25. Ibid., 311.

64

other than the deepest unreason. For Horkheimer and Adorno, however,
historical specifics are precisely of the essence. The historical
conditions of the dialectical development of reason, and its working
out in socially specific forms of economic and cultural relationship,
mediate the development of this form of rationality. The situation in
which this occurs does not spare any of its components, including every
aspect of cultural production, and in particular cultural production
for the masses - the commodities of the culture industries. 26 Art,
whether in the form of popular or high culture, is no refuge.
For Horkheimer and Adorno, the avowedly value-free science that
Weber championed was itself deeply enmeshed in the problem. Its own
dynamic led away from life lived according to the values that resisted
administration, and towards others, which in practice systematically
erected barriers to the practice of alternative values. Certain value
positions are built in to the operations of the enlightenment
rationality institutionalized in bourgeois capitalism and its
supporting social formation. Within the mode of life produced by and
under this formation, things are getting worse not just in a technical
sense, but in a material, social, cultural, philosophical

~nd

ethical

one. The spectre that is haunting late capitalism is the spectre of an
increasing inability to conceptualize, let alone choose in favor of,
values that do not support the system and ideas that are not already
sanctioned by the system. Recognizing the ultimate dysfunctionality of
the system in its current form becomes increasingly difficult as
alternatives to the system become more difficult to imagine.
The separation and irreconcilability of the value spheres,
identified by Weber, is a direct consequence of the conception of the

26. Thus, Adorno will never simply identify art as the poiesis of the true
into the beautiful, and certainly not in 1954.

65

Kantian autonomous rational subject according to Horkheimer's and
Adorno's analysis. This subject is defined by its autonomy, its selfdirection. Every substantive principle that might serve to guide its
deliberations appears to it as something externally imposed; reason
"unmasks substantial goals as asserting the power of nature over mind
and as curtailing its own self-legislation," and for that reason
recognizes these substantive goals as inimical to its project of
autonomous domination of nature. 27 "Nature" here comes to include
everything that qualifies as "affect;" by extension, those forms of
expression that do not take the form of "actual ideas," such as those
found in art and religion, are regarded as incommunicably separate from
"anything deserving the name of knowledge" both by positivist science
and by post-Enlightenment irrationalism. 28
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that rational progress oriented towards
what was understood to be the mastery of nature appears not to work as
envisioned. It turns back on itself, and produces irrationality. In
their analysis, this has to do with the insistence on equating
rationality with instrumentality, and the banishment of insecurity.
Thus, what passes for rationality assumes the character of myth,
necessity. Then, nature acquires a compulsive character. Its unexamined
content in the form of compulsive human nature blinds ides all attempts
to bring human activity within the scope of voluntary and discretionary,
chosen, human ethical activity.
Adorno's analysis of the "culture industries" further lays out
reasons why culture fails to function as a repository of critical
consciousness, why putative art or works of art cease to operate as
ways to cultivate critical consciousness. In the culture industries -

27. Horkheimer and Adorno, ibid., 68.
28. Ibid., 72.
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paradigmatically entertainment for profit, and advertising - the artful
images offered to the populace have a hidden agenda. They encourage
behavior and desires that help maintain the system. They dampen or
deaden whatever consciousness might critique or oppose it. They present
the satisfactions that are available within the system as adequate, but
also as infinitely subject to postponement. The offerings of the
culture industries refresh the tired workforce, replenishing their
exhausted labor power for another day of wage slavery. In short,
whatever ennobling or enlightening potential culture might have been
thought to have in an earlier time and a different place is vitiated by
its metamorphosis into a popular culture fully integrated with and
integral to a capitalist system

~f

production for profit and commodity

exchange.
The analysis presented in Dialectic of Enlightenment exposes a
world in which forces that harbored impulses towards liberation have
taken a turn towards generalized oppression. The elements and offspring
of rationality serve irrationality, a drive towards ftself-preservation"
that effects the destruction of life itself. Scientific and technical
progress has become an instrument of domination in the present.
ftTechnological rationality reveals its political character as it
becomes the great vehicle of better domination, creating a truly
totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body are
kept in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of this
universe. "29
Adorno's Philosophical Aim
Adorno himself described the aim of his philosophical work as the
effort to ftuse the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy

29. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced
Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 18.
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of consti tuti ve subj ecti vi ty. ,,30 In this description, the reader can
hear the echo of a deep dissatisfaction with German philosophy's turn
to the subject with Kant, and the inadequate salvation of the concrete
in every proposed solution from Hegel through Husserl to Heidegger, all
of whom come in for specific criticism in Adorno's major exposition of
his philosophical method, Negative Dialectics. The problem is that the
philosophical tradition has provided, so far, an inadequate account of
the relationship of the subject and the world of objects given to the
subject to know - including the subject itself as its own object of
knowledge. Adorno's verdict on the effort is that "traditional
philosophy" in "confusing itself with what it intends to interpret" has
been an obstacle to the truth it ought to have been a vehicle to
comprehending. 31
Moreover, the presentation of closed systems of thought makes the
world itself seem closed. As Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate in
Dialectic of Enlightenment, as discussed earlier, this appearance takes
on a determinative force through the mediation of a social system built
on its conceptual foundation. The theory of closure aids and abets
social practices that reproduce a world with shrinking opportunities
for imaginative resistance and transformation.

An anti-totalitarian concern characterizes Adorno's work generally.
The related treatment of the relationship of the subject of
consciousness, knowledge and truth to its concrete material object
constitutes a deep element of his utopian discourse. In pursuing this
central theme, his work spans a wide range of contributory problems and
30 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, xx. It would be customary to use the term
"project" here to designate Adorno's philosophical ouevre, but this seems wrong
in light of Adorno's dismissive association of the word with the "jargon of
ontology." See Theodor Adorno, "Why Still Philosophy," in Critical Models:
Interventions and Catchwords, translated and with a preface by Henry W.
Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 5-17, 8.
31. Adorno, "Why Still Philosophy," 13.
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issues. He investigates its manifestation relentlessly in particular
social, cultural and aesthetic issues, including the relationship of
presentation or form to content, the incorporation of social
contradictions in works of art and the modes by which works of art,
including music, represent or express objective tendencies and social
contradictions and possibilities. He focuses as well on methodological
issues, and here particularly the relationship of the preparation of
philosophical texts to the representation of ideas. 32
While some of his work was impelled by circumstances of his exile
in the United States during the late 30s and 40s, even this work can be
seen to cohere with his overall project. Looked at from outside, there
is a critical element present in all of Adorno's work that links his
thoughts on the culture industries, his earliest expression of his
philosophical thought in "The Actuality of Philosophy," his work on
Kierkegaard under the supervision of Paul Tillich, his critical social
commentary, and his later aesthetic theory. Seen from this perspective,
Adorno's project has to do with the theorization of a relationship
between the thinking subject and a world that, while it changes
historically, and while its operations also change the subject's
experience in material and consequential ways, can be grasped through
thought that concerns itself with truth. This thought, in turn, can
have some impact on human activity and social prospects for change, on
the cUltivation of a humanity that goes beyond the sheer domination of,
and by, "nature," and that reaches for the humane and collective life
possible to a genuinely enlightened, and therefore free, humanity.

32. Here it is possible to see the influence of Walter Benjamin's
theoretical discussion at the introduction to The Origin of German Tragic Drama,
where Benjamin depicts philosophy pre-eminently as the realm of the
representation of ideas. Walter Benjamin, ibid.
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Adorno's project is, then, an emphatically humanistic one, in what was
to become a "post-humanist" era.
While Adorno's project seems abstract, his explicit commitments
consist in a turn towards the concrete. As he says in one of the more
impassioned and utopian passages in Negative Dialectics, the very
consciousness of possibility that drives thinking on, through its
distance from the content of thought, "sticks to the concrete as the
undisfigured." Here, "thought is its servant," the "prism in which its
color is caught. ,,33 This commitment to the concrete expresses itself in
his tenacious methodological insistence on the possibilities inherent
in dialectical reasoning, mobilizing dialectics in every substantive
engagement with whatever subject matter. 34
Adorno consistently refused to advance facile political solutions,
frequently expressing the insight that practical political action in
the circumstances of the day frequently played into the agenda of the
system itself. Rather, his texts find him seeking the indispensable
theoretical grasp of those principles which appear only in the
particular political situation.
While Adorno clearly refused to participate in certain political
movements during his own time, and while this refusal became a cause
for dissatisfaction among politically engaged colleagues and students,
the import of his political practice seems consistent with his deeplyheld philosophical principles and commitments. These are relevant, in
particular, for a consideration of Adorno's utopian enunciations. His
33. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 57.
34. Adorno's insistence on the dialectical structure of thought and of truth
was at the center of his famous debate with Walter Benjamin over Benjamin's
work on Baudelaire, a methodological disagreement with grave personal
consequences on both sides. See Susan Buck-Morss, ibid.; Hannah Arendt,
"Introduction: Walter Benjamin: 1892-1940" in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations:
Essays and Reflections, edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt,
translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968)1-51, 10-11; Giorgio
Agamben, "The Prince and the Frog: The Question of Method in Adorno and
Benjamin," in Infancy and History, 117-137.
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recurrent criticism of impassioned political activity in his own time
hinged on his insight that it often proceeded in the absence of the
necessary depth of thought and understanding. 35 Adorno does not insist
that basic philosophy has political significance casually or,
ultimately, mistakenly. Despite the frequently-noted absence of
strategic or tactical political recommendations in Adorno's work, and
sometimes a sense of bafflement at how his work might be "useful," his
thought asserts its own political significance, and contains implicit
principles for political practice. 36
The political significance of Adorno's philosophical work and the
political principles implicit in that work effectively assert the
political significance, though not the actual political efficacy, of
art in its various forms. Both art and philosophy, in different ways
and relying on different "technical procedures," depend on the
"consciousness of needs," which forms a portion of the truth both art
and philosophy express. 37 Adorno's scattered but persistent references
to religion intimate the political significance of that arena of human
practice as well, again without presupposing the practical efficacy of
religion. For instance, there is a moment of truth in religion, for all
its mythic content, although the only responsible position with respect
to religion is "an extreme ascesis" that amounts to "an extreme loyalty
to the prohibition of images, far beyond what this once originally
meant. ,,38 Not coincidentally Adorno's explicit leaning to the concrete,
related to the perception of the significance of the aesthetic, makes
35. Russell Berman, "Adorno's Politics," in Adorno: A Critical Reader, Nigel
Gibson and Andrew Rubin eds. (London: Blackwell, 2002), 110-131; Susan BuckMorss, ibid.
36. "It is incumbent upon philosophy . . . to provide a refuge for freedom."
Adorno, "Why Still Philosophy?" 11.
37. Ibid., 14.
38. Horkheimer and Adorno, ibid., 144; Theodor W. Adorno, "Reason and
Revelation," in Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and
Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)
133-l42, 142.
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his philosophy profoundly corporeal. 39 The thought process of utopian
reflection does not annul its object's original and ultimate connection
to the body and bodily human life, and the relationship of art and
religion to material and bodily life establishes their potential
insights.
Adorno's work maintains a tenacious hopefulness about the
prerequisites for utopian thought, in the face of impediments that his
work draws out with painstaking clarity. This peculiar combination of
rigorous honesty and tenacious refusal to abandon all hope informs his
method and style. Both method and style figure as integral parts of
Adorno's project, rather than as incidental consequences, arguably more
than with many other philosophers. 4o
It may be fair to say that Adorno's project is the rescue of
utopian possibility in the face of the objective disaster of the 20th
century. This reading sees the philosophical groundwork accomplished in
Negative Dialectics as the indispensable prerequisite to this rescue,
which identifies the difficulties besetting the western philosophical
tradition, and in particular German Idealism and its materialist
critics, around the theory of the relationship of the subject of
conscious contemplation to the object thereof. The dilemma posed by the
question of whether knowledge is only possible by "the same," or
whether knowledge of something actually different is possible, delimits
the possibilities for utopian thinking as well.

39. Lisa Yun Lee, Dialectics of the Body: Corporeality in the Philosophy of
T.W. Adorno (New York: Routledge, 2005).
40 On Adorno's specific style, see Rose, ibid., in particular chapter one,
on style. Most commentators mention Adorno's difficult style, which poses
issues of translation as well as understanding. See Buck-Morss, ibid.; E.B.
Ashton, translators note, Adorno, Negative Dialectics; Robert Hullot-Kentor,
translator's note, Adorno, Aesthetic Theory; Martin Jay, ibid. On the
fundamental question of style, see the superb discussion in Francis-Noel Thomas
and Mark Turner, Clear and Simple as the Truth (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994).
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Utopia is, or perhaps more precisely would be, if it were possible
to describe it, a state or condition of reality different from the one
in which people find themselves or come to recognize themselves as
thinking and acting subjects. This makes the question, of whether
thinking can come to a knowledge of someone or some thing really
different from its subject, one of first importance. What kind of
knowledge of utopia, of anything like the content of utopia,

can be had?

Can this knowledge be counted as knowledge at all or would it merely be
the projection of something lacking in the present into an imaginary
future? The answer given bears on any conceptualization of the utopian
state or condition. It bears as well on the possibilities for any
eventual approach to that state.
Adorno's efforts to rescue utopian thinking proceed via emphasis on
exploiting chinks in the armor of an increasingly demonic understanding
of rationality. His references to "micrological" approaches need to be
understood in this way. He searches out tiny crevices of difference
between one thing and another, the slight and occasional differences
between a name and its habitually understood referent, the almost
trivial but telling contradictions that beset definitions, formulae,
and cultural arrangements, in order to obtain glints of light from the
realm of the "non-identical. "41 His procedure works, if it works,
something like prying open the lid of a box from the inside, using the
thin logical tools at hand for the liberation of the deadened western
imagination. It works, if it works, by turning logical precision
against itself, demanding of its identities even more rigorous

41. For instance, many of the fragments in Minima Moralia demonstrate that
popular cultural equations ("love is marriage," "responsibility is hard work,"
"culture is appreciation of this particular form of art") fail.
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correspondence, so as to expose some actual remainder of noncorrespondence, as the field of possibility.42
The Relation of Utopia to Adorno's Work
Adorno qualifies as a utopian thinker in the precise sense that his
thought develops with a potential utopian outcome in view, and has as
its aim the theorization of the prerequisites for a thought that might
grasp the truth content of utopian ideation and practice. Utopian
thought surfaces in Adorno's key works explicitly, and he returns again
and again to the concept of utopia. The explicit mention of utopia
inaugurates and concludes Negative Dialectic; it surfaces in Minima
Moralia; it anchors Aesthetic Theory; it hovers in his exegesis of the
work of Samuel Beckett and the modernist visual artists. More
significantly, Adorno's texts endeavor to identify the possible spaces
for the perception and the cognition of differences between the current
state of the world and some alternative, and the practice of thought
which conserves those spaces.
The possibility of thinking outside the existing state or condition
of the world, and the possibility of the truth of such thinking, sets
the outer limit on the possibility of utopian thinking that carries
hope in its train. Theorizing the possibility of precisely this
thinking emerges as Adorno's key project, which underlies his treatment
of the relationship of subject and object in Negative Dialectics, and
his defense of the negativity of modern art in Aesthetic Theory, as
well as his ironic vignettes in Minima Moralia.

42. Adorno's concern with tautology, false copula, and the character of
metaphor are all relevant here. If logic proceeds through the exposure of
implications and equations, and also through the Aristotelian exclusion of
certain simultaneous identities, the job of negative dialectical method becomes
that of finding the ragged edges, the non-correspondences, the failures of
these seemingly watertight identities. It depends on finding the concrete and
precise points in which propositions of the form "x is a" or "x is y" do not
hold.
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The notion of utopia figures early in Adorno's philosophical
efforts, and the relationship of reality to utopia,

for better or worse,

is a constant feature of his work. The specific understanding of utopia
never strays far from that articulated by Marxist philosopher Ernst
Bloch in The Spirit of Utopia, which had a profound effect on members
of the generation that had experienced the First World War. Bloch's
work was a pastiche of German idealism, materialism, Christian
symbolism and references to Jesus, and mystical romanticism, all
advanced in a lyrical, evocative prose style that defies easy analysis.
Adorno read it as a young man and claimed it as a decisive and
permanent influence on his intellectual life, later identifying it as
one of the most influential books he ever read. 43 Thus utopia as a
concept figured in Adorno's intellectual consciousness from an early
point. Adorno's thinking continued to echo the basic picture that
emerges from the Spirit of Utopia, with its stress on the "not-yet" and
the openness of reality to transformation.
Bloch's main idea is that the human being strives forward towards
something new, not yet in existence, that captures the utopian spirit.
This longing evinces itself in dreams, cultural fantasies,

sexual

relationships, music. Utopia as presented by Bloch has the structure of
something that has to be brought into existence from elsewhere, from a
place of non-being. More precisely, utopia comes from non-being of a
special kind, because Bloch talks about utopia as if it is something
"there" in a real sense, something that guides its own actualization.
In this sense, utopia shares a characteristic of the Hegelian world
spirit, but without its guarantee of ultimate self-actualization in a

43. "I do not believe I have ever written anything without reference to it,
either implicit or explicit." Theodor W. Adorno, Notes to Literature Vol. 2,
trans. Shierry Weber Nicholoson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992),
212.
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cultural form. While this something does not yet characterize the
reality in which we live, it is the reality into which we live, or
might if we live rightly. It is not "not" in a simple sense. Its
negative relationship with the existential present is more complicated;
this not-yet (noch nicht) cannot be described as "existing," and yet it
constitutes a critical element of reality.
The notion of something that is real, and in a special sense
existent or present, in spite of its inhabiting a space of non-being,
is vital for Adorno's own discourse. The continuing reality of the
possible future, the world that could be made, is the source of hope
that some key values might be realized. On the other hand, the specific
contours of this "not-yet" seem likely to be affected by history, both
as past and as future. What has happened modifies and what will happen
in the historical realm of existence affects the contours of the notyet as well.
Utopia, then, shares the status of every work of art, which has to
be wrested from this realm of non-being, created and creatively brought
into the realm of the existent. This is one of the reasons art itself
particularly points in the direction of utopia. Art is that
transformative collective fabrication that has not yet been organized
and achieved.
Adorno's work turns on the question of how this legitimate
imagination of an alternative situation might be secured
philosophically - again, demonstrated as possible and defensible. His
philosophical effort includes critical engagement with those schools of
philosophical thought which definitively eliminate this alternative
mode of thought; his critical project raises objections to those
cultural formations and phenomena that conspire to do the same thing
practically through the manipulation of popular cultural products. His
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thought attends to the prior structures imposed on thought itself by
its concrete situation, and seeks to find a way out of the
predeterminations of this prior structure, this constructive situation,
which threaten to make thinking of what it does not already contain
strictly impossible. In this very precise sense, Adorno constitutes a
most important utopian thinker of the late 20th century.
The Actuality of Philosophy
One of the best places to observe this characteristic is in
Adorno's inaugural presentation "The Actuality of Philosophy," where he
does not mention "utopia," but criticizes an established philosophical
ideal, which has implications for a preliminary understanding of utopia,
namely that of grasping the underlying rational system of reality. The
notion that "the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality
of the real" has to be abandoned by the would-be contemporary
philosopher. 44 To the extent that we can use that guiding aspiration as
an index of an earlier, philosophically-defined utopian moment, and
that is to a large extent, then Adorno's understanding of the
philosophical utopia, and of its relationship to the more concrete and
popular utopia, diverges radically from that philosophical ideal.
Already in "The Actuality of Philosophy" Adorno lays out some of
the main themes that will structure his thought during the next three
decades, and in which his discussion of utopia will figure. These
include his opposition to the imposition of an alien, allegedly
rational systemic unity upon reality, whether in a strictly conceptual
way, or through the actual creation of such a system in the reduction
of reality to that which can be treated within such a system; the
objectively ascertainable inadequacy of reality to the structural

44. Theodor W. Adorno, "The Actuality of Philosophy," in The Adorno Reader,
Brian O'Connor editor (London: Blackwell, 2000) 23-39, 24.
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limits of rational thought; the inherently historical, and therefore
also changeable, character of both object and sUbject; and the need to
focus thought and analysis on the concrete and particular. Ultimately,
Adorno's sympathy with the concrete does not rest in the relationship
of the particular to the universal. It would be possible to care about
the concrete entity or situation because it is a convenient point of
access, and because it is a microcosm or analog of a universal that is
of greater intrinsic interest. This is not Adorno's point. If anything,
the priority is reversed:

interest in the universal is for the sake of

the concrete, and the recognition of its irreducible truth.
O'Connor notes that Adorno is in "The Actuality of Philosophy" most
clear in his efforts to define the contemporary task of philosophy.
Contemporary philosophy here would include the philosophy of 1931, but
could encompass the early decades of the 21st century as well. Adorno
urges the dissolution of pressing, concrete situational questions in
illuminating interpretations which show a practical way forward into
productive human activity. Adorno's substantively utopian political
program is on display in "The Actuality of Philosophy." Political
action needs a footing in ideas, and not just any ideas, but ideas that
embody the proper, illuminating interpretation of concrete elements
drawn from existing reality. These interpretations give insight into
the actually existing character of the situation, and "make it possible
to recognize the demonic elements." They annihilate the "riddle" posed
by the juxtaposition of those elements in the experiential situation in
the solution, their coming together in an interpretive flash that
grasps the whole in a new way. 45
For Adorno, the task of the philosopher is pre-eminently to shed
light on the situation into which politics will be required to act.
45. Adorno, "Actuality," 31.
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More precisely it is to open up and release the light that will emanate
from the elements themselves, once they have been placed in proper
configuration.
Elsewhere in the same address, he speaks of turning the ciphers
into a text. What emerges from his discussion here is a picture of
reality that is messy, significantly irrational and non-systemic, but
far from entirely meaningless. This is a reality that resists all
philosophical efforts to identify its single "engine" or central
principle. This reality not only does not necessarily have a single
engine or driving force, but not all of its elements and processes are
smoothly articulated into a functional system. Adorno refuses to make
the mistake of imputing a functionalism to a system that has not been
observed. The scholar or interpreter of the situation cannot make such
statements about the whole, in Adorno's view, for significantly
intellectual reasons:

it involves theorizing in advance of the data.

We do not know enough about this fragmented, partial, obscure real
situation to make such sweeping statements. In part, this structure of
the real is what prevents our turning the ciphers into a text; things
are missing - either actually, because what earlier philosophers had
hypothesized as mechanisms of coordination are simply lacking, or
seemingly, because we do not have the appropriate viewpoint from which
to observe them; indeed, when it comes to the human unconscious, it may
be that no one has this viewpoint.
In "The Actuality of Philosophy," Adorno rejects both of two
dominant philosophical alternatives. On one hand, he dismisses the
systematizing efforts of the earlier German idealists and the tradition
from which they emerge, as impossible. On the other, he deplores the
reductionist efforts of the Vienna School and logical positivism to
reduce the scope of philosophy to that which can be grasped by the
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autonomous reason. The idealists reach too far; the positivists do not
reach far enough and end by creating contradictions of a different sort.
They fail to give an adequate account of the intelligibility of other
consciousnesses, just as they are unable to resolve the problem of 'the
"given," and its historically changing character. 46
In contrast to both, Adorno advances a different philosophical
method. "Plainly put:

the idea of science (Wissenschaft) is research;

that of philosophy is interpretation. "47 The horizon of the
philosophical ideal Adorno describes in this discussion becomes one of
illuminating interpretation. This is not, for Adorno, the kind of
interpretation that seeks the hidden meaning embedded in or lodged
obscurely behind words or figures, as if it were an arcane treasure.
That particular exegetical enterprise would be better left to a
different kind of interpreter. Rather, he elaborates his view of
interpretation as the solution of "riddle figures of that which
exists. "48
The metaphor of the riddle becomes central to the presentation in
"Actuality." In a riddle, a particular configuration of words and ideas
is presented in such a way that the configuration itself creates a
puzzle, a momentary (or more than momentary) bafflement. When we are
given a riddle, we usually know at least something about all of the
terms. We know the "meanings" of the individual elements; we know a
superficial reading of the configuration. The problem is that it is
clear that the superficial reading can't be the "right" one, if it is
not one that makes all the individual pieces, and their relationship as
a whole, resolve into a whole that also includes its answer. When that
kind of reading is found, the "riddle" in a vital sense disappears; it
46. Adorno, ibid., 30.
47. Adorno, ibid., 31.
48. Adorno, ibid.
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is no longer a puzzle, a source of bafflement, but has become "one I've
heard before." It is no longer a question, but a move to which the
hearer knows the response. That response then prepares the ground for
the next step, whatever that next step is.
There is, then, something about truth which, in such a riddling
context, will be self-validating. One index of truth will be that it
accompanies an actual or workable resolution to the puzzle presented by
the situation, and "negates" the question present in the intelligible
configuration of elements. A touchstone of truth becomes, then, not its
correspondence to particular a priori conditions, but its relationship
to the concrete, precise demands of the situation. This recognition of
truth on the basis of its fit with elements, consequences, and
experience does not, however, make of truth either an arbitrary or
"subjective" phenomenon. On the contrary, its precise attunement to the
requirements of the available evidence, and its relationship to
conceptual clarification of the fragmentary character of the data, make
this understanding of the recognition of truth both objective and
exacting.
Adorno asserts a precise connection between his own conception of
philosophy as interpretation and the mode of analysis in use by
materialism. According to Adorno, "[i]nterpretation of the
unintentional through a juxtaposition of the analytically isolated
elements and illumination of the real by the power of such
interpretation is the program of every authentically materialist
knowledge

,,49

As with the solution to a "riddle," materialist

analysis, perhaps exemplified by Marxist "unmasking" of reified
constructs and objective social relations, throws always already
accessible experiential evidence into suddenly more intelligible relief,
49. Adorno, ibid., 32.
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so that the requirements of action also become more clear, if not
absolutely clear. Adorno's example is the Marxist analysis of the
commodity structure. That analysis not only does not solve the
philosophical problems posed within the Kantian framework - the "thingin-itself problem" - it does not even address that problem, or
acknowledge it as important, since its aims point thought elsewhere.
Adorno's presentation does assert that philosophers have to be
willing to face the risk of the "dissolution of philosophy," but this
seems disingenuous, since he earlier notes that some of the central
problems of the philosophical tradition will be addressed under this
new approach. ".

[T]he function which the traditional philosophic

inquiry expected from meta-historical, symbolically meaningful ideas is
accomplished by inner-historically constituted, non-symbolic ones."so It
is clear, however, that the outcomes Adorno seeks will not satisfy
certain demands. There will be no deities or transcendent world spirits
that underwrite an ultimate optimism about the trajectory of reality,
or that guarantee the ultimate resolution of the contradictions and
dilemmas of the real situation in a redeemed future. The disciplined
philosophical mind will confine itself to the territory circumscribed
by the concrete elements available to it. It will produce - manufacture
- useful constructs, but it will not presuppose a particular outcome.
It will seek to explain, and then check to see whether its explanations
might offer grounds for future hope. This discipline is to prove
exacting and uncompromising as the elements of the real situation that
Adorno's philosophy is required to grapple with pile up historically.
It will ultimately prevent Adorno from taking certain kinds of refuge
in recycled theological and artistic ideas and dreams of redemption

50. Adorno, ibid., 33.
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whose validity seems to have been vitiated by the events of the first
half of the 20 th century.
It is significant that Adorno calls his presentation the
"actuality" of philosophy, and once again, he turns to the comparison
of materialism with his vision of a reclaimed and principled philosophy
to make his case clear. The dialectical process whereby a riddle is
illuminated and negated "is executed in earnestness by materialism," by
which he means "that the answer does not remain mistakenly in the
closed area of knowledge, but that praxis is granted to it."s1 The
consideration of philosophically interesting problems leads to some
change in the reality that throws the problems up for analysis, and
this change in the reality generates new, modified problems, and so on.
This dialectic can be understood and to a degree anticipated, but the
program of philosophy to which its practice will give rise can, clearly,
not be outlined in advance. It is, of necessity, a program of
philosophy that will have to remain radically responsive to the everarising concrete problems of its day. And while, as we have already
seen, this does not mean that the knowledge of philosophical tradition,
with its possibly meaningful "threads" of argument and insight, becomes
superfluous, and while it does not mean that the "large" philosophical
questions will simply no longer be addressed, it does mean that the
matters most urgently before philosophers will change with the times in
ways they might not have imagined heretofore.
One way of characterizing the approach Adorno lays out in "The
Actuality of Philosophy" is to say that it is the illumination of the
recurrent principles or operating elements of a reality that it is not
possible for the mind to grasp in its entirety. Nevertheless, becoming
aware of the state of things in our local area - and by local, we might
51. Adorno, ibid., 34.
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mean century or contemporary world situation, not necessarily our
village or even country - attuning ourselves to a precise,
"micrological" understanding of that reality that leads to some
concrete prescriptions for action, becomes the contribution of the
serious philosopher to the urgent task of the humanity with which she
or he shares both time and place. 52
We might notice that Adorno already sees the entrance of "the
separate disciplines," and particularly sociology, into the picture.
Where Heidegger accuses the sociologist of being a burglar, Adorno
turns the accusation on its head, embracing the burglar's occupation,
under the dire present circumstances. When the whole of western culture
seems more analogous to a house that is falling down around the ears of
its residents, the burglar will at least salvage something from the
disaster. 53 When the world is on fire, the New Leftists of some later
decades thought, what's urgently needed is action. For Adorno, however,
it always seemed more necessary to understand what the fire was really
burning, perhaps even at the risk of being burned by it oneself.
Utopia in Negative Dialectics
Adorno in Negative Dialectics is specifically grappling with the
pressing problem, not yet solved to his own satisfaction, of the
relationship of the subject of such an understanding of the real to the
objects of its understanding. Adorno's aim is to develop a solution
different from what western philosophy has so far attempted in the
solution of that problem. Adorno is dealing specifically with the
structure of consciousness, or in other words, with the structure of
rationality - and with its significant possibilities for irrationality,

52. Adorno draws his notion of the "micrological" from Walter Benjamin,
whose work on the origin of German tragic drama figured as his first seminar at
the University of Frankfurt. See Brian O'Connor, ed., The Adorno Reader, 23-24.
53. Adorno, ibid., 35.
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which he takes fully seriously, along with that structure's disturbing
historical contingencies, and the dawning of the awareness that the
physical substrate of consciousness poses significant issues for
insight into the structure of rationality as well.
Thus, in Negative Dialectics, Adorno deals also with the subjectobject structure that has permitted western philosophers to talk about
"transcendence" as if it were something that people understood. In fact,
it is this structure that has permitted philosophers since the early
Greeks to talk about "understanding" as if it were something that
people did, and was an unproblematic tool of knowing and dealing with
the concrete world around them. The extent to which the world around
them was also "in" them, and to which they were also "in" the world
around them, and the extent to which this posed dire problems for
practical activity as well as for philosophy, was left to the late 20 th
century to appreciate more fully.
Adorno's commitment is precisely not to give up on the ultimate
program of philosophy, that of understanding the reality in which
humankind finds itself. "The cognitive utopia would be to use concepts
to unseal the non-conceptual with concepts, without making it their
equal. ,,54 Adorno's program is still a program of conceptual
understanding, of formulating conceptual truth about reality which will
provide genuine understanding of and insight into that reality. The
reality with which he is specifically concerned has become the way
people approach an understanding of their relationship to their world,
and the possibilities for rational understanding of that relationship,
that is, for understanding that has a reasonable claim to have grasped
the truth of or about that reality.

54. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 10.
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Another way of saying the same thing, which emphasizes the role of
sUbjectivity and its possible consequences, is to say as Adorno says in
the 1966 preface to Negative Dialectics "To use the strength of the
subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity this is what the author felt to be his task ever since he came to trust
his own mental impulses.

. ,,55 Along with this, as a "determining

motive" is the wish to "transcend the official separation of pure
philosophy and the substantive or formally scientific realm .

,,56

Where philosophy has been seen as something that has to do with
strictly mental phenomena, the realm of the mind as divorced from,
separated from the world around it, and as speculative rather than
experimental, Adorno casts it differently. Drawing on "The Actuality of
Philosophy," we notice that Adorno is advocating experimental
procedures for philosophers. These experimental procedures will have to
do with precise consideration of concrete things, not just taking
refuge in conceptual abstractions as if these will suffice for the
method of philosophy.
In the quest for a society fit for human beings, in the quest for
the right world, philosophy is not irrelevant, but it will have to be
the right kind. Famously, Negative Dialectics begins with the assertion
" [p]hilosopy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment
to realize it was missed. ,,57 A complex historical discourse around
utopia is already embedded in this first line. The reference is to
Marx's 11th thesis on Feuerbach:

"The philosophers have only

interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.,,5B

55. Ibid., 9.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., 3.
58. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in The German Ideology Part One with
Selections from Parts Two and Three and Supplementary Texts, ed. C.J. Arthur
(New York: International Publishers, 1974) 122-123, 123.
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Marx, and even more, Engels, differentiated themselves from those who
became, because of their allegedly less utopian approach to socialism,
the "utopian socialists," like Fourier, Saint-Simon, Owen and Proudhon.
Marx's "The Poverty of Philosophy" was directed against Proudhon's
anarcho-socialism, an ellegedly utopian alternative. Nevertheless, as
Adorno notes, "Marx and Engels were enemies of Utopia for the sake of
its realization."s9 The role of philosophy, then, from the outset of
Negative Dialectics, includes the rescue of the possibility of utopian
thinking, namely, that thinking that can imagine an alternative to "the
unspeakable world that is. ,,60 In sum, Negative Dialectics begins in
reference to an already-existing utopian discourse, and places itself
in a specific relation to that discourse; it stands on the side of
maintaining the possibility both of that discourse and of the practice
that might carry it forward.
The idea of the utopian form as an effort to "enlarge the field of
the possible" and explore its possible contents, going back to the
creation of a space for imaginative exploration in the "no place" of
Thomas More's 1516 work, is precisely that of utopia not as strictly
impossible but rather as an exercise in distinguishing the possible
from the utterly fantastic.

61

In this sense, philosophy has from its

inception had something to do with utopian forms. While there can be
dispute about whether Plato's Republic and Laws constitute "true
utopias," either formally or substantively, there is little dispute
that the philosophical exploration of the ideal, and the possible, in

59. Adorno, ibid., 322. Adorno's discussion in these two pages (322-23) is
vital for the purpose of the work as a whole, with respect to the concrete need
for philosophy. Also note the implicit critique of Biblical religion:
"More in
line with the catastrophe that impends is the supposition of an irrational
catastrophe in the beginning." 323.
60. Adorno, ibid., 403.
61. "Introduction," Utopie, http://gallica.bnf. fr/Utopie/Tl.htm, October 20,
2008
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the context of the actual - at least, the actual as ascertained by the
philosopher - characterizes those works. While utopian discourse is not
an indispensable component of philosophical discourse, it is a
classically-established, sanctioned element. Adorno plays on this fact
throughout Negative Dialectics, even as he turns the traditional
foundationalist philosophical method and many traditional philosophical
concerns against the program of traditional western, and in particular
German idealist, philosophy.
Adorno's explicit references to utopia in the text of Negative
Dialectics are limited, and cluster in the introduction and the
concluding section, "Meditations on Metaphysics," which he presents in
the preface as a demonstrative experiment in the use of the negative
dialectical method. 62 Nevertheless, the relationship to utopia can be
read as providing the structure of part two, Adorno's elucidation of
the method of Negative Dialectics, as well. First, Adorno demonstrates
the unattainability of the cherished utopia of the traditional
philosopher, the dream of a total philosophy.63 He implicitly raises
utopian concerns, such as the theme of reconciliation, which haunts the
exposition of dialectics, as the form of a refused Hegelian synthesis:
"What tolerates nothing that is not like itself thwarts the
reconcilement for which it mistakes itself. The violence of equalitymongering reproduces the contradiction it eliminates.,,64
This statement does not sound utopian at first blush. Adorno,
however, is attempting to elucidate the relationship of consciousness
to reality, beginning with the most general level. Similar issues arise
at every other level of analysis as well, because this awareness of
contradiction between something and its non-identical conceptualization
62. Ibid., 361-408.
63. Ibid., l3 6 .
64. Ibid., 143.
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is the engine of thought. Its nonidentities continue to emerge. Adorno
is presenting an account of concrete socially-embodied reality. The
postulate of a longed-for reconciliation - of people with one another,
of humanity with its life, of consciousness with nature, we could
extend possible reconciliations ad infinitum - becomes an implicitly
utopian articulation. 65 This is further emphasized by his statement
about the role of theory two short paragraphs later:

"Those who chide

theory anachronistic [sic] obey the tapas of dismissing, as obsolete,
what remains painful as thwarted. ,,66 Theory is no anachronism, and what
is thwarted by the world as it is may not simply be dismissed as
meaningless. Defying "the world's course" that does the thwarting, and
helping to fulfill the desires so thwarted, is precisely what theory is
supposed to do. Once again, theory is presented as a practical
intervention in the "world's course." Theory pries open and holds open
the space for an intellectual apprehension of that which differs, in
precise ways, from the official or accepted representation of the world
in which the theory is developed. This structure, of an intellect
oriented towards extending the possibilities of the world, is the
paradigrnatically utopian structure as presented by Adorno.
Then, he works through the alternatives to the articulation of a
utopia to be desired beyond the operation of any dialectics. Dialectics
itself is a method confined to the current situation, and to the core
or kernel of nonidentity which lies at the very heart of the most
traditional philosophy. "Nonidentity is the secret telas of

65. It is important to distinguish those explicitly utopian references, and
those references that might be construed as utopian because of the desiderata
they contain, as does this reference to ultimate reconciliation. This statement
seems worth including, in light of Adorno's embrace of Bloch, whose own
identifications of utopian thinking are broadly inclusive.
66. Ibid., 143.
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identification. un Instead of forcing things to become identical with
their concepts, says Adorno, we need to recognize and acknowledge

~the

concept's longing to become identical with the thing. u68 Here Adorno
invokes Plato's ideas, in a passage that is as lyrical as it is
explicitly utopian:

the ideas are the

~negative

joining of pragmatism and utopianism, that live

signs" of truth, the
~in

the cavities

between what things claim to be and what they are," and that point to
the possibility of ~A" becoming ~what it is not yet. "69 The conclusion
to this exposition of the ideas is then explicitly utopian:
~Utopia would be above identity and above contradiction; it
would be a togetherness of diversity. For the sake of utopia,
identification is reflected in the linguistic use of the word
outside of logic, in which we speak, not of identifying an
obj ect, but of identifying with people and things. "70

In this critically important passage, in his discussion of the concepts
and categories of the negative dialectical method, Adorno identifies at
a very general level the content, or rather, the criterion of the
utopian situation he has in mind. The utopian vision, then, sketches
the objective of the negative dialectical method or program.
His exposition then proceeds to elaborate the method, rationale,
and categories involved in the negative dialectical philosophical
program:

contradiction, and its rationale; in particular the category

of negation; the position of the individual. Here we move closer, still
implicitly, to utopian thinking once again, prefiguring something that
will arise at the end of the section. The discussion leads into the
category of the constellation. Finally, a discussion of the re-casting
of the familiar concepts of essence and appearance within negative
dialectics, and further discussion of other critical concepts finishes

67.
68.
69.
70.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

149.
149.
150.
150.
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the exposition. None of the discussion makes any explicit reference to
utopia. Nevertheless, the exposition of the negative dialectical
program, and the rationale for it, target a "world's course" that would
eliminate the possibility of utopian thinking. The negative dialectical
thinking developed by Adorno amounts to the cultivation of a form of
thought that includes space for the idea of utopia. This space is held
open by rejecting the (always premature) philosophical closure that is
ardently desired by the thinking mind, but that most urgently threatens
utopian perception.
Physicality and Suffering
What it means, ultimately, for negative dialectics to grant a
preponderance of attention to objects, to give them their due, to
resurrect the objective content of the subject, and so on, is
ultimately to have posed one of the critical problems of humanity that humankind is physical existence with the potential to understand
itself - which can also be construed as a togetherness in diversity.71
This peculiar human structure leads Adorno instantly to a consideration,
in this context, of the problem of suffering, and its inextinguishable
physical moment. Phenomena of consciousness are not exclusively
phenomena of some abstract consciousness, but are "invaded" by a
physical moment, the physicality of pain and suffering, or of happiness.
"A happiness blocked off from every such aspect [of sensual fulfillment]
is no happiness."n Once more the question of utopia hovers around the
text; the utopian impulse is precisely that towards the happiness of

71. Though it ought to be pointed out here instantly that the categories
"mind" and "body" themselves are subject to the criticism of abstract
categorization that is at the heart of the dilemma Adorno is trying to take
apart.
72. Ibid., 202.
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its inhabitants as the paramount question. 73 Adorno's negative
dialectical philosophy demands a serious consideration of the physical
moment not just of human existence but of thought itself, and of the
necessary consideration of that physical subjectivity in the reflection
of thought. Whatever the post-revolutionary utopia would be,
the telos of such an organization of society would be
to negate the physical suffering of even the least of its
members, and to negate the internal reflexive forms of that
suffering. By now, this negation in the interest of all can be
realized only in a solidarity that is transparent to itself
and all the living. ,,74
This observation leads to a critique of the allegedly materialist antiutopian praxis. That praxis, epitomized by the state socialism of the
USSR, allegedly builds on materialist dialectical philosophy. It fails
not only to produce happiness, but to tell the truth, in an ideological
insistence on thought being the representation of what it is thinking
about.
In opposition to this (anti-utopian) assertion, Adorno posits a
different theory of the relationship between thought and thing in the
activity of thinking:
The materialist longing to grasp the thing aims at the
opposite:
it is only in the absence of images that the full
object could be conceived. Such absence concurs with the
theological ban on images. Materialism brought that ban into
secular form by not permitting Utopia to be positively
pictured; this is the substance of its negativity.
. Its
great desire would be the resurrection of the flesh, a desire
utterly foreign to idealism, the realm of the absolute
spirit. 75

73. With this are set aside temporarily both flawed utopias, in which some
or all the inhabitants are actually unhappy - one thinks of Brave New World,
for instance; and also those utopias in which some, or, in the limiting case,
one, inhabitant is miserable - so, all utopias based on slavery, as in the
Republic, or the still-flawed postmodern utopia, open to any specific happymaking content, that obscurely requires the meaningless misery of one, in
Ursula K. LeGuin's "The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas."
74. Ibid., 204.
75. Ibid., 207.
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In other words, the truth a genuine, as opposed to an ideological,
materialism seeks is the substance of the material. Its transfiguration
as an image, which could then abandon the material source, would betray
that matter.
Thus, this critical programmatic section of Negative Dialectics
actually begins with utopian considerations, moves through an
elaboration of the philosophical considerations necessary to advance
these considerations, and ends with a statement of the criterion for
utopia. Utopia must be imageless, and in fact, cannot be arrived at by
means of representational thinking. The hope of negative dialectical
critique and this program of understanding is that it might escape the
threat of idealism, as well as the threat of materialist dogmatism, and
outline a way to pursue utopia through its pursuit of changing
constellations, in order to pursue a utopia that is always in danger of
being represented to death philosophically.
Semblance and Second Reflection in Aesthetic Theory
While utopia itself must remain imageless, images in the form of
artworks can render a service to utopia. The "incomparable metaphysical
relevance of the rescue of semblance, the object of esthetics [sic]"
lies in the way this semblance of transcendence points towards
something other than semblance and, at the same time, other than the
already known world. Moreover, the relationship of the philosophical
mind to that object, which it encounters in a material existence they
both share, and in which it can recognize the traces of a "moment of
transcendent objectivity" in which it also shares, constitutes "the
unobtrusive site of metaphysical possibility.,,76 This insight,

76. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 393. Lambert Zuidervaart translates what is
of incomparable metaphysical relevance, Adorno's "die Rettung des Scheins,"
more beautifully, and suggestively from the perspective of 'messianic light,'
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delineated in the concluding sections of Negative Dialectics, also
points explicitly towards the role Adorno sees for Kantian aesthetic
categories, and prefigures the project that takes detailed shape in
Adorno's Aesthetic Theory.
While Adorno's complex aesthetic theory deserves lengthy and
detailed examination in its own right, this chapter restricts itself to
identifying three aspects of central importance to its utopian moment,
and in particular to its address to a subject of utopian possibility.77
Those are the way the methodology of aesthetic theory proceeds, by
second reflection; the way the work of art reflects, and simultaneously
fails to reflect, transcendence; and the significance of the work of
art as an exemplar of creative praxis. Taken together, these points
demonstrate the role the development of aesthetic theory might play in
the cultivation of a subject of utopian possibility.
Aesthetic theory implicitly claims to be philosophy whose object is
art. Adorno's editors note that his intended motto for his own
Aesthetic Theory was a quote from Friedrich Schlegel, "What is called
the philosophy of art usually lacks one of two things: either the
philosophy or the art. ,,78 The irony was more than casual. Adorno's
planned introduction to the work makes clear his assessment that
existing aesthetic theory failed to make good its promise, which is, or
ought to be, the interpretation of the phenomenon of art, beyond the
phenomena of individual art works, as a source of objective knowledge. 79
From the side of philosophy, the truth content of art needs to be
as "the redemption of illusion." Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory:
The Redemption of Illusion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
77. See, among others, Donald A. Burke, "Adorno's Aesthetics of
Reconciliation: Negative Presentation of Utopia or Post-metaphysical PipeDream?" in Adorno and the Need in Thinking: New Critical Essays, eds. Donald A.
Burke, Colin J. Campbell, Kathy Kiloh, Michael K. Palamarek and Jonathan Short
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) 233-260; Finlayson, "The Work of
Art and the Promise of Happiness"; Jameson, Late Marxism; Zuidervaart, ibid.
78. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 366.
79. Ibid., 359.
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rescued from an epistemological context in which it is automatically
dismissed as false or irrelevant due to its difference from the
empirical world. 8o From the side of art, philosophy is to be called back
to its footing in the effort to give voice to suffering, which is "a
condition of all truth" and also that in which art's expression and
form "has its substance," without which what it would be is, at present,
unimaginable. 81
For this task, Adorno proposes
Kant's theory is more apposite to the contemporary situation,
for his aesthetics attempts to bind together consciousness of
what is necessary with consciousness that what is necessary is
itself blocked from consciousness. It follows its course, in
effect, blindly. 82
The reappropriation of Kant takes place, in part, in a redeployment of
Kantian aesthetic categories: beauty, natural beauty, art beauty,
spirit. Of greater interest here, however, is the specific
appropriation of this Kantian "blindness" in what Adorno calls "second
reflection." Second reflection is the philosophical counterpart to the
first reflection of artistic praxis. It is interpretive, but not in the
sense of seeking the "message" of the artwork, as if the artwork were
frankly communicative. Instead, second reflection "lays hold of the
technical procedures, the language of the artwork in the broadest sense,
but it aims at blindness. "83 It gropes its way backwards from the
monadic result that is the artwork towards a comprehension of the
problem the artwork set out to solve, the tensions it was forced to try
to resolve, and towards an understanding of the impulse that set the
work on its course in the direction of "the old darkness of the new. "84

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Adorno,
Adorno,
Adorno,
Ibid.,
Ibid.

Negative Dialectics, 393.
Negative Dialectics, 17; Aesthetic Theory, 261.
Aesthetic Theory, 343.
27.
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This philosophical encounter with the work of art is made necessary
by the complicated status of art itself, and is inseparable from the
"rescue of semblance" towards which Adorno's thought strives. "Art
awaits its own explanation," since art itself operates non-conceptually,
blindly groping towards the expression of its own truth from the side
of its engagement with ~he concrete. BS This explanation must make its
way dialectically back and forth between the complicated arrangement of
truth and falsehood embodied in the work of art. The recognition of
this complex and, in Adorno's presentation, objective inner-artistic
relationship leads to the second point of emphasis, the way the work of
art reflects and fails to reflect transcendence.
The work of art presents itself as a fact, but it is a complex fact,
a fact with a history that does not speak directly about that history.
What it speaks of, instead, is something that seems to be beyond or
different from the empirical world, in that it occupies space in the
empirical world - people can see it, hear it, feel it - but it
registers some greater or larger difference from the way things
actually are. The task of aesthetic theory is to grasp art's entrapment
in concrete technical and social relations that dictate its materials
and methods, to discern its actual technical achievements, and to
understand beyond those specific concrete achievements the more general
aim embodied by art.
Art is a form of fantasy. This exposes it to disqualification as
simply lying wish fulfillment. But"

. if art has psychoanalytic

roots, then they are the roots of fantasy in the fantasy of omnipotence.
This fantasy includes the wish to bring about a better world. "B6 Adorno
proposes as a reasonably exact definition of fantasy "the differential

85. Ibid., 353.
86. Ibid., 9.
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of freedom in the midst of determination," discernible in the "probably
aporetic nexus of problems" to which the artwork represents a proffered
solution. 87 These problems, which in some real sense are all problems of
material, incorporate the effects of the social totality and its
contradictions, since they, too, are deeply sedimented in the artist's
only available materials. 88 The task of aesthetic theory is to uncover
these problems, to analyze the contradictions facing the artist and to
understand the work of art as a response to those problems and
contradictions. At the same time, it is to perceive the contradictory
impulses of the artwork as the response to art's impossible predicament,
the concrete counterpart to the impossible predicament of philosophy:
The relation to the new is modeled on a child at the piano
searching for a chord never previously heard. This chord,
however, was always there; the possible combinations are
limited and actually everything that can be played on it is
implicitly given in the keyboard. The new is the longing for
the new, not the new itself: That is what everything new
suffers from. What takes itself to be utopia remains the
negation of what exists and is obedient to it. 89
While works of art modify the empirical world in critical ways,
they remain fully within that world. At their most transcendent, they
remain rooted in the matter of common life. Their illusory character,
however, is not only a "promise of happiness" without any guarantee. It
is also an ongoing invitation and provocation to think the thought of
something different from the world that is. "Artworks are what they are
able to become," and the task of aesthetic theory lies in trying to
survey the distance between what artworks aim for and what they manage
to achieve, by performing the redemptive task of "second reflection,"
re-reflecting what the work of art reflects in itself.

87.
88.
child.
89.

Ibid., 174.
For instance, F1aubert needs Emma Bovary to be married and to have a
But for that reason, she must be an awful mother.
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 32.
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If aesthetic theory faces up to this task, it brings to light and
cultivates an understanding of an aspect of the artwork that is deeply
relevant to utopian thinking. That is the work of art's identity as a
solution to a problem generated by the interaction of the subject with
its world. As noted, the artist works with materials that are available
to her,

and these materials are themselves spirited, historical,

social,

political, and include the contradictions built into these materials,
and the specific suffering they entail. The work of art is the existing
mediation of the tensions latent in this situation; it does its best,
if it is good art, to bring these into an internal relation, to resolve
the tensions, to order them, to make something of them. This task,
embodied as if complete in the work of art, is in essence also the task
of art's audience with respect to their own problem. Art seems to
manage, on its smaller scale, what people have yet to manage in the
larger commission that is the creation of a cultured social whole.
Because the work of art embodies the drive towards reconciliation, and
because it illustrates the creative process of finding ways around the
obstacles and through the aporias "given" to the artist, the work of
art constitutes a space that models the kind of thinking required of
the subject of possibility.
The Concept of Utopia
For Adorno, "utopia" designates most often a state or condition
that is, at its limit, what we could call "analytically prohibited."
That is, it would be a reconciliation of opposed, mutually exclusive
states, conditions, or entities. However, we might need to notice here
that the opposition, or mutual exclusion, of these states is itself
brought about by a kind of thinking. Ideological thinking produces the
opposition or mutual exclusion of real entities by concepts, and
perpetuates it through and by its operations. This recognition of the
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complicity of thought in the construction of its own delusive context
is one of Adorno's emphatic insights. The chance to make thought noncompliant with this delusive context is what makes the truth-seeking
effort of philosophy worthwhile.
The problems to which utopia will one day be required to answer, or
will need to answer in order to be the promised utopia are not ideal
problems. They are problems that reside in concrete material reality
rather than in thought alone. Problems like hunger and starvation,
disease, homelessness, material deprivations of every sort are not to
be resolved in principle or in theory without being addressed in
practice, at the level of specific hungry human beings, specific
wanderers, specific sufferers. But these material problems will, it
seems, ultimately not be resolvable without certain changes in the way
people think about all kinds of things, including themselves and the
world. The rehabilitation of the thinking subject is a central
prerequisite for sustainable utopian imagination.
SUbjectivity and Its Objective Content
One core problem faced by the thinking subject of western
philosophy is this subject's enmeshment in the objective world about
which it thinks. Every subject is also an object, asserts Adorno. Not
every object is a subject; it would presumably be a mistake to impute
consciousness, thoughts, to everything. But every subject is also an
object. Every subject has a material side, an existential side, a side
along which it interacts with objective reality, and which is not
equivalent to an interaction of ideas or thoughts. And along this side,
the subject comes to know its world in a way, and in ways, that pose a
challenge to the subject's mental life.
One implication is that the rational subject of western philosophy,
who stands apart from an objective world as an outsider and who
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dispassionately considers that world from an uninvolved vantage point,
is a fiction. The thinking subject, whether individual or collective and Adorno disdained the imputation of consciousness to a group as such
- being also an object, is caught up in the consideration of the
objects of the world and of thought. 9o In thinking, it is mixed with
these objects experientially, shares something of them, is "like" them,
although also "unlike" them, in being mediated to itself in different
ways. Thought is an activity, but it is not an activity like building a
house, in which one proceeds through a series of steps to a predesigned outcome. It is rather more like following a trail towards a
destination that is not very well envisioned in advance, a destination
which might or might not be clearly recognizable once reached.
What the western philosophical tradition has treated as
"transcendence" is shadowed by an estrangement from objective reality,
born of this very "transcendence." This estrangement is perhaps nowhere
better evidenced than in the Kantian treatment of the categories givens for the thinking mind - and the elusive "thing in itself" of the
real world, from which, as rational and thinking beings, we are
definitively estranged by the workings of our own minds. Adorno finds
fault with this Kantian subject, but continues to work within a
tradition in which the subject experiences estrangement from objective
reality through the mediation of thought, which is a mechanism of
estrangement, a substitution of concepts for things in themselves,
concepts which perennially fail to become transparent, which abstract
from the concrete particularity, and hence individuality and nonsubstitutability of the various concrete conditions and situations in
which human beings find themselves and about which they long to arrive

90. On Adorno's rejection of the collective subject, see Buck-Morss, ibid.,
28-32, 82-85.
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at understanding. Adorno accepts the core opposition in western
philosophical tradition between presence or immediacy and
understanding. 91
Understanding is necessarily conceptual; understanding and truth
involve an ineluctable quantum of separation of subject and object.
Adorno does not hold out the elusive grail of unmediated knowledge in a
kind of fusion of subject with object that dissolves the separation
between the two in a mystical way. However, he leaves himself open to
something very close to this mode of apprehension of objective reality,
possibly through the medium of a common recognition of mutual objective,
material existence, a common ground of subject and object that permits
(mediates) the knowledge and understanding sought. This is the thesis
of Lisa Yun Lee, who notes the significance of corporeality and
mutuality in Adorno's thought. 92
A number of Adorno's references to utopia, then, make use of this
by-definition-separated or by-definition-opposed concept of subject and
object, or of thought and material reality, such that the "utopia"
would be reconciliation, would be "to unseal the non-conceptual with
concepts, but without making it their equal," would be to achieve a
kind of seamless co-presence of thought or philosophical presentation
and the body of language in which it is housed.

93

We might think of this

91. Calling this opposition into question has been one of the central
projects of postmodern philosophy, which since Derrida has attacked the
opposition from the direction of a belief in a kind of presence that escapes
and yet precedes understanding, constituting a privileged access to reality
that the mind endeavors to mimic or attain. Rather, it seems from a Derridean
vantage point, no such access to a reality unmediated by prior concepts exists
at all, so that the alleged opposition between presence and understanding
collapses into an opposition between one mode of understanding and another, one
elaboration of a discourse of thought and another, with alleged presence
supporting a particular appropriation by thought of what is adjudged to be a
particular kind of reality. See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other
Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1973).
92. Lee, ibid.
93. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 10.
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as utopia as the achievement of the debarred desirable, since
conceptual thought arises from a desire to understand objective outside, material, non-self - reality, a longing towards what is
outside the self, and even to some extent what turns out also be within
the self but unknown, overlooked and underappreciated. Utopia
represents the accomplishment or satisfaction of that longing.
The Myth of the Constitutive Subject
A second core problem with the position of the subject of thought
in the west is this subject's confusion of his or her thoughts with the
things about which they are thought. This confusion has been extended
in an ideological fashion, as a denial of the content of objects that
exceeds their concepts. This denial may take the form of a nominalistic
tendency to define a concept by the immediate reality to which it
applies but partially, and to deny that an alternative definition or
representation of the concept may legitimately govern its use. For
instance, we might talk about a society of "free human beings" or a
declaration of "human rights," and imagine that the term "freedom" is
exhausted by the way it is implicitly defined within liberal
democracies, or rather, those societies that go by that name and that
can be enumerated in lists of existing polities.
With respect to this problem, utopia takes on the appearance of
that state or condition, that social arrangement, in which the truth of
key concepts is realized. This realization would be the indictment of
all partial identifications, and the vindication of insistence on the
full specification of a particular concept. People are fully free in
actuality, rather than in some limited way. People are actually happy,
when they are happy, and not theoretically or necessarily so.
"Knowledge" means what it points to in ordinary usage, not the limited
"what passes for knowledge" that we accept as falling under that
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concept in contemporary life as it is organized and lived under more or
less authoritarian social arrangements.
Adorno's metaphysical moments stress the breaking-in of happiness,
almost shamefully, in the course of life. 94 These in-breakings forbid
the despair that would, in itself, condemn the course of the world to
despair. The persistent experience of something that contradicts
conclusive despair compels a different conclusion. "All happiness is
but a fragment of that complete happiness that men are denied, and
denied by themselves.
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Utopia, which represents the actualized realm

of that complete happiness, thus persists in appearing as
simultaneously outlandish or foolish, and as possible.
Adorno's repeated references to the "image ban" or the prohibition
of mentioning "the name" of God, drawn from his acquaintance with
Jewish and Christian religious tradition, should probably also be read
in the light of this understanding of utopia and redemption as holding
open the possibility of something outside what the extant and
historical world dictates as reasonable. Such references abound in
Adorno's work, in particular forming the crux of his meditations on
metaphysics at the conclusion of Negative Dialectics and arising also
in Aesthetic Theory. His explicit references to this iconoclastic
monotheistic tradition are what led Jacoby to use Adorno as the
paradigmatic "iconoclastic utopian". Perhaps more important in light of
the role of utopian conceptualization, however, might be the role of
religious symbolism, if not religious organization or practice, in

94. " . . . the lighting up of an eye, indeed the feeble tail-wagging of a
dog one gave a tidbit it promptly forgets, would make the ideal of nothingness
evaporate. A thinking man's true answer to the question whether he is a
nihilist would probably be 'Not enough' - out of callousness, perhaps, because
of insufficient sympathy with anything that suffers." Adorno, Negative
Dialectics, 380.
95. Adorno, ibid., 404.
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providing the concept of an alternative reality, something not subsumed
under the concept of the existential.
Robert Scharlemann has argued that Adorno's refusal of totality,
which was consistent with his commitments as a theorist of the
Frankfurt School, ruled out a theological consciousness. Adorno's
friend and older contemporary Paul Tillich, on the other hand, could
develop a systematic theological account of reality precisely because
he accepted a concept of totality.96 Adorno's insistence on a different
and non-totalizing understanding of reality does, however, display
aspects of solidarity with theology. Adorno's refusal to conceptualize
a totality insists on his perspective that human consciousness, which
must respect its own subjective position, is not in a position to
perceive or theorize something like a totality, but instead always
takes wrong on its understanding of totality. Tillich, a theologian who
took Adorno and his ideas seriously, himself acknowledged the demonic
force of idolatry. Adorno's adamant refusal to permit the construction
of final totalities in his philosophy points in the same rigorously
iconoclastic direction. Adorno explicitly refuses every form of
dogmatic consolation as a matter of principle. 97 Nevertheless, his
ultimate insistence on "solidarity with metaphysics" proceeds from a
commitment that his negative dialectical approach shares with the
dogmatic traditions. It may no longer be possible to theorize
transcendence in any of the ways the metaphysical tradition has tried;
all have proved faulty on his analysis. But the subject of knowledge
recognizes, truly, that its "need in thinking" is a need for something

96. Robert P. Scharlemann, "Totality: A Philosophical and Theological
Problem Between Tillich and the Frankfurt School," in Laval theologique et
philosophique, 47:3 (1991) 329-341, http:id.erudit.org/iderudit/400626er,
(accessed January 11, 2010).
97. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 405.
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like transcendence:

the objective reality of something outside that

subject and its prior knowledge. 98
Conceptual Commitment as Utopian Discourse
The line of thinking that secures the need for something that is in
solidarity with metaphysical thinking is thought at its most rigorous
and abstract. Adorno insists that this form of thought is the
prerequisite for a defensible utopian imagination and, even more, any
practice that would proceed from that imagination. His persistent
defense of the need for philosophy attests to this profound conviction.
What is at stake in philosophy, the effort to grasp and understand
reality conceptually, is whether understanding will come to the aid of
a suffering humanity or, instead, will perpetuate the domination under
which humanity suffers. Adorno's by now famous contention that "the
need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth" arises
in the context of his insistence that philosophy must first of all take
as its privileged concern what is most concrete, least conceptual, and
then move beyond that. 99 Philosophy, by its understanding of concrete
reality, prepares the indispensable element of "transcendence" or
exteriority that might underwrite liberation. So Adorno's argument here
makes thought the potential vehicle of its own, and humanity's,
possible freedom:

"What in thought goes beyond that to which it is

bound in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge
of the subj ect. "100
An impending and real danger is that thought will abdicate its

responsibility to pursue truth. Adorno is not a post-modern thinker. He
takes truth seriously, as adequate understanding of the concrete
situation in which the thinking subject thinks and acts, and identifies
98. Adorno, ibid., 408.
99. Adorno, ibid, 29.
100. Ibid.
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the quest for truth in that sense with the task of philosophy. Where
philosophy seeks to evade the discipline of truth-seeking and truthtelling it succumbs to ideology. Where philosophy succumbs to ideology,
thought collaborates with an oppressive reality, representing it to
consciousness as an irresistible and alien totality: "the subject as
the Subject's foe."101 This danger is being realized on all sides, from
the false equation of totalitarian statism with revolutionary praxis
that Adorno names at the outset of Negative Dialectics to the equally
false equation of "what is" with the defensible limit of cognition
championed by logical positivism, to the worship of death that founds
the jargon of authenticity, to the annihilation of thought in the
culture industries' presentation of pure ideology as "thoughtful" and
"thought-provoking". Against all of this, philosophy worthy of its
calling seeks to "crash through" the "fa<;:ades" erected by "the status
quo. "102
Adorno's arduously cerebral and carefully linguistic philosophy at
the same time relentlessly concerns itself with the corporeal and
concrete. As he announces in the introduction to Negative Dialectics,
the matters of greatest and most urgent interest to philosophy in the
late 20 11i century are "nonconceptuality, individuality, and
particularity .

.

it fails to cover

[a] matter of urgency to the concept would be what
.

. "103 It is precisely for this reason that the goal

of philosophy, the "cognitive utopia" is "to use concepts to unseal the
nonconceptual with concepts, without making it their equal. "104
The reflection that will furnish philosophy with the critique it
urgently requires depends upon its original and ultimate connection to

101.
102.
103.
104.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

22.
29.
8.
10.
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the body and bodily human life. Utopia will be a recovery of a valid
and acknowledged physical, corporeal human life, human life lived in
the body; its precondition is a way of thinking that prepares for a way
of life that does not depend on the domination of nature. Such a way of
thinking will constitute a significant departure from the operation of
the instrumental reason analyzed in Dialectic of Enlightenment, and
also from the totalizing dialectical reason of which Negative
Dialectics is the critique. In the end, Adorno's famous abstraction and
uncompromising intellectualism serves an understanding of subjective
life that is indissolubly tied to its bodily experience, and to its
desire for the satisfaction of that experience. l05 Another way to say
this is that "the emancipation of the subject depends on its capacity
to emancipate its object," including the object that constitutes the
subj ect' s very body. 106
Textual Form as Utopian Discursive Practice
Texts are bodies. lO ? The form of Adorno's texts embodies the utopian
aspiration deeply embedded in Adorno's work. With respect to Adorno's
utopian discourse, three elements of his textual practice require
particular note:

the use of "paratactical" textual practice, which is

most fully realized in Aesthetic Theory; the use of precise, and for
that reason sometimes inaccessible, language, dictated by the principle
of the subject matter; and the use of anti-systemic forms, a tactic
discussed most fully in "The Essay as Form." These three practices

105. See in particular Lee, ibid., on Adorno's commitment to the integrity
of embodied experience.
106. Robert Hullot-Kentor,"Translator's Introduction," in Adorno, Aesthetic
Theory, xiii.
107. "The vilification of Cicero and even Hegel's aversion to Diderot bear
witness to the resentment of those whom the trials of life have robbed of the
freedom to stand tall, and who regard the body of language as sinful." Adorno,
Negative Dialectics, 56, italics added.
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constitute different formal aspects of utopian aspiration, according to
interpretations provided by Adorno himself in his texts.
Adorno makes clear in more than one text that the form of the
philosophical text matters, not least for conveying its content. Adorno
comments extensively on matters of presentation and rhetoric, as
witnessed by his inclusion of sections on language in the introduction
to Negative Dialectics and the text of The Jargon of Authenticity.
Jargon itself was to have formed a section of Negative Dialectics, but
in its growth according to its own concept outgrew its space in that
work, and came to require its own housing. There, Adorno reflects at
length on a rhetorical strategy that produces a simultaneously reverent
and dismissive use of language to encourage the treatment of the most
conditioned form of experience as the most primal and unconditioned. lOS A
fragment of Minima Moralia includes cogent reflections on the
preparation of texts that pertain to Adorno's specific textual practice.
One paragraph in particular from this reflection, "Memento," is worth
quoting at length.
Properly written texts are like spiders' webs:
tight,
concentric, transparent, well-spun and firm. They draw into
themselves all the creatures of the air. Metaphors flitting
hastily through them become their nourishing prey. Subject
matter comes winging towards them. The soundness of a
conception can be judged by whether it causes one quotation to
summon another. Where thought has opened up one cell of
reality, it should, without violence by the subject, penetrate
the next. It proves its relation to the object as soon as
other objects crystallize around it. In the light that it
casts on its chosen substance, others begin to glow. 109
The metaphor of the spider's web leaves the reader in some doubt as
to the identity of the spider, whether the author or the subject matter
itself. The indication that it might be the author, the philosopher,
gains some support from a related fragment,

in which the text is

108. Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, translated by Knut
Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London: Routledge Classics, 2003).
109. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 87.
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likened to a house full of furniture, in which the author seeks to
dwell. Nevertheless, it is clear that the text-web also emanates from
the central constellation of ideas itself, and constitutes its
expression or unfolding; elsewhere, Adorno insists that "the
presentation of philosophy is not an external matter of indifference to
it but immanent to its idea."no The spider's construction of its web,
the philosopher's construction of a text, develop according to a
rigorous, stringent instinct-like discipline responsive to the content
itself.
Robert Hullot-Kentor has identified this arachnid form of Adorno's
posthumously published Aesthetic Theory as just such a "paratactical"
text. III His discussion of the differences between his own recent
translation of that work and its earlier appearance in English call
attention to the significance of the paratactical form in relation to
the more conventional, and presumably marketable, outline form. An
outline, visible as chapters, headings, and helpfully short paragraphs,
advertises a linear, progressive argument, and a systematic thrust.
That strategy is disavowed, for better and worse, in the paratactic
form. The paratactic form moves from one point to another in strict
parallel with transitions and shifts in its object of analysis,
repeating itself throughout. The form denies externally imposed system
while affirming internal dynamics. With respect to the maintenance of
customary relations of space and time, a paratactical text produces "a
constantly looming sense of being caught in a vortex" due to its
repetition, and both posits and impedes the recognition of the "virtual
presence of the whole of the text at anyone point."lU In that sense, it
enacts both the immanence, and the blockage, of the feasible and
110. Ibid., 18.
111. Hu11ot-Kentor, ibid., xiv-xix.
112. Ibid., xvii-xviii.
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effectively denied utopia latent in the society that produced modern
art.
Such paratactical texts, of which Negative Dialectics is also an
example, perform the refusal of a philosophical system that would
impose a false identity between an object of investigation and the
philosophical concept through which it is investigated and understood,
an identity that can in the end only be imposed illegitimately and
prior to investigation. That false identity constitutes a potent weapon
of ideology, and discourages the attentive engagement of sUbjectivity
and objectivity from which utopic practice might be expected to arise.
The paratactical form takes on, in the context of Adorno's work, yet
another implicit invitation to the cultivation of utopian consciousness.
Adorno's merely mortal readers might well exclaim that, if this is
utopia, the easy dystopia feels preferable. The reaction arises all the
more since the fibers of Adorno's texts are the difficult formulations
of "precise" rather than

"clich~"

language. As he notes, "A writer will

find that the more precisely, conscientiously, appropriately he
expresses himself, the more obscure the literary result is
thought .

" since "[rJigorous formulation demands unequivocal

comprehension, conceptual effort, to which people are deliberately
dis encouraged .

." and only "consider understandaj;)le" what is readily

accessible, whether or not it communicates precisely.113 He derides the
tendency to rely on stereotyped phrasing, going as far as to caution
against the overuse of the conjunction "but" in a dialectical text. 1l4
And he insists on the need for patient, thoughtful selection of
vocabulary, attentive to the ravages wrought by recent history on the
meaning of words, and asserting that "the writer must combine the

113. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 101.
114. Ibid., 85.
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tightest control in ensuring that the word refers, without sidelong
glances, to the matter alone

,,115

This principled use of language

accompanies his philosophical insight that the concept itself, which
comes to material expression in language as nowhere else, is the
terrain on which whatever reconcilement between thought and its other,
the desire for which is Adorno's paradigm for utopian longing, is to be
negotiated.
What Adorno avoids on all accounts, as philosophically unwarranted,
is systematic, linear and hierarchical textual presentation. In "The
Essay as Form," he argues that essayistic effort of thought, which is
preeminently anti-systemic, may be the home of philosophy in the
contemporary period. Indeed, it constitutes a utopic practice.
Criticism of the essay as "fragmentary and random" stems from a view
that, illegitimately, presupposes the identity of subject and object
which Adorno's philosophy constantly challenges, and which the essay's
form denies. Moreover, the essay's preoccupation with "transitory"
matters is another mark in its favor:

"it points to that utopia which

is blocked out by the classification of the world into the eternal and
the transitory."u6 [emphasis added]
The "traditional idea of truth" opposed by the essay is the idea
that what is can be expressed correctly in a formula, statement,
narrative, intellectual system of concepts. In their correspondence,
clarity, and systematic relationship these statements and concepts are
to act as the double of the reality they purport to understand, and the
understanding they purport to represent. The logic on which this
concept relies purports to make different things identical by means of
the form of subject, object, and copula. In the context of "Trying to
115. Ibid., 221.
116. Theodor W. Adorno, "The Essay as Fonn," in The Adorno Reader, Brian
O'Connor editor (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 91-111, 99.
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Understand Endgame," Adorno asserts that Beckett exposes the everpresent absurdity in this logic, by taking it rigorously to its final
extreme in Hamm's last absurd insistence upon opening the window
precisely because it is pointless to do so. If opening the window is
pointless,

then it must be opened. Logic.

The alternative would, presumably, be to refashion understanding
into a different kind of tool, less analytic-descriptive, more
insightful and knowing. Statements that purport to describe always
remain outside and divorced from the concrete reality they pride
themselves on having captured - always without having captured the
essential qualities of concreteness. An alternative would be that
"cognitive utopia" that "would be to use concepts to unseal the nonconceptual with concepts, without making it their equal."l1? The problem
is the incommensurability between conceptual and nonconceptual, and the
aim of philosophy in its search for truth, "that the concept can
transcend the concept, the preparatory and concluding element, and can
thus reach the nonconceptual" is thereby in its inception and nature
dialectical, something that must make itself take contradictions
seriously. 118
The utopia "blocked out" by the division of reality into things
eternal and things transitory is that utopia in which truth is to be
sought in the realm of the transitory. A rejection of that division
expresses the specific desire to make that realm of the transitory the
eternal realm of truth and life. The essay, according to Adorno, values
precisely those aspects of life that higher philosophy typically
eschews, in favor of more abstract and general - i.e., livid and
lifeless - concepts. Its form functions utopically, as it elevates the

117. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 10.
118. Ibid., 9.
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micrological concerns of living authors with concrete things to the
level of serious philosophical consideration, and constitutes a textual
place where theory and practice almost become one. 119
Adorno, in sum, identifies the form of philosophical texts as
integral to the pursuit of the truth those texts explore and endeavor
to present. Philosophical texts whose form, as a precise embodiment of
their content, demand the reader's active engagement, are themselves an
invitation to a particular kind of practice. The practice of reading
such texts is not neutral; it affects the reader. This understanding of
the active engagement of the philosopher with the reader through the
vehicle of the philosophical text grows out of Adorno's understanding
of language. Language, like text, is not neutral; it is deeply enmeshed
in the content of what the subject knows. Language is also the
indispensable tool that philosophy uses to know what it knows. For that
reason, the subject needs to have available to it a language in which
it is possible to think the concept of utopia. Adorno's critique of
language addresses this issue.
Adorno's Critique of Language
Adorno shares with 21 st century philosophers a keen appreciation for
the role of language in the conduct of philosophy. Dialectics means
"language as the organon of thought," and locates its hope for breaking
through the context of apparent totality in a judicious use of language
that aims at "a mutual approximation of thing and expression," that
prepares the mutual approximation of thing and the thought that
expresses. 120 Adorno's comments on language are directed with hostility
towards contemporaneous developments that would reduce language
exclusively to an allegedly communicative consensus, eliminating its

119. Adorno, "The Essay as Form," 99.
120. Ibid., 56.
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potentially utopic naming function, as well as towards practices that
divorce language from the truth represented by content. Both
developments can be seen as threats of totalitarian, dystopian, closure
of the possibility of thought's rescue of the utopian moment. Adorno's
recurrent language about language has as an aim the conservation of
that moment.
The threat of totalitarianism in language arises from severing the
original link between language and its objective content. History has
witnessed a split between the sign function of language and the mimetic
function, in which something in language resembles something in the
objective world of which it speaks. The split took place long ago, but
has become increasingly complete, with the result that scientific use
of language views language exclusively as sign, while art (poetry)
treats it exclusively as expressive material. Both attitudes jeopardize
the potential, still latent in language, to mediate a relationship
between thought and thing.121 That potential can be activated
dialectically in the awareness of language as name and image, and in
the accompanying effort of "determinate negation" to read all images including those of names, concepts - "as script," as surfaces with the
abili ty to reveal "their social, historical, and human meaning. ,,122 Such
scripts incorporate both truth and falsehood, but in the process of
parsing these elements dialectically, even their moments of falsehood
can lead on to an understanding of truth.
This description of language owes everything to that of Walter
Benjamin in the prologue to The Origin of German Tragic Drama. There,
Benjamin distinguishes the communicative from the naming function of
language. The figure of Adam in Paradise becomes the prototype for

121. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectics of Enlightenment, 10-21.
122. Ibid., 20.
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language's naming function, which is a mimetic one:

"Ideas are

displayed, without intention, in the act of naming, and they have to be
renewed in philosophical contemplation. In this renewal the primordial
mode of apprehending words is restored."u3 Philosophy hereby acquires a
political task, becoming the struggle over the representation of ideas;
it also acquires a potentially transformative one, as it becomes
responsible for seeking, and inhabiting, a realm of truth that does not
depend simply on popular consensus or appearance.
Adorno does not adopt this perspective uncritically; he charges
Benjamin, too, with positing a premature identity between concepts and
the things they conceptualize. 124 Nevertheless, Adorno's recurrent
denunciations of nominalism and positivism acquire additional depth in
the context of Benjamin's depiction of language. The treatment of
language as exclusively the embodiment of ordinary usage, as containing
nothing that is "not merely significative," as being by definition a
system of signs, and not merely a system of signs, but a system that
depends less on individual words than on the system of differences they
encode, has already taken on the given and unquestionable character
Adorno sought to oppose.1 25 This makes exhortations like "we cannot
ignore the perpetual denunciation of rhetoric by nominalists to whom a
name bears no resemblance to what it says" all but structurally
unintelligible. 126 That unintelligibility is an index of the reality of
the threat Adorno perceived, and which the focus on language in his
philosophy opposed. Once again, the threat is that of the dystopian
closing off of imaginative possibilities.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Benjamin, German Tragic Drama, 37.
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 53.
Ibid., 56.
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The problem with nominalism and positivism, which are linked in
Adorno's treatment across his various texts, is that they reduce
language to the function of describing what may be observed in the
extant situation. They rob dialectical reasoning of its hand- and
footholds, by eliminating one pole of the situation used by dialectics
for its procedure, the pole of the larger meaning of a term. This is a
serious problem, in that dialectics is the philosophical method that
offers some hope for understanding both the current situation in which
philosophy finds itself and locating the possible exits from that
situation. Even more serious, however, is the effect of such a view on
consciousness. By denying the gap between idea and thing, perceptible
in language and its inadequacy, the participation of nature in the life
of thought is also denied, and thereby repressed. Nature is apprehended
exclusively as something to be dominated; thought is reduced to the
consciousness of such a nature. Nothing else appears. The exit - the
actual participation of nature and cognition in a common enterprise remains, but it is behind a curtain, and the light is out. The chances
that a suffering humanity will find the reconciliation that original
conjunction promises dwindle.
A similar concern with closure, and with truth content, animates
Adorno's critique of what he labels the jargon of authenticity. In this
use of language, with which he charges the German existentialist
authors of his day, the link between language and reality is broken in
a different way. Language is not limited to describing an empirical
situation, but used to point to a special experience that is, in
relation to its context, manufactured.

~The

empirical usability of the

sacred ceremonial words makes both the speaker and listener believe in
their corporeal presence," which

~is

delivered ready from the factory,
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a transcendence which is a changeling said to be the lost original. ,,127
It is language used with a hidden intent to deceive and conceal, in the
manner of repression, which cannot allow elements of 'particularly
traumatic content to reach consciousness. The traumatic content
repressed by the jargon of authenticity is the utter loss of meaning in
contemporary existence in the late capitalist way of life. It proceeds
by way of reverent depictions of wholesome, homey rituals that no
longer really are performed, an exaltation of religiosity without
doctrinal content, the deployment of old words as if they contained an
immanent meaning immune to history. 128
In the end, this language is the tool of a philosophy that seeks to
link a feeling of depth and ultimate meaning to the utter
meaninglessness of death in an irrational cause itself. The jargon
"asserts meaning with the gesture of dignity by which Heidegger would
like to dress up death. ,,129 This dignified gesture amounts to the
signature of the triumph of the enlightened unreason that is the target
of the critique of Dialectic of Enlightenment, the reduction of thought
to self-preservation. "The worn-out principle of the self-positing of
the ego, which proudly holds out in preserving its life at the cost of
the others, is given a higher value by means of the death which
extinguishes it. ,,130 What begins as a deformation of language ends in the
worship of the power that first elicited language, death, but without
any consolation other than posturing. 131 In the end, the problem of the
jargon of authenticity is that it attempts to keep alive the experience
of dignity in language, a dignity which needs to be seen for the
decadence it always contained. "With it goes that humanity which has
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Adorno, Jargon of Authenticity, 4.
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Ibid.,
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its basic nature not in self-reflection but in its difference from a
suppressed animality. ,,132
Language errs as much when it seeks to maintain that suppression,
in the face of a situation that makes it increasingly impossible to
maintain, as when it seeks to reduce thought to the pure reproduction
of immediate reality. In neither case is the ideal of self-reflection,
as the self-reflection of nature itself, glimpsed or cultivated. But
for Adorno, this self-reflection would be the route that might lead
towards a utopia worthy of the name. That is, this self-reflection
might generate an ultimately messianic light.
As an aside, Adorno's project preserves a peculiar place for and
emphasis on the appreciation and use of metaphor. Along with Nietzsche,
Adorno recognizes that much of what philosophers take for literal and
precise language constitutes "a mobile army metaphors," which, in
particular, constitute frozen social relationships.133 From Adorno's
perspective such language may be frozen in place in ways that block out
alternative, creative and potentially freeing cognitions. On the other
hand, some metaphors, precisely chosen, can illuminate truths that are
obscured by the operations of what conventional philosophy holds as
literal language, as his stress on the element of presentation in
philosophy, and his own judicious use of vivid metaphors, makes
abundantly clear.
The Subject of Utopia
As we have seen, Adorno deals with the epistemological problem of
the relationship of subject to object, and echoes of this problem

132. Ibid., 136.
133. Friedrich Nietzsche "On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense," in
Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, edited and translated by Sander L.
Gilman, Carole Blair and David J. Parent (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989) 246-257, 250.
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reverberate throughout his work. 134 Adorno takes the problem of the
relationship of "the subject" to "the object" seriously, making it
central to his major works. That may strike post-modern readers, who
take the death of the subject as yesterday's news, as quaint. Adorno
himself acknowledges the inescapable vagueness of the formulation. 135
Nevertheless Adorno treats the alienation of the subject of thought,
in its thought, from concrete reality as both emblematic and
constitutive of the dystopian reality of the late 20th century. The
reversion of enlightenment to myth as a consequence of the subject's
ignorance and heedlessness of its domination by nature in the aims of
enlightenment itself is but one striking example. In returning to the
problem over and over again, his effort to find ways to overcome the
problem philosophically constitutes the utopic direction of Adorno's
philosophy.
The central dilemma of the sUbject-object problem is the alienation
of the subject from its object or objects. This alienation, captured by
the form of the concept as "the wall between thinking and the thought,"
separates the knower from what the knower knows (as that which is
thought, its object)

.136

"The thought" in this context, that miniscule

separation, also forms the substrate of domination. It constitutes
domination all the more as the subject remains ignorant of its
participation in its material object, because of its own status as an
object, and because of its own objective material composition.
In his latest statement on the matter, Adorno wrote "If speculation
on the state of reconciliation were permitted, neither the
undistinguished unity of subject and object nor their antithetical

134. See Buck-Morss, ibid.; Brian O'Connor, Adorno's Negative Dialectic.
135. Theodor Adorno, "Subject and Object," in The Adorno Reader, edited by
Brian O'Connor (Oxford: Blackwell, 137-151.
136. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 15.
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hostility would be conceivable in it;" what would be conceivable,
instead, would be "the communication of what was distinguished," that
is, the communication of what is distinguished as "subject" and what is
distinguished as "object.,,137 The sentiment echoes images traced as early
as Dialectic of Enlightenment, in which the genuine utopia, in contrast
to Bacon's patriarchal one of the mastery of nature by mind, involves
the synchronous reconcilement in difference of mind with its origin. 138
This reconcilement "would be the thought of the many as no longer
inimical, a thought that is anathema to sUbjective reason," because of
its urge to subject everything to itself .139
What emerges from Adorno's treatment of the relationship of subject
to object, is that the subject itself may not finally, legitimately, be
separated from its individual, particular human subjects, however
epistemologically abstract or socially collective an understanding may
be demanded during the course of philosophical investigation. These
human subjects are the subjects of the utopia, as insufficient as
merely individual happiness is to constitute utopia as such.14o Adorno's
critique of Hegel culminates in his rejection of the immense distance
of absolute spirit from its bearers, in which "the subject, the
substrate of freedom,

is so far detached from live human beings that

its freedom in necessity can no longer profit them at all.,,141
Adorno's allusion to the desirable philosophical condition in which
the subject and object of knowledge actually "communicate," in which
subject recognizes its own objectivity, and in which the object's
participation in conceptualization becomes more transparent, has

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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appealed to feminist theorists. 142 It presents a figure of reciprocity
rare in mainstream philosophy. It shares an affinity with Irigaray's
understanding of the need to ensure communication across the boundary
of sexual difference, and the relationship of that line to the
conceptualization of the line between culture and nature, of which more
later. And it attests to the centrality of this particular basic
structure of thought, in Adorno's philosophical discourse, to the
matter of utopia. For Adorno, the distance between society as it is and
the utopia that even this society might realistically strive to bring
into being, stems from the drive towards domination that finds its
earliest and pre-eminent expression in epistemological subjectivity,
along with its characteristically instrumental attitude. The
achievement of a happy, mutual relationship between thinker, thought,
and thought-about, would require the acknowledgement on the part of
thought of its own objectivity, or

~nature,"

or

~particularity,"

as

well as its own enmeshment in relations of power vis-a-vis nature, its
own status as repressed and dominated nature. Such an acknowledgement
would be tantamount to the achievement of a form of consciousness with
an affinity to class consciousness, based on membership in a large
class:

the class of social beings dominated by reified mind. Such a

consciousness might, if it proceeded thoughtfully, be able to

~devote

itself to dissolving that power. "143 Empirical signs of this devotion are
few and fleeting. Adorno's philosophical work seems inclined towards
encouraging their appearance.
Paradoxically, the estrangement of subject and object that
constitutes the problem also seems to hold the key to its solution, if
that solution is ever to be effected. That is, the hope for a
142. Lee, ibid.; Patricia Mills, Feminist Interpretations of Hegel
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996).
143. Horkheimer and Adorno, ibid., 34.
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reconcilement lies in a principled refusal to succumb to the delusion
of identitarian ideology, to accept any substitute or sham
reconcilement, but to hold out for its actuality, even if its actuality
is unreachable in its fullness. This task demands of thought, of
philosophy, an adamant refusal to work towards pre-scribed systematic
solutions, or to impose alien thought forms on its object. A philosophy
that would work in the direction of hope must resolutely hold its own
concepts, the tools with which it cannot dispense, in perpetual
suspicion, leaving them open to dialectical correction by the reality
they endeavor to grasp.144
Space and Time
Adorno's utopian enunciations are directed towards preventing a
complete totalitarian or identity-thinking closure. They search for the
location of some discrepancy, a necessary distance, between conditions
as they are and some alternative. The concluding section of Negative
Dialectics, the "meditations on metaphysics," proffers "the object of
aesthetics" as one such a place. 145 The place constituted by the
aesthetic object is a problematic one. The promises the aesthetic
object makes are always over-promises, without the guarantees required
by philosophy. Nevertheless, the structure of the aesthetic object, in
relation to the structure of the world in which it appears, acts as a

144. This insistence embodies, in capsule form, the appropriate response to
Nigel Gibson, who challenges Adorno's reading of Hegel, in particular around
the function of the "absolute negative" in Hegel's system, as well as his
reading of Marx's theory of alienated labor. The central point of departure for
Negative Dialectics, which applies to every conceptual criticism leveled at its
thinking, is that "objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a
remainder" (5) and that furthering an understanding of the relationship of the
subject to that remainder is the vital desideratum. The method of calling
attention to Adorno's non-Hegelian-Marxist failure to understand the true
meaning of Hegel's and Marx's concepts as challenges to the import of Negative
Dialectics misses that point by a wide margin. See Nigel Gibson, "Rethinking an
Old Saw: Dialectical Negativity, Utopia, and Negative Dialectic in Adorno's
Hegelian Marxism," in Adorno: A Critical Reader, edited by Nigel Gibson and
Andrew Rubin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) 257-291.
145. Adorno, ibid.,
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concrete representative of an alternative to the closed context of
immanence that mitigates against utopia.
Adorno is careful to point out how "micrological" the potential of
this object, or of any possible metaphysical thought that aims at
transcendence, has become. Metaphysical possibility - which remains
desirable for a humanity that continues to wish to revoke the suffering
that is past as well as redeem the suffering that obtains and cancel
whatever suffering might await in future, but the truth of which has
become radically questionable - retreats into micrology.146 The category
of the micrological is probably on loan from Walter Benjamin, and
relates as well to his concept of constellations. 147 It is illustrated in
Adorno's metaphysical speculations in two ways. One is with his
concluding insistence that the smallest "intramundane traits" are the
stuff of metaphysics, suggesting a focus on the most particular as the
pre-eminently suggestive of something irreducible to identity
thinking.l4B The other is his striking statement that small
representational discrepancies make themselves disproportionately
significant, as in the discrepancy between "death" and "rest" that
constitutes the "haven of hope, the no-man's land between the border
posts of being and nothingness" that serves as a metaphor for the
possibility of utopic space .149
A no-man's land is the opposite of a romantic place removed from
day-to-day conflicts. In war, a literal no-man's land is by definition
146. Ibid., 407-408.
147. According to Giorgio Agamben in The Coming Community, Walter Benjamin
was fond of a tale about the world to come in which "everything will be just as
it is now, just a little different." Agamben, The Coming Community, 53. Novalis,
in The Universal Sketchbook, repeats the same story with a slight variation:
"In the world to come everything will be as it was in the former world - and
yet it will be altogether different. The world to come is rational Chaos - the
Chaos that has permeated itself - that is inside and outside itself - Chaos 2 or
ao" See David Farell Krell, "Two Apothecaries: Novalis and Derrida," Studies in
Romanticism 46:3 (Summer, 2007) 289-309, 301.
148. Adorno, ibid., 407.
149. Ibid., 381.
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a contested space, fraught with lethal possibilities. In peace, it is
marginalized and excluded, less a place that supports life than a place
that testifies to its withdrawal. A conventional metaphorical use of
the term emphasizes its undecidable and precarious character. ISO But
precisely because it constitutes a place that cannot be definitively
claimed for one side or the other, and because it belies the identity
of socially- and politically-imposed boundaries on something that
continues to exceed and underlie them, it constitutes the "neutral"
territory that is always, as Louis Marin insists, the classic structure
of utopia. ISI Despite its empty appearance, no-man's land has the right
address.
The hope associated with this no-man's land, as also with the
object of aesthetics, is less directly spatial than it is temporal. It
is the hope that something might yet happen, or rather, be made to
happen. It is inseparable from the refusal of "absolute conclusiveness"
in history that is the temporal consequence of the negative dialectical
approach. IS2 The stubborn refusal of history, or something like history,
to come to an end constitutes the temporal horizon of a utopian hope,
though not of expectation. The possibility that something un-natural,
un-conditioned might yet arise in the still-moving historical space or
place is too small to label hope, but not too small to link to the
micrology of a thought that would affirm its solidarity with
metaphysics. What an ontological philosophy would exempt from history,
dialectics locates within it, making history itself a place where
something worthy of the name of metaphysics, the philosophy of
something beyond the immediate and dystopian context of everyday life,
150. "An area of human activity characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, or
peril." Funk & Wagnall's Standard College Dictionary (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1966).
151. Marin, ibid.
152. Adorno, ibid., 403.
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"may originate only with the realization of what has been thought in
its sign. ,,153 The failure of human beings simply to be what they are and
always have been, to go into their concept without a remainder, remains
the source, micrological as it is, of whatever possibility of utopic
practice, or creation, might be anticipated from Adorno's analysis.
If hope is prohibited, as if its enunciation would be idolatrous,
despair is prohibited all the more, particularly in the context of a
history that still provides the concept of an outside, as the concept
of "not yet." Despair, too, is tantamount to idolatry: it fallaciously

"

guarantees to us that the hopelessly missed things exist . . . ",

though they are not of this world. 154 This treatment of despair should
remind us of Agamben's analysis of the medievalists' acedia, embodied
in Durer's etching of the angel looking motionlessly into the distance,
surrounded by forsaken toolS. 155 That image itself encodes an
indispensable element of contemplation, and attachment to the image of
what is contemplated. Its specific error in Adorno's context would lie
in its attachment to a prematurely-closed form. The inability to act
associated with acedia would be inseparable from the inability to
relinquish the beloved image for an activity promising more substantive
content, but without any guarantee of its ultimate form. "If rescue is
the inmost impulse of any man's [sic] spirit, there is no hope but
unreserved surrender:

of that which is to be rescued as well as of the

hopeful spirit. ,,156
But if a rescue of the self along with the hope for it must be
abandoned, the persistence of truth "along with its temporal core"

Ibid., 404.
Ibid., 372.
Giorgio Agamben, Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture,
translated by Ronald L. Martinez (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1993) .
156. Adorno, ibid., 392.
153.
154.
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continues to open up a place that travels along with the course of
history.ls7 That place constitutes its ever-present, promising and as-yet
dissatisfied companion. It cannot be the "homogeneous, empty time" of
the Social Democratic illusion of progress derided by Walter Benjamin,
although whether Adorno's dialectical time contains the messianic

"Jetztzeit" described by Benjamin is not entirely certain. ISS If it does,
it will be because "a legible constellation of things in being" had
been read in such a way that its "elements unite to form a script" a
script unlike that of the administered world with its repetitive
prescribed relations and outcomes, both in the truth of its content and
the fidelity of its form.

IS9

The task of noticing, reading, copying, and

distributing that script seems to belong to philosophy. Saying so
constitutes the recurrent theme of Adorno's utopian discourse.
Adorno's Reader as a Subject of Possibility
In short, while utopia is not often the explicit topic of Adorno's
philosophical texts, the possibility of utopian imagination is a
constant concern of his philosophical work. Adorno persistently
addresses his reader as a subject trying to know, and in particular,
trying to know how to respond to the suffering that subject encounters
in herself and her world. Adorno's address incorporates a recurrent
critical moment that depicts the reader's context as one of deeply
dystopian urgency, which it is the philosopher's task to display, and
the reader's task to grasp and see clearly. The analysis of that
situation, and of its underlying causes, comes in the form of texts
that cannot be read and understood without adopting a significantly
modified point of view, an altered subjective state. The language of
157. Ibid., 371.
158. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in
Illuminations, edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt (New York:
Schocken Books, 1978) 261.
159. Adorno, ibid., 407.
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those texts is self-consciously language that permits, and in places
encourages, something like metaphysical experience. This use of
language stands in contrast to the superficially self-effacing
operation of conventional or nominalistic language on one hand, and in
contrast to the self-consciously mystical pretensions of "authentic"
language on the other.
The subject of philosophical inquiry, insofar as that subject is a
reader of Adorno's philosophy, hereby becomes a site of the discrepancy
between concepts and their objects in the struggle to come to an
adequate appreciation of those texts and that language. This state of
discrepancy is a state of possibility. The subject of that state is a
subject in a better position to cultivate the need in thinking in the
direction of truth, one condition of which for Adorno is, as already
noted, the "effort to give a voice to suffering."
That some of that suffering is the direct effect of the
philosophical task, properly pursued, reflects the relationship of
philosophy to truth, and the relationship of truth to its world. Only
in a happy world could philosophy honestly be a gay science. The double
reflection that philosophy must undertake is negative on both hands. On
one, it must enter the confrontation with "consummate negativity" which
"once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image of its opposite. ,,160 On
the other, it must pursue the "redemption of illusion" in the knowledge
of art. For Adorno, this second reflection is potentially restorative.
"What spirit requires of subjective spirit is that spirit's own
spontaneity. The knowledge of art means to render objectified spirit
once again fluid through the medium of reflection. ,,161 In the fantastic
fluidity of that reflected light, a micrological possibility might be

160. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247.
161. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 357.
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realized: that of an active thought which, in affirming its solidarity
with metaphysics, is reminiscent of something messianic, without
mentioning its name.
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CHAPTER III
RADIATION

Luce Irigaray has spent a lifetime pointing out the incomparable
metaphysical relevance of sexual difference. The history of western
thought makes it possible to recognize the object of aesthetics as the
trace of an enigmatic other who has synthesized and reflected material
and social reality in a complex way under the press of an impulse to
create a better reality. The history of that same thought makes it
possible to recognize woman as nature. That demonstrates that the
tremendous energy and illumination that could radiate from sexual
difference - energies that could power the discovery of "worlds more
fecund than any known to date" - have not only not been addressed, they
have not even been sensed. "Sexual difference is probably the issue in
our time which could be our 'salvation' if we thought it through."l
Irigaray's work as one of the controversial "French feminists" has
by now spanned several prolific decades. Like Adorno, her work touches
a wide range of concerns, from linguistics through psychoanalysis to
philosophy. She is a practicing psychoanalyst who has expressed
explicit appreciation for the psychoanalytic tradition and its
therapeutic possibilities. She is a practitioner of religious
traditions, in particular meditation based on Hinduism. She has engaged
in political activity, notably through her work with the Italian

1. Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. by Carolyn Burke
and Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 5.
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communist party. She is also, when the opportunity presents itself, an
educator. 2
Her work also demonstrates a similarly wide range of influences. It
engages central theoretical insights of psychoanalysis, with which she
takes issue but which she also appropriates at significant junctures.
It draws on linguistics, including Irigaray's own original research in
this area. And it famously displays the fruit of her "fling with the
philosophers," from Plato through Levinas and Derrida. 3 Nietzsche and
Heidegger in particular have become the conversation partners of fulllength dedicated philosophical treatments in Irigaray's characteristic
mimetic style. 4 In comparison with the depth and breadth of the
influences and import of her work, the focus of this chapter, which
devotes most of its attention to three of Irigaray's recent texts,
seems narrow.
Irigaray's reputation as a controversial theorist grew following
the publication of Speculum de l'autre femme (Speculum of the Other
Woman), an event to which she also owed her dismissal from the
University of Vincennes. In that work, she stated that she was working
to develop the appropriate objective context for an investigation of
feminine subjectivity, a topic which has formed her perennial interest.
Irigaray's early work remains integral to her larger intellectual
objectives. Nevertheless, this chapter focuses attention on three more
recent works, I love to you (J'aime

a

toil, The Way of Love (La Voie de

l'amour), and Sharing the World. These texts include both the critical
and utopian elements identified by Margaret Whitford in her analysis of

2. Luce Irigaray, Teaching, ed. by Luce Irigaray with Mary Green (New York:
Continuum, 2008).
3. Irigaray, This Sex, 150.
4. See Luce Irigaray, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Gillian C.
Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) and Luce Irigaray, L'oubli de
L'air Chez Martin Heidegger (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1983).
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Irigaray's early writings, but lean more heavily toward the utopian
than the critical side. s The focus on these texts in particular permits
discussion both of Irigaray's interactions with Hegel, which are most
on display in I Love to You, and her interactions with the Heidegger of
"On the Way to Language" and "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" which are
explicit in the construction of The Way of Love and Sharing the World.
Irigaray may be best known for the frequent label of "essentialism"
that has accompanied her indefatigable emphasis on sexual difference.
In spite of an alleged dissipation of the essentialism-antiessentialism tensions associated with discussion of Irigaray's work in
recent years, this theme remains one of the most accessible handles by
which Irigaray's work is grasped in casual conversation. 6 Since the
question of sexual difference colors the chapter that follows, the
question about essentialism poses itself accordingly. But the emphasis
here will fall to a much greater degree on the way Irigaray deploys
language of sexual difference as she interacts with Heidegger on the
development of language and its role in the generation of culture. That
is, the emphasis is on her effort to develop a paradigm of conversation
between two. This effort goes beyond the paradigm of "amorous exchange"
to which Margaret Whitford's analysis points, extending that exchange
to include interactions that are something different from what is
commonly called "amorous," although no less cognizant of sexual
difference. This exchange still takes place along a way Irigaray
characterizes with the word "love," the way of which she describes as

5. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine.
6. Alison Stone, "The Sex of Nature: A Reinterpretation of Irigary's
Metaphysics and Political Thought," Hypatia 18:3 (Autumn, 2003) 60-84.
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illuminated with a light that radiates from and returns to an intimate
source. 7
The chapter glances at the objectives of Irigaray's work as a whole,
and then proceeds to consider her use of utopian themes, primarily as
they appear in three recent works:

I love to you, The Way of Love, and

Sharing the World. Then, it considers how Irigaray's use of utopian
elements incorporates the devices also seen in Adorno, in particular
the emphasis on textual practice, a dedicated treatment of a form of
the subject-object relation, an emphasis on the problem of language,
and her specific treatment of space and time and their trans formative
possibilities. Overall, it argues that Irigaray responds to what she
identifies as the foreclosure of properly feminine subjectivity, which
has so far barred the coming-into-existence of what she designates as
"Woman-as-Subject," by addressing and discursively constructing "Woman"
as a subject of utopian possibility in a world that has not yet
realized the trans formative possibilities implicit in sexual difference.
Because sexual difference both characterizes the material world, and
has as yet not been recognized in the construction of the cultural
world, the unrecognized possibilities of sexual difference radiate a
messianic light.
Dystopian Repression and Response
It has not been easy for Irigaray's readers to understand what she
is trying to do. It has not even always been clear that she had a
philosophical project. The first serious interpreter of Irigaray as a
philosopher, Margaret Whitford, acknowledged "it has taken me a long
time to understand her" while also concluding that Irigaray is
"committed to 'the work of the universal' and to the centrality of

7. Luce Irigaray, The Way of Love, trans. Heidi Bostic and Stephen P1uhacek
(London: Continuum, 2002), 174.
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ethics." Whitford summarizes Irigaray's overall project as the effort
"to intervene as a woman .

. in the discourse of philosophy".8 Judith

Butler has explicitly discussed her initially dismissive response to
Irigaray's approach, only later to realize that her project involved
"this strange practice of reading, one in which she was reading texts
that she was not authorized to read,

. and that she would read them

anyway." Such a project was clearly "a feminist critical practice" with
some edifying potential. 9
Irigaray herself, in an answer to a question about the status of
her text Speculum, described herself as
. trying, as I have already indicated, to go back through
the masculine imaginary, to interpret the way it has reduced
us to silence, to muteness or mimicry, and I am attempting,
from that starting-point and at the same time, to (re)discover
a possible space for the feminine imaginary.Io
Irigaray's statement indicates her use of the three-fold Lacanian
division of the objective world into real, imaginary and symbolic. That
acceptance places Irigaray, as we have already noted, within a project
that draws on the psychoanalytic tradition, taking Freudian and
Lacanian categories seriously while also taking issue with them. Her
use of, and ambivalent loyalty to, the intellectual framework of
psychoanalysis, specifically Lacanian psychoanalysis, testifies to the
persistently therapeutic dimension of her work, which manifests itself
in her textual as well as her psychoanalytic practice.
Although she emphasizes the impact of her work on the "imaginary,"
her work also addresses the "symbolic" register. Irigaray has been
described as being "invested in rewriting the symbolic as a way of

8. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, 4, 13. Whitford's use of "the
universal" indicates a human concern not restricted to the interest of a single
gender.
9. Cheah, Grosz, Butler, and Cornell, ibid., 19.
10. Irigaray, This Sex, 162-3. Note that in this statement, "us" mayor may
not be read as referring to "women".
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changing the social and political situation of women and initiating a
culture of sexual difference."n Elsewhere, she labels the phallic,
which marks the boundary for Lacan between the imaginary and the
symbolic, "tantamount to the seriousness of meaning," something her
project contests. In particular, and in a reversal of Adorno's explicit
objective of securing the conditions of possibility for the thought of
"truth," understood as a giving voice to suffering, Irigaray says the

"speaking of truth constitutes the prohibition on woman's pleasure, and
thus on the sexual relation. ,,12
Irigaray's refusal of "truth" here does not indicate either a
contempt for honesty, nor her determined opposition to the objectives
advanced by Adorno. Adorno's use of the word "truth" indicates a desire
to go beyond the constraints imposed by its conventional association
with the adequacy of language. Irigaray's use of the word "truth" in
this context refers precisely to the way those constraints themselves
are made absolute and binding on the users of language. Adorno develops
a standard of truth that seeks to dislodge a premature identification
or adequation of concept and presumed object of conceptualization,
finding in that identification an illegitimate closure and denial of
remainders and non-identities. Similarly, Irigaray struggles here to
express a consciousness of the radical excess of objective and concrete
reality with respect to the language and conceptual apparatus available
for expressing its intellection. The "truth" Irigaray opposes in this
context, then, amounts to what Adorno opposes, on similar grounds, as
"identity thinking."
It might be more precise to identify the objectives on which
Irigaray's work converges as avoiding the articulation of a new
11. Krzysztof Ziarek, "Proximities: Irigaray and Heideger on Difference,"
Continental Philosophy Review 33:2 (April, 2000), 133-158, 134.
12. Irigaray, This Sex, 163; italics in original.
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symbolic, which would presumably replace the current phallogocentric
one. A single, unitary symbolic will not resolve the problem she
perceives and struggles to bring to her readers' awareness. For
Irigaray, the one symbolic within which humanity now operates, which
represses both the characteristic meanings of the feminine and the
masculine, is problematic because it excludes recognition of the
intrinsic sexual differentiation of the human. The inability to accept
and cultivate difference then makes impossible a cultivation of the
internally-differentiated human, and a passage from nature to culture,
that draws on the full range of human possibilities. For Irigaray,
"culture" as something authentically human has not yet emerged in human
life; "culture" as something other than what is opposed to a "nature"
equated with a "feminine" that has been constructed by the exclusion of
the possibility of a feminine sUbjectivity is something that human
beings have yet to begin to create.
In spite of their shared opposition to forms of "identity
thinking," Irigaray's philosophical objectives differ significantly
from Adorno's. Her efforts focus consistently on the role of sexual
difference and sexuate possibilities as the source of something like
metaphysical experience. Where Adorno sees a micrological and fugitive
site of discrepancy, Irigaray detects a vast, unexplored territory with
the riches to create an alternative to the language and syntax of
"truth" that suppresses women's reality, sexual

plea~ure,

the sexual

relation, and the cultivation of human culture on the basis of human
nature in its fullness. Irigaray pursues this quest for the objective
conditions of a changed form of thinking and communication that would
include a revised human subjectivity, a human subjectivity that would
be internally diverse, in something like dialogue with the philosophers
of the western philosophical tradition, but in particular with Plato,
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Levinas,

and Heidegger. The rehabilitation of psychoanalytic constructs,

the rethinking of the unconscious, and its relation to language,
remains a significant part of her work.
One way to present Irigaray's efforts might be to say that she
psychoanalyzes the philosophers, while interrogating the philosophical
presuppositions and implications of psychoanalysis. As she says in
response to a question about her use of Freudian theory, whatever
"challenge" her critique offers is not designed to "return to a precritical attitude toward psychoanalysis" or to deny its therapeutic
effectiveness, but to show that "if Freudian theory indeed contributes
what is needed to upset the philosophic order of discourse, the theory
remains paradoxically subject to that discourse where the definition of
sexual difference is concerned.,,13 She poses over and over again the
question of how to retain the insights of psychoanalysis that promote a
liberating understanding of human subjectivity, while opening the
repressive structure of the psychoanalytic system to its excluded
content.
One element of this project has been a conscious reconstruction and
creation of scenes of origin that recognize sexually differentiated
subject positions. An example here is Irigaray's insistence on the
importance of the mother-daughter relation. 14 Such scenes of origin
offer a contrast to the single oedipal scene offered by traditional
psychoanalytic narrative, through which a non-sexually-differentiated
humanity passes to produce, according to the classic account, a
humanity distinguished as Same and Other-of-the-Same. Irigaray's
appreciative but critical engagement with Freud and Lacan impels her to
search for ways to intervene in practices of thought that become
13. Irigaray, This Sex, 72.
14. See "Love of Same, Love of Other" in Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual
Difference, 97-115.
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embodied in congealed spirit prior to consciousness and language. IS That
recognition suggests that at least one aspect of Irigaray's work is
therapeutic, a kind of couples counseling for the western cultural
relationship.
At the same time, the psychoanalytic framework itself requires
intervention, as indicated by Irigaray's lengthy critique of its
philosophical presuppositions in Speculum. A corresponding element of
Irigaray's project is the renovation of psychoanalysis to open up the
space for the articulation of a subjectivity excluded by the terms of
the system of subjects and sUbjectivities. In this work, Irigaray both
draws on Lacan, for a non-humanist, psychoanalytic account of the human
subject and its incomplete constitution by reason and consciousness,
and deconstructs Lacanian discourse by questioning the unconscious
identification of the unconscious with woman or women by virtue of
women's enforced silence. Women, who have not been allowed to speak for
themselves within the space of theory, and who have often been
prevented from vocally entering the places of general human discourse,
become identified with the unconscious in the official and even the
Lacanian psychoanalytic account. Another aspect of Irigaray's project
involves the restoration of a voice to women as subjects - even if, as
Grosz suggests, it requires the mime of a hysterical voice to effect
that reinsertion of voice. 16
Philosophically, Irigaray engages with a long list of western
philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle through Deleuze and Levinas.
However, as Patricia Huntington notes, "Twentieth-century Continental
philosophy proceeds by way of a love-hate affair with Heidegger," and
Irigaray's participation in that menage is evident from her earliest

15. Luce Irigaray, Sharing the World (New York: Continuum, 200B) xii.
16. Grosz, Lacan: A Feminist Introduction.

137

------------------------------------

work, as in her acceptance of Heidegger's adage that "each age has one
issue to think through, and one only.,,17 One of her texts, L'Oubli de
l'air chez Martin Heidegger, is dedicated to a close reading and
mimetic treatment of Heidegger's philosophy. Her two most recent works,
The Way of Love and Sharing the World, both explicitly depart from
Heidegger's "On the Way to Language," with substantial considerations
of "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" and "The Question Concerning
Technology. ,,18 Irigaray sometimes refers to Heidegger as "the
philosopher," ironically casting herself in the role of Thomas Aquinas
vis-a-vis Aristotle, and leaving her readers to wonder who occupies the
position of Augustine. Nevertheless, as she makes clear in her
introduction to Sharing the World, she finds the philosopher's stance
wanting, and dangerously so. A chronic preoccupation with the same, a
fixation on a single subject to the exclusion of other subjects, and a
consequent failure to allow others to exist as others deforms his
ontology. That approach requires others to be integrated into a
"shared" world that is less a "shared" world than it is commonly or
even imperialistically imposed on all its subjects, without regard for
their differing subjectivities. 19 Irigaray's ongoing engagement with
Heidegger needs to be understood as the struggle to rehabilitate and
rearchitect a framework for co-habitation of a world; for a kind of
"building, dwelling, and thinking" together that has yet to acquire its
proper ground.
Irigaray's commentators repeatedly identify her project as utopian.
As part of this utopianism, Irigaray develops a "new poetics" of

17. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 5.
18. Irigaray, L'Oubli de l'air chez Martin; Irigaray, The Way of Love;
Irigaray, Sharing the World. For discussions of Irigaray's relationship to
Heidegger, see especially Chanter, Ethics of Eros; Huntington, Ecstatic
Subjects; Krzysztof Ziarek, ibid.
19. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 136.
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indispensable utopian imagination. This explicitly poetic dimension of
her work involves her work in aesthetics, without constituting a
distinct, fully developed aesthetic theory.2o Her work has inspired
artists, and in particular architects, for this reason. 21 Similarly,
while not a theologian, her work incorporates an extensive and often
favorable treatment of religious themes. She takes seriously a need for
religious symbols of the feminine as an aspect of the effort to
construct a feminine imaginary, and has given classic religious texts,
in particular the texts of female mystics, extended consideration. 22
Utopia in Irigaray's Work
Since Margaret Whitford's early, careful analysis of Irigaray's
early important texts, scholars have recognized that a particular
utopian vision plays a profound role in Irigaray's work as a whole.
Whitford assigned Irigaray to the visionary utopian "strand" of 1970s
and '80s feminist theory. Irigaray does not offer a detailed
"blueprint" vision of utopia, she does not quite fit Jacoby's model,
either. Whitford sees her "myths and utopias~ presented as evocative
glimpses throughout her work as "attempts to construct new fictions"
that promote change in a world that requires transformation. 23
A Utopian Ethical Vision
Irigaray's utopian direction is perhaps most explicitly on display
throughout the text of An Ethics of Sexual Difference. This text
assembles lectures given at Erasmus University in Rotterdam in 1982,
under the title "The Ethics of the Passions." Both the location and the
20. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 5; Whitford, Philosophy in the
Feminine; Huntington, Ecstatic Subjects; Drucilla Cornell, Transformations:
Recollective Imagination and Sexual Difference (New York: Routledge, 1993); Ewa
Plonowska Ziarek, Ethics of Dissensus; Hilary Robinson, Reading Art, Reading
Irigaray: The Politics of Art by Women (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006).
21. Robinson, ibid.; Peg Rawes, Irigaray for Architects (New York: Routledge,
2007) .
22. Of particular note is the section of Speculum titled "La Mysterique," an
extended reading of texts of feminine mystics.
23. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, 19, 170. '
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rubric of the lectures seems significant with respect to the text's
explicit utopianism. Erasmus was the designated recipient of Thomas
More's text of Utopia. The "passions" are etymologically those
experiences humans suffer, and in Irigaray's treatment, even such
seemingly positive experiences as wonder and joy are shown to entail
their share of suffering. These lectures can be read as an extended
utopian reflection constructed around the utopian space opened and
created by a "sensible transcendental" of which "we would be the
mediators and bridges.

,,24

Irigaray's concept of a "sensible transcendental" attaches to what
she identifies as a tangible site for something like metaphysical
experience. The experience of a discernible difference, like that of
sexual difference, across which people can discern unknown but
communicable otherness, combines the paradigmatic elements of the
experiential and the transcendent. Her address makes her readers
responsible for developing the forms of revelation called for by this
communion, casting them in the role of the recipients, or even
enunciators, of the word from beyond. In this sense, her writing
addresses a prophetic subject of possibility who speaks on behalf of a
not-yet subject.
The reflection that constitutes Ethics of Sexual Difference begins
with the announcement of a "horizon of worlds more fecund than any
known to date" implicit in thinking through the philosophical issue of
sexual difference. That reference brings to mind the polarity of Old
and New Worlds which More's utopia neutralized. It concludes with her
elaboration of the indispensable contribution of "flesh" to a creative
and radically unsubstitutable touch in the context of "The Fecundity of
the Caress," a touch which lies "on the horizon of a story" that
24. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 129.
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precedes the subject, and in which she describes pleasure itself as an
architectural material. 25 The journey from horizon to horizon takes the
reader on a whirlwind tour of western philosophy, from Plato's
Symposium through Descartes and Spinoza to Hegel, Heidegger, and
Merleau-Ponty.
What is at stake in the world that might yet be glimpsed by
thinking through the philosophical issue of sexual difference is
precisely the "horizon" of "a world for women" which has not yet been
built. The basic conditions, of language, thought, and political
economy, for developing a recognition of the transcendent possibility
of that world have yet to be developed; the linguistic, philosophical,
and political-economic conditions that obtain operate continuously to
take away "the vertical dimension .

.

. from female becoming. ,,26 That is,

the development of female subjectivity is not described as naturally
entailing an orientation towards the heavens, and is not encouraged to
adopt that orientation.
The potential builders of this not-yet-world that would include
such a vertical dimension will need "an intuition of the infinite" that
supports a "love of other" rather than, as has been more traditional, a
hatred of other. 27 This intuition, whether of God or of a subject
appropriately open to a complex form of becoming, calls for a renewed
symbol, a call that raises intense resistance. Her simultaneous
proposal and disqualification of "sexual difference" as a "living
symbol" demonstrates that sexual difference fails as a symbol in the
first instance because it functions as literal language. 28 To the extent

.

it functions symbolically, it functions in ways already pre-scribed by

25.
26.
27.
28.

Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference,S, 214-217.
Ibid., 108-109.
Ibid., 112.
Ibid., 113.
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the discourse that operates to block the imagination and construction
of the fecund new world. That discursive situation informs other claims,
including her identification of women's traditional "immediate"
relationship with nature (as revered in romanticism) or with God (as in
the examples of female mystics), and illuminates other suggestions in
Ethics, such as the "mucous" of the interior of the body, or the
potential "caress" of its exterior.
Irigaray's discussion builds on her early development of a reading
of Diotima in the Symposium that perceives a complex dialectical
movement between here, beyond, and the two poles of whatever
dialectical encounter. The internally polarized "third term" or
mediating path, which in the Symposium is occupied by love, changes the
oppositional character of the more familiar Hegelian dialectic. It
constitutes a dynamic relation between the poles of the dialectical
engagement. On Irigaray's reading, this incipient dialectic comes to be
superseded by a less complicated, more oppositional understanding that
comes to privilege an incorporeal contemplation of beauty, separated
from its character as "sensible transcendental," by the end of the
Symposium.

29

Nevertheless, if Plato's readers can trust Socrates' report - not a
small if - they can discern and consider Diotima's dialectic, since it
is on display throughout the entire discourse. The way of love
described by Diotima permits the undoing and opening up of all
seemingly binary oppositions. That way permits a continuous movement
between "here" and "beyond," a reverse as well as a forward motion, and
a dynamic presence that does not seem to presuppose a closed
ontological substance. After all, this way is a "way," a form of
29. Ibid., 20-33. For a critique of Irigaray's reading of the Symposium, see
Andrea Nye, "The Hidden Host: Irigaray and Diotima at Plato's Symposium,"
Hypatia 33:3 (Winter, 1989) 45-61.
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relation, not a UthingH to be grasped and possessed. In fact, this way
of love is precisely the way of philosophy, the way to wisdom and to
apprehension of what is good and beautiful. It is also a uneutral H and
thus Uutopic H way between two opposing poles. Whether it works as a
neutral ground from which to produce a closed and static utopian vision,
or an open and dynamic one, seems to depend on who does the mapping.
Irigaray calls particular attention to the exchange between
Socrates and Diotima around the question of whether Eros is a ugreat
God.

H

The exchange provides an example of Diotima's method, and

illustrates Socrates' will to tie things up in a closed, binary context
of judgment. Moreover, the question of the identity of the God who
underwrites the way of love remains relevant throughout Irigaray's
Ethics, and she returns to the question more than once. She reminds her
listeners and readers of Heidegger's insistence that uonl y a god can
save us now H as she suggests that a usensible transcendental H will come
into being as a mediation Ubetween H the two poles of an internallydifferentiated UweH whose relation would bring this dynamic bridge into
being. 3o Later, as she begins to address the uLove of the Other H
explicitly, she places the task of the love of the other into the
religious frame of a divine appearance in the flesh:
Does parousia correspond to the expectation of a future not
only as a utopia or a destiny but also as a here and now, the
willed construction of a bridge in the present between the
past and the future?
. Would crossing through the neuter
- the space-time of remission of the polemic? - set up the
return or reappearance of God or of the other?
Why
should this theology or theologality of hope remain a utopia?
Not an inscription in the flesh. An atopia. 31

30. That is, in implicit opposition to Heidegger, the bridge does not
construct the two sides of the mediated relation. Irigaray suggests, rather,
that the sides, however many, in and by their relation bring about the bridge.
Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 128-129.
31. Ibid., 147.
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That is, it seems that the only dream of presence that has been
permitted to western thought has been one that presupposes the absence
of a place for its taking place, a presupposition implicit in the "ou"
or emphatic "not" of u-topia. Why might this place not possibly take
place in the here and now, in the place already occupied by the
material of flesh and blood?

Maybe the NO-place of utopia is just the

so-far non-place of something that is possible but that humanity has so
far been without:

a-topia, without place, a deprivation or denial of

place. 32
In this passage she invokes once again Diotima's dialectical bridge,
already established as a bridge named "eros," which mediates time (here
and now, beyond) as well as dialectical polarities. Now the bridge is
set between a present and a utopian beyond, and the approach to the
utopian beyond is linked both to the image of religious transcendence
and that of the transcendence of the other in the flesh. The problem
with this possibility is that the conditions for its philosophical
reception are not yet prepared, as she indicates in her readings of
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. The western anticipation of a divine
parousia continues to be developed in a willful refusal of recognition
to the bridge of the flesh. One consequence is that the understanding
of God so developed is separated from the sense of bliss in touch, and
"will always be thought of as a god who touches in suffering but not in
joy or bliss.,,33 This suffering is the very suffering the utopia
suggested in Ethics would challenge.
Throughout this text, Irigaray is drawing out the implications of a
"way" that remains dynamically accessible both backwards and forwards,
32. In the sense that a-phasia is a loss of speech, in a context of the
possibility of speech, or an-hydrous refers to something that makes do without
water on a watery planet.
33. Ibid., 162. Irigaray's statement is made in the context of her reading
of Merleau-Ponty. Elsewhere she challenges its generality.
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from "here" to "beyond," perhaps a "beyond" that moves in more than one
temporal direction, and uses the device of a "God" or god, who is a
counterpart of an other as subject, to designate the "beyond" of this
way.

Involved throughout, most clear in her discussion of Merleau-Ponty,

is the "invisibility" or "blind spot" constituted by the maternal,
incarnate matrix in its relationship to philosophy, and in particular
the disappearance of the mother's daughters.
Her discussion of color in her extended response to Merleau-Ponty
calls to mind Adorno's use of the metaphor of color, a color that
emanates from non-being, which it is the task of philosophy to mediate.
Adorno's metaphor is closer to Irigaray's understanding of the dynamics
of color, which for her emanates from a source that has persistently
been suppressed in the history of western philosophy, but, ineffably,
remains available to in-corporation in philosophy, generally
unconsciously and in the manner of exclusion, and that needs to be made
conscious. This making conscious would constitute a way towards freedom
and represent utopic practice.
In short, An Ethics of Sexual Difference develops a complex,
immanent set of suggestions about utopia, utopic practice, and the
relationship of philosophy to that practice. It promotes that practice,
less as a foolhardy "utopia" than as a possible becoming with
trans formative potential, particularly in a dire technological context.
It lays out Irigaray's specific understanding of dialectical
relationship, which continues to appear in her later work, and
indicates some of the significance she assigns to this utopic dialectic
with respect to space-time. It introduces the significance she assigns
to the notions of "way" and "philosophy." In particular, it indicates
the origin of the "way of love" she describes Diotima as advocating,
and Socrates limiting in a way that imposes premature closure, on which
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she will reflect at length in her text The Way of Love. It elucidates
her concept of the "sensible transcendental" that underlies her
treatment of the "beyond" to be cultivated between sexually different
subjects. It introduces her term "flesh," which differs micrologically
from "the body," and· which functions as the subsistence of a network of
non-fungible intersubjective relations with ethical implications. 34
The relations Irigaray depicts as utopian she also depicts as
pleasurable, although the precise nature of the pleasure associated
with these relations is not examined. The concluding discussion of
pleasure counterbalances remarks by Socrates about happiness, and its
source, in the discussion of the Symposium. However, in I love to you,
Irigaray reiterates the utopian impulse to happiness in a distinctly
concrete treatment.
Happiness must be built by us here and now on earth, where we
live, a happiness comprising a carnal, sensible and spiritual
dimension in the love between women and men, woman and man,
which cannot be subordinated to reproduction, to the
acquisition or accumulation of property, to a hypothetical
human or divine authority. The realization of happiness in us
and between us is our primary cultural obligation. 35
Love's Negative Dialectical Labor
In I Love to You, Irigaray goes on record against the utopian
designation, insisting that she is "

a political militant for the

impossible, which is not to say a utopian. Rather,
to be as the only possibility of a future.

"36

I want what is yet

Rather than a "utopian"

program and practice, a program oriented towards an unreachable ideal
in relation to which its actual objectives always represent a fallingshort, Irigaray writes in favor of a political practice that aims at
objectives now considered impossible as the only practical political

34. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 217.
35. Luce Irigaray, I love to you, translated by Alison Martin (New York:
Routledge, 1996), 15.
36. Ibid., 10.
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program. The subtitle of the work, "Sketch for a Felicity in History,"
underscores her treatment of the "happiness" at which she aims as a
material, historical objective. Treating I Love to You as a text that
constructs a representation of utopia remains permissible as long as it
is permissible to treat "happiness," and its determinate possibility,
as a focus for utopian discourse.
With some confidence that it is, Irigaray's description of the
shape of the felicity in history towards which her thought moves
outlines what this argument would categorize as a utopia grounded in a
specific form of communication or "communion" that would involve:
. a new economy of existence or being which is neither
that of mastery nor that of slavery but rather of exchange
with no preconstituted object - vital exchange, cultural
exchange, of words, gestures, etc., an exchange thus able to
communicate at times, to commune . . . beyond any exchange of
objects. What we would be dealing with, then, is the
establishment of another era of civilization, or of culture,
in which the exchange of objects, and most particularly of
women, would no longer form the basis for the constitution of
a cultural order. 37
This description is explicitly and directly a commentary on LeviStrauss's analysis of culture as the exchange of women, and also
constitutes a repudiation of the culture built around the exchange of
commodities criticized by Marx in his long philosophical and political
critique of Hegel and of the philosophers' reserved efforts to
understand rather than change the world. The main text, set between a
prologue and epilogue that combine personal and conceptual resources
for its reading, sets out from a comment on Marx's avoidance of the
original problem of man's exploitation of woman and the sexed division
of labor. This avoidance, the origin of which she in turn locates in
Hegel's philosophy, and its treatment of love as labor, she identifies
as her focus. I Love t,o You then becomes a terse, condensed critique of

37. Ibid.,

45.
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Hegel's dialectical account of the development of civil society and its
fruit in spiritual self-awareness, and the development of an
alternative "double" dialectical program that accomplishes a
correspondingly more adequate, and more consistently negative, approach
to the cultivation of the passage from nature to culture.
I Love to You here shares a limited structural similarity with
Adorno's far longer Negative Dialectics. Irigaray's text echoes
Adorno's initial invocation of Marx, and his inaugural announcement of
the objective of the work as a return to philosophical investigation in
the wake of an inadequate working-out of the historical materialist
demand. Irigaray's extended engagement with Hegel and the development
of a dialectical project that will hinge on something she terms "the
labor of the negative" emerges as another similarity. This labor of the
negative elaborates the "way of love" she discerned in Diotima's
discourse from the Symposium, the dialectical exchange that proceeds by
way of an ongoing relation-in-distinction of dialectically engaged
positions. Here, the "negative" stems from the determinate negation of
a presumptive human totality constructed around man's subjectivity that
is provided by woman's subjectivity, and vice versa.
For Irigaray, this always already available negative resides in
sexual difference. The implications of sexual difference for Hegel's
dialectic entail an opening up of Hegelian totalities that serve as the
identities on which Hegel's dialectical moves pivot. Hegel's version of
natural immediacy is an illusion; the assumption of a sexed subject
implies an always partial and incomplete, rather than full
identification with nature. The negation of that false identity is "not
a real negative, even if it is mortification" and the thinking that
proceeds from it is a dreamy pseudo-thinking that "has had to unfold
over centuries in a sort of somnambulism" without even becoming real
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thinking yet. On the other hand, the self-limiting potential of an
internally differentiated nature would permit man [sic] "to postulate
the infinite without an anti-natural labor of the negative," not having
to deny an already-constituted "whole" to make possible some form of
becoming. 38
At every point of her argument, she deploys the self-limiting,
participative nature of sexual difference to deconstruct Hegelian
totalities, and to challenge the violence and domination implicit in
Hegelian negations. The mutually limiting poles of sexual difference
are not opposites; they are differences. They do not synthesize in a
mutual negation that might be called "neuter," like the allegedly
neuter citizen of the sovereign state, which turns out to be Man, the
Same, writ large. Rather, the recognition that founds a collective that
can be designated "we" in a precise way, that incorporates a relation
of communication between different subjects, "is constituted by
subjects irreducible one to the other, each one to the others, and thus
capable of communicating out of freedom and necessity.

Speech

between replaces instinctual attraction or the attraction of
simili tude.

,,39

I Love to You makes this communicative "we," at least symbolic of
the place from which the felicity possible in history can be
constructed, if not concretely constitutive of it. Significantly, "we"
has the linguistic form of a universal, but in enunciation always
refers to a particular constellation of subjects in being. 4o The
structure of the we-relation incorporates the "double dialectic" of a
38. Ibid., 40-41.
39. Ibid., 104.
40. This form, that of the "shifter,"
For a relevant discussion of how personal
and concrete subjects of enunciation, see
trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt
Press, 1991) 19-26.

is common to all the personal pronouns.
pronouns mediate universal concepts
Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

149

relation of sexual difference across and through a bi-directional
trajectory of cultural mediation. For Irigaray, the space figured by
the relationship of indirection re-forms and makes appropriable a
recognition between different sUbjectivities that was always already
available, but not actualized. The "we" becomes a place where sexed
differences in the use of language, which have been a focus of
1rigaray's research, become the media of a different form of
communication, an exchange of words that departs from the pattern of an
exchange of objects, and begins to take on the contours of an exchange
of subjectivities. Drawing on both Hindu and Christian religious
symbolism, she presents a compressed description of tantric practice,
and a "non-patriarchal interpretation of the Annunciation," as symbols
for such exchanges and their capacity for the cultivation of
transcendence within history and culture. 41
"This we still has no place."

42

The construction of a place for

this we of a felicitous exchange that does not involve the exchange of
objects entails a political as well as a linguistic and philosophical
program. Linguistically, the task may be sustained by developing a
relationship of "indirection," space, between the terms of the
dialectic:

"I love to you," a syntax of indirect objectivation that

supports inter-subjectivity, rather than "I love you," a syntax of an
objectification that has historically spelled the denial of the other's
subj ecti vi ty. 43 Here the term "obj ecti vation" struggles to communicate
discourse in which an object position does not automatically coincide
with a loss of ,subjectivity, unlike the "objectification" with which
everyone is all too familiar.

41. Ibid., 138-141.
42. Ibid., 48.
43. Irigaray, Ibid., 109-113.
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Politically, Irigaray's concrete recommendations strike many of her
readers as distinctly dystopian, as she advocates granting "women and
men rights corresponding to the reality of their respective needs."44
This program produces dismay even among those who are favorably
disposed to reading Irigaray's obsessive emphasis on sexual difference
as capable of reconciliation with the concrete political and social
needs of subjects whose articulation of difference belies the adequacy
of the man-woman relation. 45 It illustrates the potential slippage
between her uses of sexual difference. Sexual difference in Irigaray's
work can be a symbol that figures a site for human intersubjectivity
and transcendence, a site with the potential to challenge established
exclusions and foreclosures. Sexual difference may also be used as an
available framework for a practical political program, which mayor may
not challenge such exclusions and foreclosures. The question is whether
a utopia imagined under the influence of Irigaray's discourse makes use
of, or demands, a particular kind of dwelling in sexual difference, and
whether this habitation of sexual difference permits, or actively
demands, participation in prescribed forms of heterosexual
intersubjective exchange. That question is not resolved, but raised yet
again, in Irigaray's later texts, On the Way to Love and Sharing the
World.
Sharing an Intersubjective World by Way of Love
In the remarks that conclude the text of I love to you, Irigaray
develops an image of history as something that could be articulated
"between two," in a process that preserves a vital, creative space of
non-identical relation. This space would be secured by the mutual

44. Ibid., 132.
45. See in particular Cheah, Grosz, Butler, and Cornell, ibid.; Penelope
Deutscher, Mary Beth Mader and Alison Stone, Critical Exchange, differences: a
journal of feminist cultural studies 19:3 (Fall, 2008) 126-157.
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recognition of an irreducible difference between the participating
subjectivities. The history built in this way would be a felicitous one,
which in other contexts might be labeled "utopian":
We can construct a History on the basis of an interiority
without power. We need to be two for this task, a man and a
woman. Two indefinitely, weaving relations between nature and
culture, the universe and society.46
What follows this affirmation is a lyric, or hypnotic, paragraph on
"Air, that which brings us together and separates us" and "which gives
us forms from within and from without." 47 These could ideally be
aesthetic forms that are simultaneously forms of address and autopoietic works of art.
The notion that an intersubjective context in which trans formative
intersubjective relations modeled on amorous exchange require "a man
and a woman" cannot possibly strike all of Irigaray's readers as
"utopian." That problem calls for further consideration, though not yet
here. Here her reference to "an interiority without power" requires
attention. In describing the site of a cultivation of this envisioned
interiority without power, Irigaray constructs what can be read as a
utopian condition. In her account, this cultivation takes place in the
operation of a dynamic, dialectical and discursive intersubjective
relation. This construction process receives its most explicit
development in the recent texts The Way of Love (La Voie d'amour, ,2002)
and Sharing the World (2008). These texts constitute repetitions or
iterations, with variations and extensions, of Irigaray's appreciative,
appropriative, and passionately critical response to Heidegger,
especially the Heidegger of On the Way to Language. 48 They elaborate a

46. Irigaray, I love to you, 148.
47. Ibid., 149.
48. Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971). This text includes essays initially

152

common and clearly utopian scene which takes shape as an explicit and
critical alternative to its dystopian counterpart.
The texts' formal structure is remarkably similar. Both are
arranged dynamically along stages of a journey from a subject position
through an encounter with a differing subjectivity and towards
reconstitution of an exterior and interior world affected by that
encounter. Differences in sequence and timing highlight differences in
emphasis between the two texts, as well as a progression of thematic
treatment. The treatment of sexual difference, in particular, undergoes
some modulation between the earlier and later texts. So, in The Way of
Love, the movement from self to other is compressed, and readers' last
image of the differentiated subjects is of their suspension in a space
between two, poised to reconstitute the world; in Sharing the World,
the journey expands, with more text-time devoted to its initial stages,
and to the consequences of the return trip.
Both texts elaborate the dynamic, potentially utopic, scenography
that could underwrite the cultivation of an interiority without power.
This scene begins with a differentiated - in the first place, sexually
or sexuately differentiated - human subjectivity; moves into encounter
with and relation to a sensibly transcendent other; then returns to
self and the possible creation or co-creation of a world that sustains
its differentiated separateness in relation. Irigaray calls attention
to the utopian possibilities and the dystopian threats related to this
unfolding scene. The author's role becomes something like that of a
guide on a tour of the imaginary. Both texts locate the clearing of
this place of utopian possibility in a transformed relation to language.
The transformation is made possible by a recognition of irreducible

collected in Heidegger's Unterwegs zur Sprache. See in particular The Way of
Love, note, xxi-xxii.
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subjective difference, a difference that escapes such traditional forms
for understanding as binary opposition or Collapse into
undifferentiated neutrality.49
What can be discerned through these texts is an adamant opposition
to the closed systemic understanding of language that Heideggerian
philosophy and Lacanian psychology collaborate in designing. This
"airless" world crammed with language that leaves no space for
difference or differing with respect to the matter of language is a
function of the philosopher's presuppositions. 50 As Irigaray notes" [tj

0

claim that nothing would be there where the word is lacking means to
deny the existence of the other and of that which remains unspeakable
where two worlds join together. ,,51 When the philosophy that understands
the world people encounter as a function of the language people use to
encounter it joins forces with a psychology that forecloses any
possible articulation of the interiority and specific desire of woman,
the two engineer a house of language that is less a prison-house than
an abattoir for woman-as-subject. 52 Challenging this particular
totalitarian possibility is at the heart of the way not yet taken to
language being scouted by Irigaray in these texts.
The alternative way emanates from the possibility of a language
which "favors the act of speech in the present, and not a language
already existing and codified."~ Such language is explicitly not
language as the lifeless corpus of a simply pre-existing system of
fixed meanings. It is instead language as a living - therefore
49. For instance, understandings that reduce woman to "other-of-the-same,"
or to an accident of an essentially single humanity.
50. For instance, the view adopted from Aristotle that language points to a
universal human relationship with matter or matters. See Martin Heidegger, "The
Way to Language," in Basic Writings, 40l.
51. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 5. The "claim" is Heidegger's in On the Way
to Language.
52. Abattoir, standard French for slaughterhouse, is also slang for a house
of prostitution.
53. Way of Love., ix.
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transformable as well as trans formative - matter. A way of language
like this can be explored beginning with a situation in which "[e]ach
sUbjectivity .

. has before it a source of words foreign to that in

which it dwells.,,54 This confrontation of a subjectivity, in a context
of sexual difference, is probably most easily read as an evocation of
amorous exchange. At times, however, it also evokes the confrontation
and communicative task of mother and child, which in Irigaray's
presentation is ineluctably either a mother-daughter or mother-son
relation,

in infancy. 55 This "foreign source" would properly prompt a

recognition of a possibility of a different relation to language and
meaning than that perhaps presupposed by the subject. Cultivating the
possibility inherent in this situation requires "entering into a new
epoch or language .

.

in which saying is no longer constituted in an

ecstatic - ek-static - manner with respect to the real and its
becoming. ,,56
Instead, in this new relation to language, in which "no word is yet
available, no 'object' constituted" and yet in which "there is not
nothing," the subject may be "on the way to regions of the encounter
with oneself, and with the other" that beckon beyond "the obstruction
produced by speech itself and its silences not yet attentive to such
dimensions. ,,57 Here, the utopian "not yet" of the new epoch or era of
language is a double one:

the new language is "not yet" language, it

54. Sharing the World, 6.
55. For instance, Irigaray explicitly calls out the sexually-differentiated

structure of the mother-child situation at the outset of Sharing the World. "To
cultivate the relations with the one who brought you into the world does not
involve the same elements for those who are the same as her or different from
her - that is, for a female or a male subject." Lacan's solution of interposing
the "paternal law" between the ill-theorized early infantile relations "evades
the problem by repressing it." See Sharing the World, 3. Giorgio Agamben
reminds readers that the meaning of "infancy" is literally to be without speech
- though precisely not without the capacity to experience language. Giorgio
Agamben, Infancy and History: An Essay on the Destruction of Experience, trans.
Liz Heron (London: Verso, 2007) 54.
56. Ibid., 16.
57. Way of Love, 44.
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does not exist as a pre-scriptive system of names and corresponding
objects, and the old language is "not yet" undone as language, though
it could yet be. An attentiveness to its silences and spaces amounts to
an attentiveness to already-existing possibilities latent in what is
unsaid if not always unable to be said in its particular vocabulary,
grammar and syntax.
Heidegger's treatment of language as a "house" or "dwelling" for
being fails as a treatment of the language Irigaray imagines here. This
language, which might support the co-construction of a world that does
not yet exist - a more nearly utopian world - offers very little
shelter. The subject "finds himself in every instant unsheltered by the
crossroads where the other waits for him, and by a springing forth of
meaning unknown to him. "58 The linguistic demands of using language to
"succeed in transforming what happens, from within or without, into
saying" are rigorous. 59 However, failing at this task destroys the
possibility of the intersubjective relation. Succeeding requires
relinquishing language as a fixed abode, and embracing the continuous
re-invention of language, and the preservation of space, silence,
"air," through which an intersubjective "proximity" can be cultivated
that does not regress to a denial of difference. 6o
Irigaray's imagination likewise challenges Benjamin's depiction and by extension, Adorno's - of a language of pure names as utopically
paradisiacal. In Benjamin's treatment, a language of names rather than
signs represents a language not yet alienated from, because still one
with, the substance it means. This dream of Adamic language as the
language of the utopia that achieves "substance in cognition," Irigaray
renders as a nightmare. For Irigaray, "[d]enomination results from a
58. Way of Love, 58.
59. Ibid., 64.
60. Ibid., 67.
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mastery, even if it lets the thing or the other be thanks to the name
gi ven to them. ,,61 Denominative language still brings the other into
"one's own" world, bypassing the effort to build a shared world, that
constitutes a place of meeting between different worlds. The evidently
utopian possibility for Irigaray is not a reversion to a language of
names in perfect communion with their concepts that would correspond to
the "reconciliation" envisioned by Adorno. Instead, Irigaray advances
the dream of a new, not-yet-invented language that lies somewhere
between "a concerted denomination" - a language of names - and "wordcries manifesting a simple affect," - a purely animal communication of
feeling - that would constitute "indirect ways of advancing" into
mutually intelligible relationship.62 This still imaginary language of
inter-subjective exchange preserves, according to Irigaray, the
intrinsic mobility or temporality of things.63
Silence and listening are indispensable to the creation of this new
linguistic mediation of intersubjectivity. Silence constitutes a
gesture of welcome, a willingness to make a place for a meaning that
cannot be shared, because it belongs to someone else. This welcoming
silence resonates with the utopian "not yet," in that it "requires an
availability for that which has not yet occurred. ,,64 In elaborating this
silent welcoming, Irigaray contrasts the gesture of welcome that is
silence with a more traditional form of hospitality, the room reserved
for some one who might yet arrive and need shelter. This form of
welcome, presumably better than no welcome at all, nevertheless fails
to respond to the particularity of the other whose "call" provokes the
subjective response. It is too generic. Moreover, as a pre-arranged

6l.
62.
63.
64.

Ibid. , 48.
Ibid. , 58.
Ibid. , 62.
Sharing: the World. , 18.
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empty space, it leaves the welcomer's world unaffected. The potentially
transformative call of the particular other calls for a kind of silence
that involves silencing - making silent - already existing meanings. A
"guest room" made available in a generic way does not answer the
requirement; the response to the call of the particular other with whom
new language will need to be made requires clearing out an alreadyfilled space. That is, it requires discarding or setting aside already
existing meanings, concepts, understandings. e
The need for silence does not end with welcome. It continues
throughout encounter, facilitating a dynamic process of withdrawal,
approach, renewed encounter, recognition or memory and change on the
part of the participants and within their relation, and re-constitution
of the participating subjectivities. The key to this dynamic is "the
silence of a not-yet-come-to-pass" which underwrites are-imagination
of the classically utopian picture of the reconciliation of nature and
culture. 66
Irigaray retains the analytic polarity of nature and culture, while
seeking to re-map its relationship to sexually differentiated
subjectivities. The differing subjectivities of man and woman each have
their specific relationships with nature, as well as with culture. An
archetypal example of this sexually differentiated relationship is the
relationship to the maternal body, which differs for woman and for man,
as between a relationship to "being like me" and "being different from
me." The silence of the not-yet-come-to-pass holds open and un-prescripted "the place always to be re-articulated between nature and
culture, between letting be and constructing" and "necessitates

65. Ibid., 19-24.
66. Way of Love, 126.
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implementing a temporality until now unknown.,,67 This novel temporality
mediates a dialectical becoming of an inter-subjective relation between
two differently dialectical intra-subjectively becoming subjects.
Irigaray's view of welcome and encounter comes with ontological
implications, already elaborated in The Way of Love. The new era of
linguistic and relational spaciousness constructs a place for fertile
relationships across difference. The "groundless ground" woven by this
relation challenges the sufficiency of the ground composed simply of
all of being, apart from the differentiated relations of beings.
Irigaray's critique of the more familiar formulation notes first that
it willfully denies the experientially primordial intersubjective
relation with the mother. She speculates that this denial masks an even
more fundamental denial, the denial of other subjective worlds that
challenge the wholeness of the subject's own. 68 In every case, what
makes way and space for a potentially utopian relation is the
acknowledgement of particularity - not being "all" - that is a possible,
and ethical, response to a different subjectivity.
In fact,

Irigaray locates the danger of essentialism, so often

attributed to her recurrent stress on sexual difference, in the
avoidance of that difference and its possible implications.
I discovered that, in fact, we cannot be - "etre" (Being)
without falling back into a simple substance, outside of a
being in relation with an other of sexual difference. In such
a relation, which undoes any fixed essence, or substance, we
can have access to our own human Being. I could say:
to an
existence which would not be a simple passivity, notably with
regard to the construction of space, time, and the relation
with the other(s). Such a human 'Being' is always in becoming
even if it exists, or ought to exist, in every instant. 69
As always for Irigaray, the initial condition of possibility for a
more desirable alternative - i.e., the initial condition of utopian
67. Ibid.
68. Way of Love, 72-77.
69. Ibid., xiii.
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possibility - is irreducible difference, "beginning with the other of
sexuate difference. ,,70 The irreducibly different subject sets a bound to
"my" world, provides an external source of transcendence, and demands a
corresponding interior transcendence from me. As she depicts the
potential rewards of cultivating the intersubjective relation of
irreducible difference, she reaches for lyric prose. This relation
engenders a soul that is more than empty space, that comes into being
in and through relation with an original matrix. It permits the
celebration of "the feast of love .

. gathering together the mortal

and the divine, the earthly and the celestial in an encounter where
giving and receiving are exchanged in the elation of the present.,,71 It
"is also a way to escape the nihilism threatening our tradition as well
as its critique" by "being faithful to a different truth from the one,
dependent on a supra-sensible absolute, that has both exiled us from
ourselves and separated us from one another.,,72 Irigaray uses archetypal
imaginary relations, mother-child, lover-beloved, pious contemplativeGod to locate the utopian opening in its usual place, but hanging by a
different thread. The mother-child relationship no longer represents an
idyll of reconciliation with nature, but the original intersubjective
studio; the creative impetus in that relationship proceeds from
irreducible difference. The lover-beloved relationship does not begin
and end in ecstatic communion, but requires the safeguarding of baroque
thresholds and separate rooms or worlds. The pious contemplative may
need to be taught to sense the transcendent in the earthen vessels that
his neighbors, maybe even "the women at prayer," offer in their

70. Sharing the World, 135.
71. Ibid., 13l.
72. Sharing the World, 135.
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irreducible difference from him, less superficial and identical than he
has yet divined. 73
The utopian moment this discourse summons does not, however, arise
exclusively in the elaboration of a transformed intersubjectivity. It
has at least as much to do with the transformation of the intrasubjective construction process, the engendering of new possibilities
for interiority. Hence arises the importance of the "return to self"
and the processes of "self-affection" along this way.74 Hence, also,
arises the importance of an other who facilitates such a return, who
challenges and cultivates the different, rather than an other who
prohibits the return, or who simply reflects the subject statically. An
indispensable interiority is constructed discursively and dialectically,
from the groundless ground of the intersubjective relationship, albeit
not without the participation of something already present, even if
not-yet-called. The description of the intra-subjective consequences of
the inter-subjective encounter elicits some of Irigaray's most
intensely utopian prose. She describes here, literally, a process of
inspiration:

it depends on "air" or "breath" and activates something

beyond sense already present in the bounded subject, but not yet active.
In the aftermath of the encounter, this interior, or perhaps
interiorized, different other stimulates a response of and by a
dimension of the self which was "not yet," a latent dimension of the
subject's own explicitly real potentiality.75
The opportunity for an inspiration of this kind requires
preparation, in particular the preparation of a "return," a way back to
the self from the encounter with difference. Irigaray's emphasis on the
73. Cf. Stefan George, "Entrtlckung."
74. See in particular Irigaray's discussion of the moyen-passif as a
linguistic form indicating intra-subjective, auto-affective process. Way of
Love, xiv-xv.
75. Sharing the World, 48-50.
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threshold, something that requires building, preparation, that opens
both ways, outward toward another, and inward toward the self,
something that might connect to a path towards the other, that signals
an opening to the other, but that also represents indispensable
boundary conditions, preservation of the possibility of an interior
place and a time for withdrawal from encounter, sterns from the
requirements of subjectivity itself. Far from constituting an eternally
given, a priori, essence, these irreducibly different sUbjectivities
remain subject to becoming from their inception.

Building the

threshold precedes the development of full interiority, and makes it
possible. For there to be a "between-two," with its possibilities,
there also has to be a one and another, with theirs.
Irigaray offers a model of relationship between two differing
subjects who are themselves made, both self-made and other-made,
differently, in the encounter. This relationship could, or would, in
her view, constitute a "micro-culture" that "can become the leaven for
a universal culture that keeps alive the energy of each one as well as
that of the relation between the one and the other. "?6 The "leaven" of a
new quality of interpersonal relationship generates its own ethical
boundaries, organically, from the dual dialectical movement of the
related parties' dual "return to oneself" and "opening to the other."
In a dialectic not frozen in language or in pre-determined and
immutable cultural forms, the restraints imposed by each one on
"oneself" out of respect for the integrity of the other constitute
"moving boundaries" for a "restrained flowering" of each.??
"Between the two is thus preserved a becoming that is still to be
elaborated - for the one, for the other and for their relations. It is

76. Sharing the World, 57.
77. Ibid.
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a sort of always virginal space safeguarded through the attention that
each one accords to the other in their transcendent alterity."78 That is,
the space "between-two" remains a perpetually open, as yet untouched,
as yet unmet, space of and for possibility. Her subjects-becoming-inrelation require proximity. The kind of proximity they require would be
unthinkable in a closed or "total" relational or metaphysical context.
Proximity in a closed context reduces every meeting subsequent to the
first to a re-meeting. A second encounter would always take place on
the same terrain, a terrain that is now being gone "over," or "over
again." The temporal

dimens~on

becomes particularly important, then, as

the incorporation of this temporal dimension, which remains open to a
becoming that is not closed off but remains open-ended, permits
encounters always to be on new "ground," or in new "space-time,"
Diotima's double dialectic, which can only in one sense be designated
as a re-encounter, but must necessarily be at the same time a new or
species of first encounter, the next encounter, and the next encounter
being always, for Irigaray, in this analysis, a preservation of "always
virginal space."
The complex arrangement of thresholds, double dialectical interand intra-subjective movements, newly articulated temporalities, airy
shared worlds and spaces of withdrawal into self all issue, all along
the way, in that most utopian of affects, happiness. Happiness in this
context will explicitly be a transformation of "our essential disquiet
and unhappiness" in the context of "the uncultivated, inhuman, unhappy,
and 'fallen'

. character of our intersubjective relations. "79 The

desire for happiness in this context is dismissed "by most adults as an
adolescent dream," perhaps because the cultivation of the imagination,

78. Ibid., 6l.
79. Sharing the World, 75.
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and in particular the "transcendental" imagination, has not been
adequately undertaken. 8o Irigaray's characterization of philosophy as
the way of love is an explicit response to a specific constellation of
suffering, perhaps worth quoting at length:
Whoever knows the gathering together into the most intimate
only through suffering, does not know the illuminating grace
of love. This also, thanks to another light than that
cultivated by our metaphysics, opens a place of resource and
of meditative gathering. It implies, it is true, the ability
to let be as much as to make. And the acceptance of a sharing
between shadow and light. 81
The construction of something that can be read as utopian in these
texts rarely touches on the question of suffering. But the
transformative processes proposed, in their deeply poietic and autopoietic effect, have the "transubstantiation" of the matter of
suffering as their explicit aim. 82
In that connection, Irigaray turns as does Adorno to the image of
transcendental light. This "other light" that enters and enlightens,
"notably through desire," does not simply emanate from the other whom a
subject might identify as the object of desire. Seeking to merge, or
merging, with that object in a quest for complete illumination would be
futile. 83 The light seems to emanate less from a univocally-defined
subjective or objective location as from the relation, and the
attraction that arises from it. The embodiment of attraction in action
causes the encounter to "brighten.,,84 The Way of Love concludes with a
meditation on light that radiates imperceptibly within the encounter of
different subjects, taking on the form of affects like peace or joy, or
being formed into touch, which then has the ability to impress both

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Ibid. , 55.
Way of Love, 173.
Ibid.
Sharing: the World, 129-130.
Ibid. , 52.
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self and other. 8s Philosophy becomes less the prism in which the color
of this light is caught, as the way along which its force is felt.
Features of Irigaray's Utopian Scene
Several features of Irigaray's evocative construction of a utopian
scene link her work with that of Adorno and Agamben. First, the
possibility of the utopian lies in a shift in basic theory, to be
explored and promoted through her writings. What is utopian in
Irigaray's work is ultimately a conceptual matter. Second, this
conceptual matter demands a specific textual practice that makes her
work extraordinarily difficult to receive, even for those women or men
or other readers who might otherwise be most inclined to value it, if
not especially for those. Third, her utopian construction involves a
rethinking of the subject-object relationship. Specifically, Irigaray's
utopian emanates from her re-specification of the subject-object
relationship as a sUbject-subject relationship. Fourth, this
alternative intersubjective paradigm calls forth a special treatment of
language, which forms another element of Irigaray's utopian scene.
Finally, this utopian scene requires an imaginative modification of the
customary organization of time and space.
Theory as Praxis
Like Adorno, Irigaray presents her work of re-conceptualization of
sexual difference, and its connections with basic philosophical
questions, as directly practical. Her work constitutes philosophy
undertaken as praxis, as practical activity. The active and
interventionist quality of her work responds to what she has identified
as the conceptual foundation of women's political disadvantage. The
fundamental conceptual and symbolic contours of western thought and
language, which she analyzes in detail in Speculum, produce the
85. Way of Love, 174.
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exclusion of woman from western thought and language. The "aporia of
discourse as to the female sex" imposes the requirement of passing
"through the master discourse:

the one that prescribes, in the last

analysis, the organization of language," which is philosophy, on the
way to a possible solution. s6 The aim of Speculum, in Irigaray's words,
"is to construct an objectivity that facilitates a dialectic proper to
the female subject," which is "both a philosophical and a political
task."S7
The central philosophical and practical problem for Irigaray,
beginning with Speculum, has been the exclusion of the very idea of the
possibility of the objectivity of woman-as-subject by and from this
dominant discourse, and all of the cultural products derived from it.
Practical political approaches that address the consequences of this
exclusion for women - violence against women, for instance, or inequity
in the workplace - run up against this exclusion from language and
intelligibility, and are forced to re-enact the possible subject
positions that continue to exclude "woman" from subjectivity. The
central problem of the exclusion of woman's subjectivity can only be
solved conceptually. The quest for a solution must proceed by means of
a demonstration rather than a direct statement of the problem. It
entails efforts to invent new symbols, ones that can appear in the
existing symbolic, whose content is sufficiently unspecified,

ambiguous,

and non-phallic to support the development of alternative
significations.
Sexual difference constitutes a utopic horizon. But approaching
that horizon, making it "work," is a matter of learning a new way of

86. Luce Irigaray, This Sex, 149.
87. Irigaray, I Love to You, 62.
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thinking. "A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of
sexual difference is to take place."88
One index of the difficulties associated with this fundamental
reconceptualization is the storm of controversy that surrounded the
publication of Speculum, and the debates around Irigaray's
"essentialism. "89 Her project has met with a troubled reception
precisely among readers who might otherwise be favorably inclined to
accept the premise that the dominant phallogocentric or "homm(o)sexual"
discourse of western philosophy since Plato systematically and
systemically practices a compulsory exclusion of woman-as-subject, and
exports that exclusion to such influential auxiliary discourses as
science and psychoanalysis. The trouble stems from the perception that
her language of "woman" reinscribes a pre-discursive, essential and
prescriptive nature in the female body, read in a traditional and
uncritically morphological way. That is, when Irigaray says something
like "The wedding between man and woman realizes the reign of spirit.
Without it, there is no spirit," she sounds like she might be able to
make common cause with the crusaders against gay marriage. 90 This
seeming reinscription sounds suspiciously like an opportunity to
reinforce the ideological assignment of a long list of "feminine"
predicates to that essentially feminine nature. Irigaray's adamant
insistence in Speculum that the construction of femininity to date has
proceeded under the blueprint of an exclusively masculine SUbjectivity
that has usurped the status of "human subjectivity" remains easy to
forget in the face of this language. Irigaray's language of the
relationship of "woman and man, man and woman" sounds suspiciously like

88. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 6.
89. For a thorough review of this literature, see Whitford, Philosophy in
the Feminine; Chanter, Ethics of Eros.
90. Irigaray, I Love to You, 147.
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an acceptance of compulsory heterosexuality or at least
heteronormativity. How queer sexualities and desire are supposed to
articulate with Irigaray's project and language is not immediately
obvious; to the extent that Irigaray locates hope for change in the
irreducible difference between woman and man, she seems to deny the
liberating potential of queer relationships. As a consequence,
Irigaray's efforts to redesign an "objectivity" that facilitates
woman's specific subjectivity seem to misfire at their most critical
point of potential reception.
Mimesis, Poiesis, Hypnosis
The alleged confusion over Irigaray's actual purposes and meanings
is exacerbated by the specific textual practices her project and method
of rereading and reconceptualizing demand in the context of complete
exclusion of woman-as-subject. Irigaray's texts are notoriously
difficult to read. Their difficulties differ from those presented by
Adorno on one hand and Agamben on the other, although they arise for
similar reasons. In effect, Irigaray's texts are always already written
in a foreign language, a language that has not yet been invented. Their
purpose, which is integral to her central project, is to compose
objective conditions for the development of a woman's subjectivity that
has not yet been cultivated. Their task is to make use of existing
language, but to use it as from a different subjective point of origin,
to create a different objective horizon of interpretation. The devices
she has adopted to accomplish this nearly impossible task are
constitutive of the actual construction of the utopian in and more
importantly by her work. These devices include her much-discussed
mimesis, efforts in the direction of a "new poetics," and what could be
called the hypnotic element of this new poetics.
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Irigaray's mimetic practice has generated comment in the
Ii terature. 91 As Irigaray herself says, "The tool is not a feminine
attribute. But woman may re-utilize its marks on her, in her.,,92 So, her
texts mime the language and subject-position of the hysterical
analysand in relation to psychoanalysis, or the language of the
"philosopher's wife" or lover in relation to philosophy. Transformative
discourse takes these "marks" and reverse engineers the blueprints
according to which they were made, along with the models of reality
that made them so seemingly well-designed, and simultaneously so
damaging to actual women. Irigaray presents this particular form of
mimesis as the only textual strategy available under the circumstances
of the dominant discourse for someone with her project. 93
Irigaray has called for "a new poetics" as well, which goes beyond
the mimetic. 94 "Poetic language" may permit the cultivation of the
specific "energy" proper to the coming into relation of sexually
different subjects. 95 This "cultivation" is particularly desirable in
Irigaray's presentation, since it would amount to the creation of an
inclusively ethical human culture. The new poetic language Irigaray
recommends, however, cannot simply reproduce the existing forms,
associated with the phallogocentric symbolic order. In that order,
metaphors, especially metaphors of the feminine, especially as analyzed
according to a Lacanian account, inevitably work as displacements of
the always already excluded, unrepresentable, and unintelligible
"feminine subjectivity." Simply producing new images does not amount to
the new poetics Irigaray speaks of here, even though new images may be

91. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, 70-74; Grosz, Lacan: A Feminist
Introduction.
92. Irigaray, This Sex, 150.
93. Ibid., 136-137, 150-151.
94. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference,S.
95. Irigaray, Way of Love, 136.
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necessary as "placeholders."96 Instead, this new poetics involves a
special role of silence that dismantles or disqualifies older poetic
forms. 97 It involves fewer nouns and more verbs, more attuned to the
linguistic function of "modulation," whether of affect, mood, or tense.
It is less economical, no longer involving an exchange of objects, but
more revealing, an exchange of different selves. 98 This new poetics then
comes to be a genuine poiesis, creation from nothing, and a double
auto-poiesis, a collaborative creation from a nothingness "which is not
nothing" into and over the space of non-identity that lies between the
two different subjectivities, the weaving of a "groundless ground. "99
What this poetics works with is matter, and it highlights the
materiality of language, pre-eminently poetic language:

gestures,

voices, touch. The creation it effects includes civil engineering or
architecture as well as textile arts; it constructs "bridges," "paths,"
"approaches" as it effects the mediation of interiorities that remain
inviolately in relation. 100
Irigaray's descriptions of this language that has not yet come into
being are indeed lyrical, but they are, for all that, descriptive. They
indicate the character of the desirable new poetics she envisions and
encourages. Whether they enact it is less obvious, since they remain
constrained by existing textual and symbolic forms. On the other hand,
Irigaray's constructions of utopian scenes, her description of the new
poetics enacted within those utopian scenes, are certainly aimed at
cultivating in her readers the desire to participate in such scenes.
Some readers describe Irigaray's texts as "poetic," but "hypnotic"
might be a more precise designation.
96. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, 71.
97. Irigaray, Way of Love, 44.
98. Ibid., 58-62.
99. Ibid., 174, 72.
100. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 46-61, 128-130.
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The purpose of the hypnotic is to relay suggestions from the
desiring conscious to the unconscious. Hypnotic suggestion arranges
available symbols and elements of an imaginary constellation in a way
that bypasses the censorship mechanisms of the conscious, with its
vigilant super-ego, and makes new scripts available to the unconscious
with which to organize its wish-fulfilling aims. Hypnosis might be
indicated in a therapeutic context in which, as Irigaray notes, the
subject in question suffers from an obsessive-compulsive projection
which is impervious to rational dissuasion

"

. . because this

projection of a world comes before any representation, judgement [sic],
indeed any conscious feeling, it cannot be questioned in a rational
way. ,,101 A text that would have the potential to intervene in that
subject's tautological system would need to find a way to operate
simultaneously within and beyond that system.
Irigaray's descriptions in The Way of Love of the oneiric bliss of
a yet-to-be-created intersubjectivity, achieved by means of a language
that does not encode pre-scribed meanings, qualifies as such a hypnotic
device. That description barely operates on a conscious level. The
language she describes here fails as "language," within the present
linguistic system; it is non-language, signs without system or agreedupon signification. It addresses itself instead to the unconscious
reception of uncoupled connotations of "language:"

communication and

communion, expression and impression, contact, wondering and
understanding. It seeks to stimulate an imagination of, and the
creative desire for, something for which the word language no longer
quite fits.
A final element of Irigaray's "new poetics," or hypnotics, is the
multi-vocal status of her texts. Irigaray's texts are self-consciously
101. Irigaray, Sharing the World, xii.
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multi-vocal, in Bakhtin's terminology, heteroglossic. For Bakhtin,
poetic language strips away the heteroglossia present in actual life
and presents it in reconfigured aspects, creatively bringing about new
syntheses of the existing heteroglossia, under a unitary poetic
umbrella. That analysis, however, remains within the system of
exclusively masculine sUbjectivity that is the object of Irigaray's
cri tique and textual practice. 102 For Irigaray, the "poetic" function is
to create the objective horizon for the development of feminine
sUbjectivity as sUbjectivity. Her "new poetics" seeks to insert and
make audible the heteroglossic feminine.
These elements of Irigaray's texts work towards representing, not
the utopian itself, but the conditions of possibility for the utopian.
They concern themselves with describing the operation of these
conditions as desirable in themselves, in contrast to the undesirably
singular, exclusive context of a single, always masculine, subjectivity
that prevails at present. For Irigaray, as for Adorno, an element of
her discursive construction of the utopian possibility is a
respecification of the relationship of the subject and object of
knowledge.
Woman-as-Subject as a Condition for Utopia
"Irigaray is a kind of cultural prophet," says Margaret Whitford.
As such, she diagnoses the exposure of western society to a coming
conflagration based on its repression of woman-as-subject. Her
discussion of three "epochs," including the concluding epoch of the
"spirit and the bride," resonates with a theological sensibility.103 The
subjectivity that would support such a "parousia" remains to be
"cultivated." Announcing the cultivation of this subjectivity, which is
102. Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination, 296-298.
103. Whitford, Philosophy in the Feminine, 33; Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual
Difference, 149.
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woman's subjectivity, is, for Whitford, Irigaray's prophetic task. The
construction of a world that overcomes the specific forms of suffering
brought into being by the exclusively masculine subjectivity that has
dominated western thought and life since the Greeks depends on the
creation of a renewed subjectivity for woman. Irigaray's readers
encounter her call for this renewed SUbjectivity.
Irigaray invokes a phenomenon that has not yet corne into being, the
"not yet" constituting the operative term of utopian possibility. In I
Love to You, she is insistent that there are as yet no models of
"female identity" since woman's identity as subject has not been
cultivated. The "universal" that would sustain a relation of "we," two
distinct, non-identical particularities, has not yet corne into being. l04
The "we" relation itself, which would perform the CUltivation of the
appropriate subjectivities, rests on unanswered questions:

"How to

unite two temporalities, two subjects, in a lasting way?,,105 Ultimately,
the questions that two differing subjectivities will address to one
another amounts to "Who are you?" and "would remain latent between man
and woman, irreducible as they are to one another. ,,106 But this form of
intersubjective relation has not yet been cultivated.
"We cannot go along with any of that anymore. ,,107 In other words,
there are concrete practical possibilities for the cultivation of a
changed relation of man and woman, a different engagement of language,
a renunciation of "what has previously been called the love between man
and woman" that includes everything so far thought of as natural along
with everything so far thought of as cultural. lOB If these opportunities
are taken, if the quality of listening Irigaray describes takes place,
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Irigaray, I Love to You, 44, 48.
Ibid., 111.
Ibid., 139.
Ibid., 147.
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if occasions for the development of two distinct subjectivities are
allowed to become productive of individual subjects as well as of
fecund relationships between them, it would contribute to the
construction of the "we" that would actually be in a position to
develop a new form of political life. The different subjects, along
with their relationship, and the collective subject to which they
contribute, all appear in this discussion to be produced discursively
and temporally. They are subjectivities brought into being by their own
activity in interaction with the activity of other subjects-in-becoming.
While these subjects would, under favorable conditions, come into
being in some relationship to what is "inside" them, the - utopian goal would be for them to avoid reproducing the subjectivities that
have always already come into being on the ground of woman's exclusion.
Those subjectivities, as already noted, are distorted in the case of
"man" and officially absent and unintelligible in the case of "woman."109
Irigaray does not propose a political program to bring about a utopian
situation. The political proposals she has made have been directed
towards the creation of objective conditions that could facilitate the
development of communicative exchanges between and among women, toward
the objective of the development of a self-consciousness of woman's
subjectivity. 110
Since Irigaray's approach to the existence of "woman" was described
by Margaret Whitford as "strategic essentialism," her procedures have
been widely discussed under that rubric. As Maggie Berg has noted,
however, "strategic essentialism" is a less helpful terminology than it

109. The trace of Adorno's non-identical asserts itself here, since the
emergence of a text like Speculum attests to the already-existing possibility
of the development of a sUbjectivity that at least permits a recognition of the
conditions of possibility for a not-yet-cultivated woman's SUbjectivity.
llO. See however Drucilla Cornell's critique of "sexed civil rights." Cheah
et al., ibid.
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seems. III It can all too readily suggest that Irigaray primarily operates
by assigning content to the term "woman" in accordance with some
essential model of woman's nature, for the strategic purpose of having
a way to talk about woman. While there is some truth to this
description, Irigaray is more often involved in reminding her readers
that woman's subjectivity is "not yet" accessible, "not yet" met, "not
yet" cultivated as a passage from nature to culture, "not yet"
something that has contributed to the development of a shared world.
This makes perfect sense, in her framework, since the basic discursive
conditions for the development of the discursive subject that could
occupy the position of woman-as-subject have not yet been cultivated.
Those discursive conditions would have to make a place for that
cultivation. This means, in turn, that they would be are-designed
architecture of the always already operative exclusively masculine
phallogocentric symbolic order that is the problem Irigaray's efforts
have been addressing all along.
Her point with respect to the cultivation of the subjects of sexual
difference is that the discursive possibilities for such are-designed
architecture, a calling into question of assumptions, a putting in
place of objective conditions for the development of woman's subject
identity, is all possible. In fact,

it is more than possible; it is

urgently necessary, in light of the disaster that is being cultivated
in the name of exclusively masculine culture and its deadly projection
of a horizon for being. The sensible transcendental could save humanity
from impending disaster, but first we have to conceive of it, and make
it. Irigaray's discourse is directed entirely to preparations for that

111. Maggie Berg, "Contradictions": Poststructuralism and Feminism, Signs
7:1 (Autumn, 1991) 50-70.
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"strange advent," which is also a possibly spatio-temporally present,
not simply utopian, "parousia.,,112
Pursuit of Unalienated Language
The ultimate utopian possibility of the advent of woman-as-subject
is also, for Irigaray, the advent of a new, less alienated human
language. The alienation of language stems from the denial and
repression of sexual difference, and in particular of the woman beyond
the maternal, which forces Man and Woman to use a single language. That
language does not serve the subjectivity of Woman, because it does not
contain symbols for her relationship to her own origin, or to herself.
Irigaray sometimes describes this language barrier as one of "preconstituted" language, in contrast to language that more effectively
mediates "fecund" intersubjective communication. Such renewed language
communicates more than "a meaning in some way closed," and thereby
secures the "becoming" of the relation between two developing
subjectivities. 113 She is under no illusions that this language would be
easily developed. She recognizes that it pushes the definitions of
language so far developed within the discursive regimes of the western
tradition to their breaking point. This language cannot constitute a
fixed system of signs in Saussure's sense, it cannot function as a
medium of exchange as Levi-Strauss would understand it, it will not
secure a stable relationship between symbols and their assigned
contents by means of a governing metaphor according to Lacan's analysis,
it cannot be a "shelter" or "house" for being along Heideggerian lines.
The communicative language she envisions, which would be adequate to
woman's concern with "the relation between two," would have to be
constantly renegotiable with respect to meanings, and would require

112. Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 19, 147.
113. Irigaray, Way of Love, 24-25.
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sensible rather than simply conceptual points of contact. It could not
"consist of something other than the invention of a speaking
appropriate only to those who are speaking to each other, at the moment
when they are speaking to each other.,,114 She plays on the Heideggerian
distinction between speaking and saying in developing an idea of a
saying that would amount to the practice of the new poetics she calls
for in Ethics of Sexual Difference. This new poetics recognizes the
material, physical character of saying, even one involving words, but
also one responsive to the inadequacy of words.
This modified relationship to language necessarily produces a more
fluid lexicon and a more fluid relationship of lexical terms to
meanings. Its precondition is a "double syntax" that departs from the
single syntax of the selfsame symbolic order that now prevails, and
that "makes woman's 'self-affection' possible.,,115 The need for woman's
self-affection, that is,

for woman's recursive impact on her own

experience, is integral to Irigaray's perception of sUbjectivity as
discursive and developmental. If woman cannot "touch" herself
linguistically, she cannot develop as subject in discourse that takes
her distinct, separate reality into account. Instead, she is eternally
separated from that real, and is at best, officially, constructed as a
non-subject through the operation of the single, phallogocentric syntax
that rather carefully covers up the traces of the possibility of a
subjectivity different from its own.
The problem of language for Irigaray is not the same as for Adorno.
The problem is not that language as a physical marker of meaning fails
to achieve identity with what it denotes, and so fails as a medium of
absolute knowledge. For Irigaray, the problem arises prior to the

114. Ibid., 27.
115. Irigaray, This Sex, 132.
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recognition of inadequacy of language, which comes to be attributed to
the "body of language," its participation in a "nature" that is
obsessively feminized and repressed. It resides in the
incommensurability of the two subjectivities that need to come to
expression, self-awareness, and intersubjective relationship through
language. Nevertheless, she recognizes the problematic Adorno
identifies, and spins it out in relation to Heidegger's bias in favor
of the word, the logos. Where Heidegger wants to accord priority to the
word, Irigary - here, a congenial companion for Adorno -- "would think
rather .

. about the secret of the thing, or of the other, of their

resistance to the logoS.,,116 For Irigaray, as for Adorno, a specific
quality of encounter with "the thing" or "the other," with "the
concrete," can challenge the adequacy of existing language and concepts.
The ultimate wellspring of Irigaray's utopian possibility is that of a
real that is communicable, and that can communicate its resistance to
its own exclusion from language.
Adorno, however, sees the figure of unalienated language in
something like Benjamin's Adamic "names," at one with their objects.
Irigaray treats "naming" as a threat, equivalent to a closed context of
language. This closed context of language is part of the apparatus that
excludes woman's subjectivity. This is one of the points where
Irigaray's relentless reference to sexual difference hits pay dirt.
What would have induced anyone to have seen in the text of Genesis 2,
in which the Man Adam names Woman without any explicit recognition of
her subjectivity, on the basis of an interior identity with Man ("bone
of my bones and flesh of my flesh") a paradigm for an unalienated use
of language?

Irigaray could counter with the text of Genesis 3 as .the

immediately available illustration of where such naming practices end
116. I~igaray, Way of Love, 29.
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up: expulsion from paradise and the inscription of patriarchy in
society and language.
There are two issues with this picture of language for Irigaray.
One is the familiar problem of who decides what a word, a phrase, a
sentence means, and how that decision comes to be reached. The other is
the presumption of the adequacy of a static word to continue to
function in a context of becoming. The imposition of language itself
suggests that what it refers to is a never-changing context of meaning.
Irigaray's utopian discourse depends on recognizing that words may
mean different things to different people, in particular as an
illustrative example to men and women; that they may register different
experience, and that communicating this difference in experience may
become important. Reducing everything to a single common experience,
which may in the end not be common at all, does some violence to the
possibility of genuine communication and the production of something
new. So Irigaray is concerned to hold open the possibility of
encountering something or someone different. She connects the problem
of gender to the problem of the divine-human relationship, another
significant area of attempts at communication across a line of
difference. These two lines of difference stand for each other, engage
in sympathetic resonance, reflect one another, such that the inability
to imagine the transcendent female stands for the inability to
negotiate both divine-human difference and mutual transcendence, and
the inability to negotiate gender difference.
Moreover, language for Irigaray is physical, and is the physical
trace of something more elementally constitutive of the proximity that
needs to be built and cultivated between the two of sexual difference.
At the heart of her intense disagreement about language with Heidegger
in The Way of Love is what she reads as Heidegger's removal of language
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from "its carnal touching" in a way that is always already dystopian.
"No more not-yet-manifested, still-to-come animating the quest" and
eliminating the possibility of becoming a subject who is not simply a
reflection of the always already constituted world that is always
already known in and by this language. 117 Heidegger's approach, with
which she disagrees, would make the "language" of poetic language more
determinative than the "poetry," and to foreclose the possibility of
the new poetics she advocates.
Irigaray's emphasis on the physical dimension of language links her
reflections on language to Adorno's and points towards Agamben's. For
all of these thinkers the physical dimension of language, often
overlooked, is critically important. The physical dimension of language
comes to be a place where the ineradicable involvement of what might be
called matter, nature, or bodily life in every effort and instrument by
which people undertake the formation of that matter comes to awareness,
albeit with some initial difficulty. That involvement, in turn,
constitutes the ineradicable trace of what refuses to stop demanding
utopia.
Admittedly, sometimes that demand is silent. For Irigaray, silence
is an integral component of language and of speech, and a particularly
fertile one. Her project from its first manifestation in Speculum has
sought to render audible the meanings that inhabit the spaces and
silences of dominant discourse. The execution of this difficult project
is one aspect of what is termed here Irigaray's utopian discourse, a
discourse that represents utopian possibility as present in the
appearance of impossibility itself.

Another use of silence, however,

emerges in Sharing the World. This use is more directly productive of
utopian imagination. It depends upon the way silence constitutes a
117. Ibid., 34.
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welcoming of what has not yet occurred or been understood. This
welcoming amounts to a direct aOcceptance of what has been identified
here as utopian possibility, encountered in the unknown. Speaking or
saying would close the door to this possibility, by labeling and
forming it before it emerged. The [utopian] welcoming with which
Irigaray concerns herself here "requires an availability for that which
has not yet occurred, an ability and a wanting to open ourselves to the
unknown, to that which is still unfamiliar to us and, in a sense, will
always remain unfamiliar."uB An initial silence and listening, rather
than finished language, that forms a desire for an encounter with
difference that can also be an encounter with self, emerges as an
indispensable element of the apparatus of the language that promises
the human possibility on behalf of which Irigaray writes. This
possibility deserves to be recognized, according to the criteria
advanced here, as utopian.
Treatment of Space and Time
The practice of language Irigaray advocates has a distinctive
relationship both to space and to time, or in Irigaray's terms,
"temporality." Irigaray's talk about new ways of relating space and
time is part of her representation of the possibility generated in the
relation of sexual difference. She portrays the "space between two" as
the site of a new, utopic form of exchange. This exchange is not barter:
it is not the trade of objects for other objects; it is an exchange of
interiorities, and an articulation of temporalities. Irigaray
recognizes as "the western paradigm" an understanding of space and time,
in relation to subjectivity and objectivity, one in which "[t]ime
becomes the interiority of the subject itself, and space, its

118. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 18.
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exteriority.,,119 The exchange of temporalities she envisages is, then, an
exchange of interiorities, of subjectivities, which are non-identical,
non-hierarchical, and also located "outside" one another. That is, they
are transcendent vis-a-vis one another, without being supra-sensible or
necessarily incommunicable. In this place of exchange, which is a place
of possibility, a new cultivation of the human movement from nature to
culture can take place.
The western paradigmatic understanding of space and time is not the
problem. That paradigm becomes problematic in the context of the
exclusively masculine subject .120 Irigaray's images for the problem it
becomes are images of closure:

space curves in on itself; it makes for

an unavoidable "harm" in moving from one epoch to another, since time
itself has congealed in this space. 121 The exclusive subject projects,
the spirit congeals, the world closes spatially, and exteriorized space
can no longer keep pace with the temporality of the interior. It
becomes oppressive. This scenario is Irigaray's version of the
sociological paradigm of alienation, the activity of human beings
coming to appear to them as alien, almost natural forces beyond their
control.
The space so created fails to allow adequate or appropriate room
for wonder, the first of all the passions. Wonder could provide for a
creative relation to what might be new, not yet contained in the known
- conceptualized - world. Instead, "[t]he passions have either been
repressed, stifled, or reduced, or reserved for God. Sometimes a space
for wonder is left to works of art. But it is never found to reside in
this locus:

119.
120.
12l.
122.

between man and woman. ,,122 Securing a space for wonder in

Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 7.
Irigaray, Sharing: the World, ix.
Ibid.
Irigaray, Ethics of Sexual Difference, 13.
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this place of difference, where "each sex, body, and flesh" will need
to inhabit in a shared or articulated way, requires a change in the
relationship of time to space, according to Irigaray. In particular, it
"presupposes a memory of the past, a hope for the future, memory
bridging the present and disconcerting the mirror symmetry that
annihilates the difference of identity. ,,123 In other words, space must be
made into a "housing" or safeguarding of non-identical temporalities,
temporalities that can communicate and influence one another. This is a
change from a conception of space as a stage for a univocal time.
"Perhaps we are passing through an era when time must redeploy space?
A new morning of and for the world?,,124
Irigaray's treatment of time, of "temporality", has become
increasingly central to her understanding of the cultivation of the
in~ersubjective

relationship in recent work. This relationship is

paradigmatically between man and woman, but by extension between the
subjects of enunciation:

between "you" and "I," between "us," even

between "I" and "he" or "she."u5 The constituents of any "us" or "we"
each need both their proper subjectivity, recognized as such, and the
objectivity proper to this sUbjectivity. That objectivity would not be
identical to one that has been assigned to one or the other
differentiated subject, whether on the grounds of conventional readings
of physical morphology or for some other reason, by the culture,
tradition, language, perception, narrative in which the subjects come
to be. In The Way of Love she discusses this "temporality" specifically
as a commentary on the balance of "making" and "letting be" that is
required in a genuinely intersubjective relationship between two
different subjects, neither of whom can be reduced to an instance of
123. Ibid., 18.
124. Ibid.
125. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 102.
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"the same." In the imagined relationship, "a temporality, which the
sovereignty of technology endangers, can be reconstituted."u6
The destruction of temporality in technique or technology,
predictably, sterns from a systemic exclusion of sexual difference. In
the technological situation, technique or technology treats something
as an object for the exclusive purposes of a subject understood to be
both singular and exclusive. The subject encounters every object of
knowledge as something at his disposal, available for the purposes of
an activity of making that is predetermined by the thoughts, purposes,
or projects of this subject. This making takes place without a limit,
other than that set by the selfsame subject's projected horizon; there
is no "return to self" in this creative activity and, above all, no
return to self understood as a subject in relation with another subject.
In this context, the application of technique or technology - techne becomes exclusively a form of domination which "destroys temporality
because it is no longer structured by a subject. ,,127
The temporality that would be structured by the human subject, the
temporality that would represent a real mediation of nature and culture,
would necessarily be a temporality created or fabricated between the
two subjectivities that make up humanity, the open universe of the
human subject. This temporality then stands in implicit contrast with
one that is, for instance, governed by the linear life story of a
single subject, including that of an overarching collective History.
The creation of an alternative temporality does not - presumably cancel the operation of historical conditions in or on the constitution
of individual subjects. Irigaray does, however, seem to be suggesting
that such subjects could develop an intersubjectivity that transforms

126. Irigaray, Way of Love, 125.
127. Ibid., 126.
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the operation of history. The relationship between two different
subjects, especially sexually different subjects, would not be reduced
to instances of the same on either side. Instead, they would be
encountered in their irreducible difference. That irreducible
difference is governed by the temporality of the "unfolding of
history," or the "playing out of pre-established conditions," or even
the unfolding of a script presented in any existing philosophical text
(e.g., a Hegelian script of recognition, or a Heideggerian script of
going out of oneself and returning to oneself). Two such irreducibly
different subjects establish between themselves a singular temporality
governed by a "duration .

. . of which human consciousness is the

artisan," the material for which is two distinct pasts, presents,
futural hopes, and the future which represents that which has not yet
become between them.
Irigaray's "artisanal" picture of intersubjective temporalities in
relation stems from her understanding of the development of
subjectivity itself. These distinct subjects are temporal. What they
"are" is time. But the temp-oral-ity of the one is not identical to the
temp-oral-ity of the other. These two differing temp-oral-ities have to
enter into relationship, externally in the coordinated making of a
world in which the two may share, and internally in the auto-poietic
making of an interior world "appropriate" to the reality of each. The
making of this interior space or place follows the encounter with the
differing subject. The construction of the world, and the construction
of the interiority that can open on the world, happens in a way "back
to front." The world precedes the development of the subject's
interiority. The articulation of different temporalities occurs as
these temporalities emerge, through their relationship to one another,
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and to the world they construct between them. They are temporalities
that have "not yet" come into being.
Irigaray's "woman-as-subject" appears, in this sense, as an almost
messianic figure. That is, her emergence as a concrete, real subject
would initiate the promising possibilities for genuinely
intersubjective relations that make up Irigaray's utopian scenes. The
arrival of the Irigarayan woman-as-subject would mark a form of
salvation for a way of life that is destroying itself and its human
practitioners. The preconditions for that arrival exist now. In fact,
they have always already existed; they have been systematically denied,
suppressed, or repressed. They can, however, be cultivated; the
wretched state of the present world demonstrates that they need to be
cultivated.
The fruits of whatever politics that might be developed in this
idyllic intersubjective context would presumably ripen in the future.
Utopia appears in Irigaray's impressionistic account as the consequence
of future people in future intersubjective relations, towards which
activity in the present could contribute. She provides some desiderata,
which people in the present might embrace. The development of the
objectivity, and subjectivity, appropriate to authentic human culture
is work to be undertaken. Irigaray's descriptions lead her readers to
imagine it could be a pleasant task on the whole, difficult as it may
prove to be because of its radical difference from accustomed,
fundamental, habits and practices of mind and behavior.
Unresolved Questions
What is absent from Irigaray's scenarios is any sense of continuing
conflict, and how that might affect the unfolding of the development of
subjectivity between-two. Irigaray's work does not address, though it
may be argued that it performs, the cultivation of the wish or the will,
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the desire, to undertake the needed cultivations she describes. As
Patricia Huntington has observed, Irigaray, like Heidegger,
incorporates a significant element of voluntarism in her ethical
recommendations. That is, she does not adequately address the question
of what promotes, encourages, or prepares the way for ethical
cooperation with the insights of her analysis. 12B
This reliance on present voluntarism is an undeniable weakness in
her work. If, to adopt Margaret Whitford's metaphor, Irigaray does
indeed act as a contemporary prophet, her later work may have more in
common with street-corner preaching than with critically targeted
evangelism. Practically speaking, this approach may not be the best way
to cultivate the collective energies for which the development of a
renewed subjectivity calls. It seems to fly in the face of her own
account of the development of subjectivity, the recognition that
objective features of how human beings live, talk, and think, related
to concrete conditions of existence, deeply affect the interior
architecture of the subject of any potential praxis.
Irigaray's critiques of the phallogocentric order indicate that she
is aware that the smoothly functioning, respectfully intersubjective
co-creation of a shared world lived in proximity with the other-assubject has not been the direction in which human culture has developed
so far. Nevertheless, her account seems to assume reasonably good will
all around, though inarguably bad exegesis in some quarters. Her
scenarios do not extend to those cases in which a subject-in-the-making
runs up against an inability to listen, a misguided effort to close the

128. "Her work abstractly leaps from a limited textual practice aimed
largely at consciousness raising and rejuvenation of an autonomous social
desire to a material specification of needs. It rests upon a flawed premise
that an abstact textual practice suffices to establish ethical humility among
women who occupy axes of power relative to one another." Huntington, Ecstatic
Subjects, 250.
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context prematurely, as represented by Heidegger's insistence that
there is "nothing" where words are missing. Irigaray does not discuss
what might happen, in her model, when one meets up with a blind and
indifferent other, or a naughty and flighty other, or with an other who
has cultivated the aesthetics of cruelty, or engineered the perfection
of destruction. If utopia is blocked off by possibility, these are some
of the possibilities that have blocked its way in times past, continue
to block the way today, and appear to be well-provisioned to continue
to stand in the doorways and block up the halls in the future.
With that in mind, whether Irigaray's analyses constitute a
compelling macropolitical analysis remains open to question. She
proffers the hopeful vision that the cultivation of these qualitatively
different human relationships at the level of between-two will have a
cumulative, "leavening" impact on the larger cultural formation,
"possibly at the level of the family and community. "129 This vision, in
its broad outlines, is not new; it has been the hopeful vision of
religious communities and religious teaching for a long time: change
the self, change the world.
Irigaray's key change, from "the self" to the "sexuately different
selves," may face prospects for change substantially similar to those
encountered by those other programs of thought and practice. That
dystopian complaint, however, probably does not disqualify Irigaray's
fundamental point. On her analysis, an unchanged humanity - a humanity
unleavened in the way Irigaray suggests - will be incapable of creating
a remarkably new kind of political world. Her task has been to point
out the direction in which the possibility of such a new kind of worldcreation might lie, and how that direction might be approached. The

129. Irigaray, Sharing the World, 59.
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task of working out the divinity in the details of the approach itself
she has left as an exercise for her readers.
Like Adorno, then, Irigaray appears as a creator of a discourse
that calls for a specific conceptual and practical change in its
readers. She speaks as if in a dream about a way of life that might be
being lived, in another space and time different from, yet remarkably
similar to, the one in which her readers find themselves. She seeks to
awaken a desire for that way of life, and to point in the direction of
the practices - conceptual, linguistic, interpersonal - that would
cultivate subjectivities with the ability to dream these dreams more
lucidly, with more precision and determination. Her texts, too, call to
and act to equip a subject of [utopian] possibility.
Irigaray presents the task of becoming this subject as the
indispensable work of art that each human must undertake, on pain of
"losing its humanity." In her conclusion to The Way of Love, she
describes this material and aesthetic task as one that verges on
something that has always been assigned to religion:
Surpassing the matter that [the human] is in view of its
nullification should not be a human's undertaking, but rather
transforming this matter so far as to make it a work of art,
to transubstantiate it into a more subtle, spiritual, even
divine, matter. To illuminate it so that it enlightens he, or
she, who gazes upon it, who contemplates it. l3O
That as-yet-unrealized subject would genuinely, if obscurely, radiate
what might even be a messianic light.

130. Irigaray, Way of Love, 174.
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CHAPTER IV
HALO

Introduction
Giorgio Agamben is a theorist given to recurrent motifs. Many of
these are well-known, among them bare life, the structure of an
exception, profanation, and potentiality. Another of these recurrent
motifs is the halo. In The Corning Community, Agamben presents St.
Thomas Aquinas' treatment of the halo as an inessential but significant
supplement to blessedness. The halo signals an intelligible
particularity within a universal condition, marking a "zone in which
possibility and reality, potentiality and actuality, become
indistinguishable," and figures "the tiny displacement that every thing
must accomplish in the messianic world."l In The Idea of Prose, the
image of the halo serves, similarly, to evoke something nearly
ineffable, but at the same time completely visible or communicable,
albeit outside of language. The singular nearness disclosed in the
image of the halo is evoked more linguistically in Agamben's conclusion
to The Time That Remains. There, it is the messianic word of faith that
"bears witness to what, unexpressed and insignificant, remains in use
forever near the word.,,2 Agamben's halos, it would seem, glow with
messianic light.

1. Agarnben, The Corning Community, 56. According to a rabbinic story, the
messianic world will differ from this world by only a tiny displacement.
2. Agarnben, The Time That Remains, 137.
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Showing how the messianic light of the halo discloses utopian
discourse in Agamben's texts is the central task of this chapter. It
demonstrates that Agamben's writing, like that of Adorno and Irigaray,
appeals to a subject of utopian possibility. Agamben's writing does
this by addressing itself to readers who are themselves bearers of an
almost metaphysical potentiality. The model of subjectivity he advances
differs significantly from that of the rational subject of the
humanities; for that reason, on Agamben's analysis, it is positioned to
challenge the pervasive nihilism of contemporary culture.
This thesis may not be met with universal agreement. Agamben has
most frequently been identified as a thinker of "passivity."3 He has
also been identified as a utopian thinker in the pejorative sense; Mark
Mazower portrays his thought as radical political despair leading to an
embrace of a purely passive "dream of ultimate redemption, some new
'beautiful life.,"4 Alternatively, Carlo Salzani has countered such
criticisms by assessing Agamben's efforts in The Coming Community as
radically anti-utopian. 5
Sustained consideration of Giorgio Agamben's utopian discourse has
not been the central matter in studies of his thought. Giorgio Agamben
is "famous," and controversial, but that fame and controversy have come
primarily as a consequence of the pUblication of his challenging Homo

3. See in particular Wall, ibid.
4. Antonio Negri, "The Ripe Fruit of Redemption," trans. Arianna Bove,
Generation Online, http://www.generation-online.org/t/negriagamben.htm. May 24,
2010, a translation of "Il frutto maturo della redenzione," Il Manifesto (Rome)
July 26, 2003, 21; Andreas Kalyvas, "The Sovereign Weaver: Beyond the Camp," in
Andrew Norris, ed., Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio
Agamben's Homo Sacer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Mark Mazower,
"Foucault, Agamben: Theory and the Nazis," boundary 2 35:11 (Spring, 2008) 2334, 34.
5. Carlo Salzani, "Quodlibet: Giorgio Agamben's Anti-utopia," a paper
presented to the 9 th International Conference of the Utopian Studies Society, 35 July, 2008, University of Limerick.
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Sacer series. 6 Some but not all of this critique has focused on the
extreme claims Agamben makes about the structure of contemporary
politics and political institutions. His assertions about the
fundamentally totalitarian and punitive structure of western
biopolitics - the concentration camp is the "new biopolitical nomos of
the planet," and "[t]oday it is not the City but rather the camp that
is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West" - provoke outrage
at many points of the political spectrum. 7 He has been charged with
opportunism, sensationalism, arid illegitimate aestheticism in linking
the horror of the Nazi death camps to paradigmatic western state
politics. 8
His reputation for a despairing, fatally utopian or politicaltheological political passivity seems to be fed most directly by his
implicit rejection of political strategies that make control of the
state an objective. 9 Instead, Agamben paints a picture of the
contemporary state as an institution that is lethal down to its
original conceptual foundations. Making any use of an institution as
intrinsically inimical to life as the biopolitical state would call for
its profound rethinking and retooling, and may even then be inadvisable.

6. Durantaye, ibid., 7-11. The titles in the Homo Sacer series include Homo
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, State of Exception, Remnants of Ausc~z:
The Witness and the Archive, and The Power and the Glory. Early critical works
on Agarnben in English focused primarily on this aspect of his work, including
Norris, ed., ibid., Calarco and DeCaroli, ibid., and the Winter, 2008 issue of
South Atlantic Quarterly dedicated to Agarnben's work. Catherine Mills's
comprehensive introduction was the first work in English to focus on Agamben
and include his earlier literary and aesthetic work. See Catherine Mills, ibid.
7. Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo
Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000),
45; Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) 181.
8. See Durantaye, 213-214, 217-219; Dominick LaCapra, "Approaching Limit
Events: Siting Agarnben" in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life, eds. Matthew
Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) 126-162,
J.M. Bernstein, "Bare Life, Bearing Witness: Auschwitz and the Pornography of
Horror" Parallax 10 (Winter, 2004) 2-16; Antonio Negri, "The Discreet Taste of
the Dialectic," in Calarco and DeCaroli, 109-125.
9. Slavoj Zizek, In Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008), 338.
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The challenge Agamben's work poses to the repertoire of political forms
and strategies may be another reason for his reputation as a political
quietist. That reputation itself is an index of the difficulties
involved in imagining a politics oriented otherwise than towards the
state and its sovereignty.
The focus here is on showing that Agamben's work in fact
aiticulates what could reasonably be called a utopian assessment and
plan, and so constitutes utopian discourse. As will become clear,
Agamben avoids explicitly utopian language. Instead, he issues repeated
calls for bringing dystopian situations to an end. Politics needs to
"put an end to the civil war that divides the peoples and the cities of
the Earth;" humans need to understand the structure and operation of
the "anthropological machine" that distinguishes animal and man [sic]
"so that we might, eventually, be able to stop them;" "we" must succeed
in understanding how we ourselves can accept self-absorbed inattention
to omnipresent cruelty and horror as "human," and put an end to that
practice, or "there will never be hope."lo The hope he pursues is that
which yields the concrete possibility for a common human life with an
immunity to totalitarian capture.
Agamben is not only famous and controversial, he is prolific. Each
of his many books is individually trim, though not strictly speaking
concise, and repetitive. Catherine Mills has called "Agamben's

amvre .

. a complex recursive exercise" that is less a system than "a

densely interconnected conceptual web."ll In fact, Agamben's work as a
whole constitutes something like the "paratactic text" that was
Adorno's textual ambition, in which the enunciations lie, severally and
10. Agamben, Means Without End, 35; The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin
Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 38; Remnants of Auschwitz:
The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books,
2002) 26.
11. Mills, ibid., 2.
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collectively, equidistant from the center and relate to it as the
radial threads of a spider's web. That is, Agamben seems to have
extended Adorno's model for a single text to multiple works.
The paratactic or radial quality of Agamben's texts, or text, poses
a challenge for consideration of the utopian dimension of that work.
Although a case might be made that all of this work bears on the
central question of utopia, a detailed consideration of Agamben's
entire work would exceed the scope of this study. This chapter will not
attempt to reproduce the recent studies that deal critically with
Agamben's entire oeuvre in general. 12 Too restricted a consideration,
however, will not do justice to those recurrent themes that are vital
to understanding the utopian trajectory of Agamben's work. This chapter
strives to pursue a middle way. It presents a more extended
consideration of those works whose utopian dimension lies closest to
the surface, and treats the background of those utopian dimensions by a
judicious consideration of Agamben's other relevant texts as the issues
they address arise in the analysis.
Because Agamben has written so much, readers may appreciate a
rationale for the choice of texts to be considered in most detail here.
This study has focused most centrally on The Coming Community, The Time
That Remains, and The Open. The Coming Community and The Time That
Remains are the full-length texts that deal most directly with issues
of desirable or in Agamben's terms "messianic" community, its
relationship to the transformation of the subject, and the
understanding of space and time relevant to the production and life of
such a community. A third text, The Open, is especially significant for
the purposes of this study because it deals specifically with the
structure of the human subject in contrast to animal nature. The
12. See Mills, ibid.; Durantaye, ibid.

194

-------------------------

reconciliation of the human with nature is one thematization of utopian
hope. 13 From this perspective, The Open is directly, thematically
relevant to utopia. Furthermore, this text includes Agamben's most
explicit treatment of gender. This makes The Open of particular
interest both with respect to the general question of utopia, and to
the specific question of the relationship of Agamben's utopian
discourse to that of Irigaray.
Th~s

focus explicitly treats as secondary those texts of Agamben's

that have made him so famous and controversial in recent years. Readers
who are familiar with those texts will still find much to recognize
here, however. Agamben's characteristic insights and preoccupations
emerge everywhere in his work. So, for instance, divisions of divisions,
the structure of an exception, or the construct of a critical
experimentum linguae continue to playa significant role in the texts
considered here.
The goal here is to demonstrate the connection of these
characteristic preoccupations to utopian concerns. The chapter
approaches this task as follows. The first section discusses the
dystopian or "nihilist" situation against which Agamben's philosophical
project unfolds. The second section summarizes Agamben's expansive
philosophical project, through a discussion of key concepts. The role
of utopian content in that project receives additional attention in the
third section. Finally, individual sections discuss the way Agamben
uses textual form and the approach he takes to language, his unique

13. Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of
Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Richard Wolin,
"Utopia, Mimesis, and Reconciliation: A Redemptive Critique of Adorno's
Aesthetic Theory" Representations 32(Autumn, 1990) 33-49; Martin Ludtke and Ted
R. Weeks, "The Utopian Motif is Suspended: Conversation with Leo Lowenthal" New
German Critique No. 38 (Spring-Summer, 1986) 105-111.
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treatment of the subject, and his construction of space and time as
part of the construction of the subject of utopian possibility.
A Preliminary Note on Gender
Giorgio Agamben presents to some readers the dismal and dismaying
picture of a living philosopher who deals explicitly with ideas that
are profoundly engendered without ever articulating an explicit concern
with gender. Nichole Miller exemplifies the approach taken by other
feminist critics, in taking Agamben to task for the gender-blindness of
his reading of one of the Lays of Marie de France in Homo Sacer,
despite the relevance of gender for the concrete characterization of
the sacred man (or woman)

.14

Catherine Mills notes similar concerns with

Agamben's androcentric language and myopic inattention to the
engendered content of key areas of his work, and goes on to raise the
question of whether Agamben's very conceptual framework makes it
meaningless to raise and pursue questions of gender and other forms of
difference. 15
Other readers with feminist sensitivities and commitments discern
in Agamben's thought potentials for addressing splits and exclusions
deeply embedded in the western philosophical tradition. The most recent
case in point is Ewa Ziarek, who reads Agamben explicitly through a
lens constructed.by Irigaray, and who recognizes in his discussion of
potential and sUbjectivity a way through the exclusion of woman-as-

14. Nichole E. Miller, "The Sexual Politics of Pain: Hannah Arendt Meets
Shakespeare's Shrew," Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory 7:2 (Spring,
2006) 18-32; see also Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky, "Homo Sacer, das blosse Leben
und das Lager Anmerkungen zu einem erneuten Versuch einer Kritik der Gewalt,"
Die Philosophin, No. 25 (2002), 95-114; Penelope Deutscher, "The Inversion of
Exceptionaity: Foucault, Agamben, and 'Reproductive Rights,'" South Atlantic
Quarterly 107:1 (Winter, 2008) 55-70.
15. Mills, Agamben, 115; Catherine Mills, "Playing with Law: Agamben and
Derrida on Post-Juridical Justice," South Atlantic Quarterly 107:1 (Winter,
2008) 15-36.
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subject from language. 16 The approach taken here is most in tune with
Ziarek's reading. Agamben's writing and insights are not "feminist,"
but this chapter argues, in contrast to Mills, that feminist thinkers
can make good use of them.
In this connection, readers need to know that Agamben's English
translators have unanimously translated Agamben's l'uomo as man,
without discussion. So, for instance, Agamben's Italian work L'aperto:
l'uomo e l'animale, which is in German, Das Offene. Der Mensch und das
Tier, greets its readers in English as The Open: Man and Animal.
Given the concerns already noted by Irigaray about the
disappearance of Woman, the need to incorporate into philosophy a
sensible transcendental that stems from recognition of the two-ness of
humanity, and the presence of transcendental boundaries that affect
both language and dwelling between human genders, it is not possible to
believe that this usage is simply insignificant. We will need to pay
attention to those places and ways that this feature of language, both
original and in translation, brings with it certain presuppositions or
occlusions that operate in the thinking presented here. It seems
unlikely to be a coincidence, for instance, that in Agamben's textual
world, where "man" contrasts with "animal," becomes "sacer," has
language or lives politically, "the woman" appears, when she does, in
advertising and pornography.l? Or that her appearance invariably signals
utopia.

16. Ewa P1onowska Ziarek, "Feminine 'I can': On Possibility and Praxis in
Agamben's Work," Theory and Event 13.1 (2010) Project MUSE, University of
Louisville Library, Louisville, KY, http://muse.jhu.echo.1ouisville.edu/,
(accessed March 28, 2010).
17. See e.g., Agamben, "Dim Stockings," The Coming Community, 47-50; Giorgio
Agamben, "The Idea of Communism," Idea of Prose, trans. Michael Sullivan and
Sam Whitsutt (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995) 73-75.
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Dystopian Vision - Spectacular Society
Agarnben claims repeatedly that contemporary humanity is undergoing
a trial of nihilism. This problem of nihilism finds expression first of
all in art, reveals itself most profoundly in the metaphysics of
language, and ultimately concerns ethical and political life. Is Agarnben
sees this present nihilistic situation largely through the lens
provided by the Situationist International and in particular by Guy
Debord's assessment in The Society of the Spectacle. I9 He conveys his
explicit agreement with Debord in Means Without Ends, calling Debord's
books "the clearest and most severe analysis of the miseries and
slavery" of "the society of the spectacle in which we live.

,,20

Agarnben

extends Debord's critique with his assessment of the roots of
contemporary nihilism in western culture and society, in particular in
the text of Language and Death; Agamben sees this nihilism played out
in the lethal versions of contemporary biopolitics that are the central
concern of his Homo Sacer books.
Guy Debord's analysis of "the society of the spectacle" raises the
definitive challenge to hopes that culture might provide a base for
critical consciousness and awareness, independent of late capitalist
relations of production. Debord's text describes a situation in which
all cultural channels of communication tend to reproduce an alienated
mode of consciousness beguiled by the commodity and its spectacular
appearance, and correspondingly incapable of perceiving that which
"does not appear." His analysis dovetails with Adorno's and

18. Agamben, The Man Without Content, 102; Language and Death; "Marginal
Notes on Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle," Means Without End, 7389.
19. Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith
(New York: Zone Books, 1995); "Comments on the Society of the Spectacle," trans.
NOTBORED!, http://www.notbored.org/commentaires.html (accessed December 9,
2009) .
20. Agamben, Means Without End, 73.
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Horkheimer's account in Dialectic of Enlightenment, bringing their
assessment of the culture industries into the late 20 th century. The
picture Debord presents of reality being rendered culturally and
politically ineffective by being rendered inapparent echoes Irigaray's
analysis of the position of woman in Speculum, as well.
Debord deploys a number of epithets in an effort to communicate the
reality of the spectacle. "The spectacle is capital accumulated to the
point where it becomes image." It is "money for contemplation only." It
is "a permanent opium war waged to make it impossible to distinguish
goods from commodities .

." and an "augmented survival" from genuine

satisfaction. 21 Ultimately, the spectacle is a life-size, threedimensional, animated, ideological representation of "the social
totality" which corresponds to and reinforces the self-evident
appearance of the form of alienated production and consumption in the
world produced by the operation of late capitalism and its history.
That representation occludes both the possibility of achieving an
alternative form of life, and the possibility of the different form of
human consciousness that would be interested in the pursuit of such an
alternative.
Debord includes in his remarks a lengthy discussion of time, and
the relationship to time, as part of the progress of the spectacle.
According to Debord, capitalism subordinates traditional cyclical,
mythic time to the uniform, linear time of the production process; this
linear time becomes the specific time of the spectacle, in which images
are consumed, and in which the image of time itself as something to
consume is endlessly re-displayed. 22 He further identifies the
transformation of time as one of the areas in which any resistance must

21. Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 24, 33, 30.
22. Ibid., 53.
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intervene. In asserting the demand

~to

live the historical time that it

creates, the proletariat discovers the simple, unforgettable core of
its revolutionary project."D
However, contemporary resistance cannot assume outmoded historical
forms, such as that of the militant working class party. The integrated
spectacle makes resistance appear either easy, or counterproductive.
Resistance appears to be a matter of buying a progressive form of some
commodity, like free-range eggs or fair-trade coffee; alternatively, it
appears to be a matter of shredding the entire social and economic
fabric, hardly a prescription for negating suffering. Genuine options
for critical consciousness seem to vanish, along with visible
alternatives to existing social organization.
The spectacle poses a stringent challenge to utopian imagination.
In 1967, Debord was capable of articulating a covert anti-spectacular
sentiment, saying that

~a

critique capable of surpassing the spectacle

must know how to bide its time. "24 Two decades later, observing what he
termed the

~integrated

spectacle," Debord described a society already

in the grip of an ever-wider, totalizing closure of alternatives for
thought and action:
The empty debate on the spectacle -- that is, on the
activities of the world's owners -- is thus organized by the
spectacle itself: everything is said about the extensive means
at its disposal, to ensure that nothing is said about their
extensi ve deployment. 25
This prevailing situation seems in some sense intentional. Debord
characterizes it as

~ambitious,"

and says

~the

greatest ambition of the

integrated spectacular is still that secret agents become
revolutionaries, and that revolutionaries become secret agents. "26 In

23.
24.
25.
26.

Ibid., 43.
Ibid., 220.
Debord, Comments, III.
Ibid., IV
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other words, its ambition is to confound and render futile at the level
of revolutionary consciousness any activities associated with
revolutionary aims. Within the feverish and conspiratorial picture of
society painted here, the spectacle aims to control all activities of
direct resistance to its totality. This direct control, and therefore a
priori nullification, of resistance constitutes yet another step in the
progress of rationalized unreason analyzed in Dialectic of
Enlightenment.
At the same time, the spectacle asserts its official immunity to
critique. "All crimes and offenses are effectively social. But of all
social crimes, none must be seen as worse than the impertinent
pretension to still want to change something in this society .

,,27

Moreover, Debord points out that even those who want to challenge the
dominance of the spectacle will, perforce, use its "syntax" and
"vocabulary." His meaning here seems to follow a familiar logic of
visible resistance. Protest movements are said to become successful
when they gain media recognition, visibility, and have their demands,
aims, and rationales disseminated by media channels. Successful protest
means appearing. But success, understood as visibility and credibility,
must be bestowed by and within a system that bestows visibility and
credibility precisely, in Debord's analysis, upon statements and images
that are taken out of context, de-contextualized, manipulated, and used
as the substance of lies. 28 When efforts to resist, or to pursue change,
find themselves unable to pursue their aims in any way other than one
which reinforces existing social relations and forces, then people
experience their dealings with the spectacle as dealings with reality

27. Ibid., IX.
28. The classic spectacular analysis of spectacular resistance is David J.
Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).

201

itself. What appears as reality is an effective absence of
opportunities for resistance to the way things are [in the spectacle],
along with opportunities for alternative imagination, and alternative
praxis.
The spectacle functions as a mode of legitimation by presupposition,
precluding debate or decision on a range of fundamental questions. 29
Many consequential administrative decisions have been made in advance.
The managers and decision makers who execute them are absolved of
responsibility for the consequences of actions they take with a sense
of having no alternative, as they put specific economic policies into
place, take concrete production and process decisions, and ignore the
value judgments implicit in what appear to be straightforward
mathematical calculations. Rationality, defined "in use" as what
supports the strategic objectives of the corporation, justifies
technicized business practice. Corporate strategic objectives always,
whether or not stated in the mission statement, include making profits
and "being responsible to the shareholders," a fiction that guides
decision making whether or not its results prove effective in the
longer run. 30 The system that develops on the grounds of these
presuppositions acquires the unchangeable and unquestionable appearance
once reserved for "nature."
The fact that alternatives are available, at least logically,. and
that whatever can be done also can not be done, if not always vice
versa, remains officially and generally inapparent. If there are faint
shadows of hope, they are the actual, though obscure, deficiencies of
this total situation itself. For instance, as Debord points out in his

29. Ibid., XII.
30. For example, decisions justified in this fashion may prove mistaken and
costly even from this narrow standpoint, without calling the compulsory logic
into question more generally.
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Comments, "To this list of the triumphs of power we should, however,
add one result which has proved negative for it: a State, in which one
has durably installed a great deficit of historical knowledge so as to
manage it, can no longer be governed strategically."n The spectacle
appears to function with machine-like regularity and conspiratorial
efficacy. Its actual invulnerability at any particular point of
articulation or operation is, however, more an empirical and practical
than an abstract theoretical question.
To Debord's analysis of the society of the spectacle, Agamben adds
his own radical political analysis, which centers on the structure of
sovereignty and the state of exception, as well as on his reflections
on the negativity inherent in linguistic being. Something the society
of the spectacle presupposes, but which needs to be understood
alongside Debord's analysis, is what Agamben in his political works
identifies as the "state of exception." Echoing Walter Benjamin,
Agamben agrees that "today, the state of exception has become the
rule." For insight, he has turned to the thinking of Carl Schmitt,
political theorist of the National Socialist party, whose "decisionist"
political theory provided the theoretical justification for the Nazi
takeover of the German state through the implementation of a state of
exception which lasted for the duration of the Nazi regime. Agamben's
analysis here underlies his depiction of the camp as the nomos of the
modern" the more or less permanent localization of this state of
exception, as a concomitant to the stabilization of a sovereignty
abstractly located in "the people," concretely exercised by "the State"
and its permanent police force, and exercised over that "bare life"
that is, through whatever mechanism, shorn of the contingent
identifications that offer it only spectacular protection.
31. Debord, Comments, VII.
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This dystopian political and social situation rests on the negative
foundation of western ontology. According to Agamben, that negativity
is established philosophically in every component of western tradition:
the dialectical (represented by Hegel), the phenomenological
(represented by Heidegger), and the aestheticist (represented by stil

novo poetics). In the analysis of the link between the Voice, the
subject, and the subject's identification as the "taking place of
language in the Voice," this negative foundation shows itself for the
emptiness it is. Agamben's delineation of this insight constitutes the
substance of his text Language and Death. The challenge Agamben sees as
before contemporary humanity is to interpret this ineluctable
negativity in a way that overcomes its nihilism and lethality.
Agamben's Theoretical Project
Agamben's work as a whole builds on and advances this critique of
contemporary culture, ethics and politics. His vision entails a
sweeping condemnation of contemporary life, and implies that the core
institutions of western society need to be re-imagined from the
foundations up. Nevertheless, Agamben's work does not exude an
atmosphere of pessimism. The recurrent note of determined hope is
supplied by a principle expressed by Holderlin, that "near the danger
grows the saving cure." When the situation is most dire, the seeds of
its own dynamic reversal may already be germinating, although the
seedlings may be visible only to a keen analytic eye. 32 So, for instance,
Agamben writes almost optimistically in "Marginal Notes on Commentaries
on the Society of the Spectacle" that despite the spectacle's
destructive violence it "still contains something like a positive

32. Holderlin's line occurs near the beginning of "PatInos," and recurs in
Agamben's work. For a discussion of its use by Heidegger, Arendt, Horkheimer
and Adorno, particularly in the context of aesthetics, see Durantaye, Giorgio
Agamben, 40-43. Its universal validity seems questionable at best.
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possibility -

and it is our task to use this possibility against it."33

Similarly, in Infancy and History, he writes that the "destruction of
experience" that besets the people of the present day is less to be
deplored than to be noted because "perhaps at the heart of this
apparently senseless denial there lurks a grain of wisdom, in which we
can glimpse the germinating seed of future experience. "34 What needs to
be done is to discern these germinating seeds and nurture them.
Agamben's work is profoundly interdisciplinary. His earliest
writing involves a meditation on aesthetics, and the role of the work
of art in contemporary consciousness. He examines the structure of
subjectivity as expressed in diverse structural relations, including
those of poetry and philosophy, psychology, and linguistics, as well as
through treatments of spatiality and image, in Stanzas. Throughout his
work he has addressed issues of language, psychology, and most recently
devoted extended reflections to politics and ethics. His
interdisciplinary practice is tied to his insight that events in
western political life have radically altered the conditions under
which traditional disciplinary boundaries were established.
Understanding the phenomena of interest demands thinking across
traditional disciplinary lines. 35
The diversity of these concerns is tied together by the guiding
thematic thread of potentiality. Durantaye has identified profoundly
interventionist motives behind this concern, linking them to
reflections on political power and happiness. 36 Agamben himself has said

33. Giorgio Agamben, Means Without End, 83.
34. Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso,
2007) 17.
35. Giorgio Agamben, "Absolute Immanence," in Potentialities, ed. and trans.
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) 220-239, 239.
36. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 15-17. Interestingly, Durantaye notes here
the resonance of Agamben's interest in potentiality with remarks made by Adorno,
and their common view that the philosophical vocation has to do with
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that his work constitutes a meditation on the statement "I speak," or
alternatively, "I can. ,,31 Another characterization of this project would
be to say that Agamben's work focuses on the structure of modern
subjectivity, and on an effort to move beyond the nihilism that the
philosophical roots of modernism have uncovered. Agamben is a thinker
who regards the grand tradition of western philosophy as having
provided a fundamentally or radically dangerous conceptual basis for
collective political life. His project concerns itself with the roots
of western political institutions and western understandings of
knowledge and the self. It always implies and sometimes states
explicitly that these foundations or roots are the deep wellsprings of
contemporary nihilism. Overcoming that nihilism, or turning it in the
direction of happiness, calls for locating and rethinking those sources.
That rethinking draws on the work and insights of others. Most
famously, Agamben draws heavily on Heidegger, an early and profound
influence, and on Walter Benjamin. He has stated that Benjamin has
acted as an "antidote" to the influence of Heidegger. 38 At points, it
seems clear that Agamben's own work constitutes an effort to articulate
Heidegger's insights with those of Benjamin. 39
Both Heidegger and Benjamin make language a central focus for
philosophy. Not surprisingly, language appears as a privileged location
for the observation and analysis of fundamental issues for Agamben as
well. And while Agamben does not explicitly engage with Lacan, he does
link the analysis of language and law throughout his work, beginning
intervention in a system that makes change for the better appear radically
impossible.
37. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 73-76, 129.
38. Ibid., 53.
39. The text of The Open presents the clearest example. In that text,
chapters devoted to Heidegger's treatment of the difference between human and
animal consciousness are followed by a chapter on Benjamin that acts as the
antithesis to Heidegger's position, followed by a concluding chapter that
serves less as the Hegelian synthesis than as a snapshot of the newly attained
immanence.

206

with his treatment of melancholy, fetishism, poetics and semiology in
Stanzas. His diagnosis of the dilemma faced by contemporary culture
returns again and again to the relation of subjectivity to the matter
of language, and with the relationship of having language or being-inlanguage to human potentialities. Implicit in these relations -are other,
linguistically mediated, relations of sacrality and profanity, of
identity and community, and of vocation.
Agamben's Interest in Language
Language matters profoundly because of the way it constitutes, or
seems to constitute, subjects, their subjectivity, and the world. The
Western metaphysical tradition has set language at the root of humanity
itself, identifying the anthropos as the z60n logon echon. One facet of
Agamben's project has been to uncover the complexities this
identification introduces into humanity's understanding of itself.
These complexities arise because of the way language itself constitutes
an articulation of different things: language (langue) and speech
(parole), words and discourse. 4o This way of thinking makes human beings
the site or place of the articulation between language as a field of
potential and its discrete appearances in speech, its utterances or
events. Human beings themselves become, in effect, the apostrophe or
empty space of this articulation.
Another facet of the project, however, has to do with an uncovering
of the dualities that run through and contribute to language. So,
language reveals itself over and over to have a material side, to
consist in something. 41 Language involves a legion of inner
articulations, including those of the semantic and semiotic series that
form rhyme.

Poetry brings these inner linguistic articulations to light,

40. Agamben, Infancy and History, 59.
41. Agamben, Idea of Prose, 37.
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while prose allows it to remain implicit in use, hidden in plain sight.
The making of articulations themselves is an integral part of the
western metaphysical project, which fascinates Agamben.42
One point Agamben emphasizes, in the text Language and Death and
thereafter, is the way entry into language as a speaking subject
effects a radical occlusion of the singular matter of the speaker. This
occlusion of the singular stems from the entirely general and timeless
character of the system of personal pronouns. This limited set of words,
which seem so full of singular content, suffice for the communication
of infinitely varied singularity because of their status as
"shifters. ,,43 They function,

in fact, as indicators of an event of

language, something which has a perfectly general and universal,
strictly impersonal, aspect. Right at this point, language epitomizes
something that Agamben finds fascinating: the coexistence of unique and
general, singular and universal aspects in the construction of human
linguistic subjectivity. The site of the construction of sUbjectivity
through the use of language appears, in Agamben's analysis, as always
already also a site of the potential awareness of something radically
excluded from language in the act of its use.
Agamben, then, traces the western perception of the human subject's
profound emptiness or negativity back to the origins of that
subjectivity in the use of language, and of the way those origins have
been appropriated philosophically. He has traced this core insight
across diverse areas of application. In Stanzas he emphasizes the way
this structure of sUbjectivity emerges in and contributes to the
insights of medieval theology and religious practice, psychology, in
literature, and linguistics. In Language and Death he investigates the

42. Agamben, ibid., 39-41; Time That Remains, 87; Stanzas, 152-157.
43. Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death, 19-26.
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way the metaphysics of language treats but fails to go beyond the
negative foundation of the linguistic subject, and contrasts it with
the use made of that negativity in early renaissance love poetry. In
The Open he examines the role of these linguistic metaphysics in the
operation of the "anthropological machine" that grounds an essential
understanding of Being on a negative articulation of human and animal.
Homo Sacer, especially the "ethics of witness" presented in Remnants of
Auschwitz, extends this core insight to politics and ethics.
Identity and Community
One significant consequence of this involvement of language in
SUbjectivity is that the essentially linguistic elements from which
people form identities can become traps. This is particularly true in a
historical period when the proximate matter of these elements, that
renders them communications of something, has ceased to hold, and terms
of identification are used spectacularly as nothing but pretexts. Yet
another facet of Agamben's work sets out from this recognition towards
the destination of an understanding of community that cannot be
appropriated in this way by totalitarian efforts, because it does not
ground itself in identifications of this kind. The fruit of this effort
appears in The Coming Community, to be considered below.44
Another side of Agamben's critique of linguistic reification,
however, appears in his critical appraisal of the institutions of
contemporary political life. Homo Sacer is one case in point, where an
essential element of Agamben's critique of the state form is its
institutionalization of a structure of sovereign decision that is, at
bottom, a consequential decision about what something is to be called
or named. Aristotle's fundamental discussion of the polis, in contrast
to the oikos and the marketplace, distinguishes between natural life
44. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 156-161.
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(z@n)

and that life that is to be called "good" (eu z@n), a distinction

Agamben refers to most often as the distinction between bios, a
particular form of life, and zo@, common life. 4s The possibility for
something like a biopolitical "bare life" to arise as a political
problem owes almost everything to this original calling. Similarly, the
sovereign decision on the "state of exception" that constitutes the
power of the state on Agamben's analysis also rests in a constitutive
power to name, and to make that naming a justification for action. 46
Contemporary politics has become a site in which specified ways of
being-in-Ianguage are attached to concrete practices with life or death
consequences.
Yet another approach to the question of identity and identification
has to do with the assumption of individual subjectivity. Agamben's
work deals, at every point indirectly, with the crisis of an
understanding of what the classical humanities thematize as
individuality or personal identity. This problem sometimes appears as
the question of "whatever being" or singularity, sometimes as the
question of the articulation of the exemplary and unique with the
shared or impersonal, as genius or special being, sometimes as the
problem of expression and belonging in the creation of and relationship
to the work of art. 47 Ultimately, it is the problem of "face," that
place in which human beings try to "seize hold of their own appearance
and of their own being-manifest."48

45. James Gordon Finlayson, "'Bare Life' and Politics in Agamben's Reading
of Aristotle," The Review of Politics 72 (2010) 97-126, argues that Agamben
frankly misreads Aristotle, and Greek literature of the period generally, in
alleging this distinction. Finlayson's critique, while cogent, underplays the
more significant distinction Agamben rightly reads in Aristotle between mere
zoe and that life which may qualify as "good," which he designates by bios.
46. See Agamben, Homo Sacer.
47. See Agarnben, The Corning Community; Profanations, trans. Jeff Fort (New
York: Zone Books, 2007) 9-1B, 55-60; The Man Without Content.
4B. Agarnben, Means Without End, 91.
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Vocation, Inoperativity, and Profanation
Agamben's conclusions throughout his work return to the problem,
and promise, for humans of their constitutive lack of a fixed nature
that would impose a vocation or a specific telos on human activity and
organization. Aristotle raises the question of whether man alone of all
the animals has no proper work. Agamben answers the question with a
resounding "yes," and endeavors to draw out the implications of a way
of being that is essentially without a proper work that forms the
condition of its existence. 49 That answer has particular relevance to
the fundamentally utopian question about the "best form of life" for
human beings, usually implicit if not explicit in reflections on ethics
and politics. Answers to questions about the good life have
traditionally been sought in answers to the question of what people are
supposed to do; the good life appears as the life that permits people
to do it, and in and through which they succeed in doing it. If, on the
other hand, there is no specific human vocation - if no "voice"
addresses Dasein at its source, if there is nothing in particular to
which humanity is called - then a radical and consequential freedom
presents itself as humanity's potential. Thinking the implications of
this radical freedom as something other than terror is another way to
characterize Agamben's theoretical project. 50
For Agamben, these implications touch the source of human ethics.
Being without a proper or fixed work is, in fact, "the only reason why
something like ethics can exist," rather than a set of "tasks to be
done" inscribed in human nature like a metaphysical laundry list. 51 The
human lack of a fixed vocation is also what constitutes the ground of
. to the radical being-without-

politics, "that which corresponds

49. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 6-7.
50. See in particular Agamben, Language and Death, 106.
51. Agarnben, Coming Community, 43.
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work of human communities. ,,52 One of Agamben's tasks as a theorist has
been to foster a due regard for this human lack of work, in opposition
to moralistic efforts to turn this radical "inoperativeness" in a
repressive direction, and to the efforts of the integrated spectacle to
turn it in a biopolitical direction. 53 Durantaye points out Agamben's
development of this modal view of inoperativeness out of the term's
origins in radical political theory. This gives the notion of
inoperativeness in Agamben a specific double meaning. Agamben can
understand humanity to be capable of a radical political practice that
would render inoperative the reified linguistic distinctions by means
of which potentiality is twisted to the exercise of power, because of
its own constitutive inoperativity.54
The emphasis Agamben places on "the profane" and "profanation"
relates intrinsically to this notion of inoperativeness. He develops
his thoughts on the political value of profanation most fully in the
essay "In Praise of Profanation," where he cites the core meaning of
"to profane" as being a return to free use of things that had been
consecrated and separated for specifically religious use. For Agamben,
separation and restriction on use "contains or preserves within itself
a genuinely religious core," and the separations and restrictions on
use accomplished by property under capitalism and by spectacular
society within the integrated spectacle are no exception to this
reading. 55 What has been lost is neither the religious core, nor the
sacrificial system that effects consecration and removal to a separate
sphere, but the rites and practices, including play, that restore the
balance of sacrifice and return what has been separated back to free

52.
53.
54.
55.

Agamben, Means Without End, 141.
Ibid.; Agamben, Coming Community, 44.
Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 18-20; Agamben, Idea of Prose, 71.
Agamben, Profanations, 74.
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use. This form of secular religion eschews redemption, produces guilt,
and "does not aim at the transformation of the world but at its
destruction."56 What is given in spectacular society is an effort to
make everything without distinction unprofanable, in the face of which
"the profanation of the unprofanable is the political task of the
corning generation."~
How Agamben's readers are to understand his call to radical
politicized profanation, particularly in light of the specific examples
of profanation he advances, has given rise to searching questions. 58
Agamben's portrayal of the contemporary world is one of exigency in the
face of disaster. The integrated-spectacular world order in which
people increasingly and exclusively live
. actually runs the risk of being the worst tyranny that
ever materialized in the history of humanity, against which
resistance and dissent will be practically more and more
difficult - all the more so in that it is increasingly clear
that such an organization will have the task of managing the
survival of humanity in an uninhabitable world. 59
The idea of an alternative to what Adorno termed "the unspeakable world
that is," hovers around Agamben's works, despite the limited use
Agamben's texts make of the term that has traditionally designated that
idea: utopia. In its place, Agamben's rhetoric bends insistently
towards urging his readers to end or put a stop to what he sees as the
emblems of the dystopian situation of the global present. In Remnants
of Auschwitz, he refers to the specter of a soccer match recalled by a
witness at Auschwitz, between members of the Sonderkommando and the SS.
For Agamben, as for his informant Primo Levi, that emblem of normal
life in a context of ongoing horror represents "the true horror of the
camp" and also "the shame of those who did not know the camps" and yet
56.
57.
58.
59.

Ibid., 80.
Ibid., 92.
Mills, Agarnben, 128-129.
Agarnben, Means Without End, 87.
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continue to participate in the spectacle of normalcy in the midst of
universal guilt. "If we do not succeed in understanding that match, in
stopping it, there will never be hope." In The Open, the urgent problem
is the two versions of the "anthropological machine," both of which are
"lethal and bloody" and of which it is a matter "of understanding how
they work so that we might, eventually, be able to stop them." In State
of Exception the task appears as "ceaselessly to try to interrupt the
working of the machine that is leading the West toward global civil
war." All these stoppages must take place in an opaque zone of
indistinction between things thought to be distinct, like human and
animal, law and life, matter and meaning. Agamben has also said that
only a politics that begins from this confusion can interest him, and
that its positive task is to learn "how to grasp the stars that fall
from the never dreamt-of firmament of humanity.,,60
Utopia in Agamben's Work
That task, which is the "task of communism," is an explicitly
utopian one; it corresponds to the "utopia of a classless society."
Agamben claims that a glimpse of that utopia appears in pornography, in
the use made of caricatures of class markers. 61 Agamben notes that in
pornography various signs of class are displayed only to be, literally,
stripped off and cast aside; in being discarded, they are rendered
inoperative as barriers to intercourse, social and otherwise. 62 Agamben
offers a different angle of vision on the matter of the classless
60. Agarnben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 26; The Open, 38; State of Exception,
trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 87; Means
Without End, 139; Idea of Prose, 75.
61. Agarnben, Idea of Prose, 73-75. Contemporary analysts of pornography
would concur with Agarnben that the genre incorporates class critique. See Laura
Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Constance Penley, "Crackers and
Whackers: The White Trashing of Porn," in White Trash: Race and Class in
America, eds. Matt Wray and annalee Newitz (New York: Routledge, 1997).
62. Agarnben ignores here, however, the significance of the class signifiers
as incitements to the central action of the pornographic narrative; this
function seems, perversely, to establish their operativity.
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society in his essay "What Is a People?,,63 There he begins from the
insight that the word "people," which names "the constitutive political
subject," also always indicates "the class that is excluded - de facto,
if not de jure - from politics," namely the poor. 64 He discerns in the
term "people" another sign of the "fundamental biopolitical fracture"
he has made it his task to expose. Something that purports to be a
whole, in this case "the People," actually includes only the exclusion
of a key portion of that whole. Integrity demands that "the People" rid
itself of some "people" (e.g., non-nationals, speakers of other
languages), while honesty demands that "the People" lose its integrity
by including "the people" it aims to do away with. The class struggle,
which it is the utopian goal of communism to bring to an end, Agamben
claims
is nothing other than this internecine war that divides
every people and that shall come to an end only when People
[the political subject] and people [the excluded] coincide, in
the classless society or in the messianic kingdom, and only
when there shall no longer be, properly speaking, any people. 65
Agamben takes seriously what he reports as Walter Benjamin's "thesis,
that the Marxian concept of a

'classless society' is a secularization

of the idea of messianic time. ,,66 For Agamben, talk about "the
messianic" amounts to talk about utopia.
Agamben does, however, make a limited number of explicit references
to utopia outside the context of "messianic" motifs. Those references
have in common an obscure form of spatiality. He introduces his
reflections in Stanzas as a "topological exploration .

. constantly

oriented in the light of utopia," on the understanding that "only if
one is capable of entering into relation with unreality and with the

63.
64.
65.
66.

Agarnben, "What Is a People?" in Means Without End, 29-35.
Ibid., 29.
Ibid., 32-33.
Agarnben, Time That Remains, 30.
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unappropriable as such is it possible to appropriate the real and the
positive. ,,67 In an essay on Guy Debord's "Commentaries on the Society of
the Spectacle," he notes that the Situationists' "utopia is, once again,
perfectly topical because it locates itself in the taking-place of what
it wants to overthrow.,,68 Similarly, in The Coming Community, "The
taking place of things does not take place in the world. Utopia is the
very topia of things. ,,69
In each of these cases, Agamben's comments are explicitly spatial.
The space to which they refer is the phantasmatic, poetic space he
identifies in The Man Without Content as the space of art. Agamben
concludes that work with the observation that art in late modernity is
required to confront the problem of humanity's inability to appropriate
its own historical time and place by means of a seamless cultural
transmission that locates it in an intelligible world. Art accomplishes
this task by renouncing its "guarantees of truth," namely its
traditional relationship to culture, to permit it to create a
phantasmatic space independent of culture in which humanity might
continue to seek to know its own meaning through reflection on its
culture. 7o Art does not necessarily succeed in this task; indeed, in the
contemporary world it seems doomed to fail. More important for this
study, however, is the way Agamben locates in art an exemplar of a kind
of knowledge that dwells in the creation of an outside out of materials
found exclusively within the world.
This section aims to make clear how this perplexing treatment of
utopia features in Agamben's overall work by looking more closely at
the works in which he treats utopian themes at greatest length. A

67.
68.
69.
70.

Agamben,
Agamben,
Agamben,
Agamben,

Stanzas, xix.
Means Without End, 79.
Coming Community, 102.
Man Without Content, 114.
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closer look at The Coming Community, The Open and The Time That Remains
will demonstrate that Agamben's utopianism incorporates an attack on
the idea of utopia as a represented future. It is instead a call to
risk a specific form of non-knowledge that takes place in proximity
rather than identity. The index of this thought's utopianism is its
connection to happiness, and its riegative relation to pain, the core
methodology of power. 71
The Coming Community of Whatever Being
Antonio Negri reads The Coming Community as a jolt in which

"the

experience of redemption presents itself as distopia."n This jolt comes
early, in Agamben's use of the experience of the souls in limbo as a
figure for simple happiness. He presents the perdition of the nondamned as a divine abandon without pain, a "neutrality with respect to
salvation" that constitutes "the most radical objection that has ever
been levied against the very idea of redemption.

,,73

Whether or not Negri,

who favors an orientation toward redemption, should persuade Agamben's
other readers depends on the assessment of the "whatever being" that is
the material of the community that is coming. While Agamben presents it
as "lovable," happy, free and "simply human life," its content is in
many ways uninspiring. 74 Its "exemplars" are "[t] ricksters or fakes,
assistants or 'toons," and one way to think of it might be to think of
"the planetary petty bourgeoisie" minus "bad mediatized advertising.

,,75

71. According to Agamben, potentiality is the deferral of pleasure, or pain.
"Power grounds itself" on the various forces which constrain potentiality to
pause, and to delay its ultimate satisfaction. "Power bases its authority on
this upgathering of pain. It literally leaves the pleasure of man unfulfilled."
Agamben, Idea of Prose, 71.
72. Antonio Negri, "The Ripe Fruit of Redemption," http://www.generationonline.org/t/negriagamben.htm, May 23, 2010, 1.
73. Agamben, Coming Community, 6.
74. Ibid., 2, 7.
75. Ibid., 11, 65.
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This coming community that emerges from Agamben's presentation
seems to lack many of the features typically associated with political
utopias. His descriptions are evocative, abstract and figurative rather
than precise or polemical; they do not include pragmatic solutions to
familiar political problems, like class conflict or ecological
degradation. The community of whatever being Agamben described does
respond, however, to one pressing historical and political problem. The
totalitarian phenomena of the late 20 th century demonstrated the
vulnerability of various forms of collective identification - not only
nationalism or traditional nativism, but progressive or revolutionary
identifications like socialism or communism - to capture and cooptation
by the state. A community with no criteria for totalitarian exclusion,
however, would be an almost unimaginable community with no criteria for
inclusion, either. Agamben's work in The Coming Community is an effort
to develop the philosophical basis for such community that would be
invulnerable to such cooptation. 76
Agamben accomplishes this task by developing the basis for a
community of what he calls "whatever being." This being defines a form
of singularity, and of these singularities' co-belonging, that
accommodates all potential manners or ways of being while avoiding
determination by any of these. He presents a series of examples that
develop the notion of this mode of being: the example, a form of purely
linguistic being which illustrates a general case in a way that is
entirely specific, and which creates an empty space for communication;
a line of handwriting, in which all the characteristics that make the
general letters part of someone's handwriting in particular cannot be
filtered and separated from the writing to yield a general writing
without any specific characteristics; the halo, which is the
76. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 156-161.
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inessential addition to perfection which permits the individuation of
the entirely general blessedness of paradise. 77
Whatever being is not immune to evil. Agamben addresses the problem
of evil in this context only briefly. For the coming community, "truth
is revealed only by giving space or giving a place to non-truth - that
is, as a taking-place of the false, as an exposure of its own innermost
impropriety. ,,78 "Evil . .

. is the reduction of the taking-place of

things to a fact like others, the forgetting of the transcendence
inherent in the very taking-place of things. ,,79 In Agamben's scheme,
evil appears as a metaphysical attitude that denies the routine and
awe-inspiring character of the facticity of the world, its contents,
and its inhabitants. It is also a specific inadequacy in facing the
exposure to death, the "power of not-being" that constitutes a "demonic
element" in every being. "Evil is . . . our fearful retreat from it in
order to exercise - founding ourselves in this flight - some power of
being.

,,80

Evil, in other words, from a different perspective, is that

response to the problem of the death-drives that violently suppresses
the awareness and accommodation of the power to not-be in itself by
projecting it onto another singularity and violently asserting the
power to be against it. Evil amounts to a refusal to rely on the power
to not not-be, the anxious refusal to let-be the power to not-be in
every thing.
The persistence of this "demonic" temptation exposes the coming
community at every moment to evil. Thus, in spite of its often
delightful descriptions, it does not constitute a utopia in the
ordinary sense. It has not vanquished the possibility of suffering. In

77.
78.
79.
80.

Agarnben, Coming Community, 10, 20, 54-56.
Ibid., 13.
Ibid., 15.
Ibid., 32.
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fact, under current conditions, it is decisively exposed to violence.
Agamben paints the coming community in the colors of happiness and
blessedness, drawing from an unusual range of sources: the novels and
stories of Robert Walser, the discussions of Thomas Aquinas and the
Talmud, medieval images of heaven, rabbinical and cabbalistic stories
of the world to come, and hosiery advertising. What these diverse
images share is a sense of simplicity, an unassuming joy in facticity,
and an innocent impropriety. The coming community emerges in the guise
of a delightful, happy place, full of slightly misshapen but utterly
ravishing singularities. But these singularities are perfectly
"exposed" in their "exteriority." They really have nothing that might
be called inner resources, and they have no shelter in a more powerful,
overarching identity. Agamben explicitly points out the vulnerability
of this community without identity or presuppositions to state violence:
"Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in
common there will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will
appear. ,,81
"The very topia of things"
This vulnerability to violence and suffering at the hands of an
entity that is based on presuppositions or identities suggests that the
coming community is not an ordinary utopian community. It is, however,
a community of being with utopian possibility. Moreover, this utopian
possibility is embedded in its constitution as whatever being, because

"Whatever.

is the event of an outside" and incorporates as its

constitutive possibility "the absolutely non-thing experience of a pure
exteriority," a "being-within an outside."n The passage to an outside
that takes place in the encounter with whatever being, which Agamben

81. Ibid., 87.
82. Ibid., 67, 68.
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terms its "face," is fundamentally a grounded experience of
potentiality in relation to things "as such."
Agamben develops an argument to support this understanding of
whatever being in an appendix to the main text of The Coming Community,
titled "the Irreparable." That appendix is presented explicitly as text
that "can be read as a commentary on section 9 of Martin Heidegger's
Being and Time and proposition 6.44 of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus"
and which, as such, deals with the question of "the relationship
between essence and existence. ,,83 Agamben's commentary has been read as
being in fundamental accord with Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's
treatment of this question of metaphysics. 84 This reading, however, does
not do full justice to the actually utopian import of Agamben's
thinking on this point. It would be helpful, in fact, to read it also
as a commentary on Adorno's concluding comment in Negative Dialectics,
"Represented in the inmost cell of thought is that which is unlike
thought. ,,85
Agamben concludes his brief, dense argument with the statement "How
the world is - this is outside the world.,,86 For an ontological
reasoning that denies the possibility of an outside vis-a-vis the world,
this statement simply states the impossibility of a perception of "how
the world is." However, Agamben has explicitly stated that this
perception is possible, and takes the form of seeing something as
"irreparable" and "in its being-thus. ,,87 This amounts to a perception of
its simultaneously non-necessary and non-contingent existence from the
perspective of a non-thing experience of exteriority, i.e., from the

83.
"It is
84.
85.
86.
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Agamben, The Coming Community, 89. Section 6.44 of Wittgenstein reads
not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists."
Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 198.
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Agamben, Coming Community, 106.
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perspective of "whatever being." This being explicitly has the capacity
to lose itself in things "to the point of not being able to conceive of
anything but things" and then "in the experience of the irremediable
thingness of the world" to experience the event of an outside. Again
explicitly, "The taking-place of things does not take place in the
world. Utopia is the very topia of things. ,,88
In other words, the very human potential to notice that it
perceives things as such, as things, constitutes the opening up of a
limit, and effects the taking-place of a passage outside the world.
This odd and yet also familiar experience of thinking and speaking that
catches itself in the act, constitutes the transformation of the aporia
of the irreparably factitious character of the world into the "euporia"
of the "threshold" that makes evident its relationship with an outside.
Whatever being, which only ever emerges as whatever singularity, is the
site of the taking place of that experiential event. That is, whatever
being, whatever singularity, is the potential experience of the utopia
that is the very topia of things.
Recognizing whatever being as the site of this experience of an
outside makes sense of Agamben's paradoxical statement about
"redemption" as the "advent of a limit" in the recognition of
irreparability.89 That statement bears quoting at length.
We can have hope only in what is without remedy. That things
are thus and thus - this is still in the world. But that this
is irreparable, that this thus is without remedy, that we can
contemplate it as such - this is the only passage outside the
world. (The innermost character of salvation is that we are
saved only at the point when we no longer want to be. At this
point, there is salvation - but not for US.)90
Initially, the idea of hope in what is without remedy appears
paradoxical. The paradox is resolvable insofar as hope, which depends
88. Ibid., 103.
89. Ibid., 10l.
90. Ibid., 102.
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upon the possibility of a position that defeats the twin poles of
necessity and contingency, is possible. This position is available, but
only in the encounter with what is "without remedy," that is, in the
encounter with what is irremediable, irreparable. Hope is only possible
in the encounter with that which simply is in its character as "that
which it is," its character as "the thus." This character is explicitly
not its character as the bearer of thus or thus identifiable property,
but its character as whatever being, its character as being nothing
other than "the thus," the irreparable. 91
The innermost character of "salvation," then, entails an encounter
with "the thus" that does not give rise to a desire for salvation. If
"we" are saved at the moment when we no longer want to be, it is
presumably less because "we," whoever we are, have achieved some
remarkable form of transcendence, than it is because "we" are no longer
faced with the kind of challenge that makes us wish we were someone
else, somewhere else, facing something else. But if "we" are longing
for some kind of salvation, "we" definitively are not participants in
whatever being it is that no longer wants to be saved. "We," however,
for whom there is not salvation, might be in a position to interact
with the things taking place around us in ways that contribute to a
happier experience, whether in the world or outside it, at some other
point, for some other "we."
Agamben's utopia, the not-in-the-world that is the very taking
place of things as things, whatever they are, involves a definite
linguistic relationship, which Agamben describes as "the being-inlanguage-of-the-non-linguistic."~ Grasping this relationship is an

effort to counter Wittgenstein, and also Heidegger, in a move that will

91. Ibid., 103.
92. Ibid., 95.
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bring the "unutterable" to expression, and recognize that the "thing of
thought is not the identity but the thing itself" or, in other words, a
thing that "transcends toward itself, toward its own being such as it
is.

,,93

Agamben describes transcendence toward itself further, as an
element of linguistic signification that differs both from meaning and
from denotation, an element he claims is the inner meaning of the
Platonic theory of ideas. In what he calls "a Gnostic reading of the
Platonic idea," he presents the idea as the "being-such" of each thing
which is this aspect of linguistic being. This "being-such" amounts to
an exposure or knowability of the thing's features, not as predicates
but as "a limit .

. a halo;" being-such is in effect a mode of being

that hovers in the gap between linguistic and non-linguistic being. 94
This mode of being becomes apparent as an event of relationship; it
takes place as a consequence of the difficult to think being-inlanguage-of-the-non-linguistic. That constitutes a relationship of
language and something non-linguistic as a relationship of some nonthing exteriority that gives itself to knowing what is knowable as
something knowable with something that gives itself to knowing as
something which can be known as something knowable.
Agamben's line of reasoning in The Coming Community is not at all a
simple embrace of an immanence of being in existence. Instead, it is a
recovery of a form of transcendence, albeit a strictly limited form.
Transcendence does not present itself as an alternative world lying
beyond the world of things into which someone might be able to step, as
into a fully formed utopia. Transcendence presents itself instead as a
utopia that transforms the aspect of the existing world into that of

93. Ibid., 95. See Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 9 and 408.
94. Ibid., 101.
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one way or manner of being alongside other potential, imaginable ways.
None of these potential ways escape the irreparable facticity of the
world of things. This awareness of irreparability, however, exposes the
potential of that irreparability. That aspect of the world, therefore,
constitutes a threshold before which the profane things of the world
present themselves as available for creative use. The re-formed or
trans-formed world that takes shape in that creative use would still be
irreparably thus, but its difference from some other manner of beingthus might not be a matter of indifference.
Anthropological Machine Out of Order
A profanely re-formed or trans-formed world would presumably be the
site for the coming community. Agamben develops another approach to
understanding the nature of that re-formed or trans-formed world in The
Open. The text of The Open is a reflection on treatments of the
relationship of human to animal, a classic philosophical theme. These
reflections are contained within an inclusio that focuses on a
miniature in a Hebrew Bible in the Ambrosian Library in Milan. Agamben
begins The Open with a description of that miniature, and returns to
the image at the conclusion of the text.
The :j..mage in question depicts "the messianic banquet of the
righteous on the last day." In that tiny and telling depiction, "the
miniaturist has represented the righteous not with human faces, but
wi th unmistakably animal heads.

,,95

Agamben at first suggests that the

picture may point towards a new form of articulation between animal and
man [sic], a reconciliation. Such a reconciliation would, as we have
seen, parallel one of the traditional themes of utopian discourse in
the western tradition, in which the estrangement between humanity and
nature, including humanity's own animal nature, has been identified as
95. Agamben, The Open, 2.
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a source of suffering. He concludes with a reading of the illustration
that sees in it a happy renunciation of the effort of articulation and
reconciliation. That renunciation would signal the "Shabbat of both
animal and man," allowing the image to present a "figure of the 'great
ignorance' which lets both of them be outside of being, saved precisely
in their being unsavable."H
Agamben's theme of unsavability echoes the irreparability
announced in The Coming Community. In that work it is the signature of
a mode of being that provides a foundation for a viable community. Its
re-emergence at the conclusion of The Open, in relation to the utopian
project of the reconciliation of human and animal natures, reinforces
its role as a utopian motif in Agamben's work. Its relationship to the
dominant critical moment in The Open further demonstrates the changed
understanding of the subject whose task it could be to "contemplate a
human nature rendered perfectly inoperative" because of the suspension
of the effort to maintain the always articulated, and always separated,
concepts of human and animal. 97
Between the two arms of this inclusio, the heart of The Open is
Agamben's development of a critique of the way the notion of "the
human" has been understood. This paradigm, moreover, relates intimately
to the understandings available within the western tradition for
imagining the completion or consummation of human life. In Agamben's
view, the complex western imagination of the fulfillment of human
nature, whether that is conceived as the "messianic end of history or
the completion of the divine oikonomia of salvation" poses a critical
limit problem concerning the difference between animal and human, which
involves "a fundamental metaphysico-political operation in which alone

96. Ibid., 92.
97. Ibid., 87.
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something like 'man' can be decided upon and produced.

,,98

What Agamben

calls the "anthropological machine" that produces the recognition of
the human in its differentiation from the non-human which it resembles
also determines the parameters of the imagined fulfillment of the nonnature of humanity, whether in a theological or political ideal. 99
Agamben traces the roots of this debate back to the earliest
intellectual sources of the western tradition in Aristotle's De anima,
considering its deployment in several exemplary moments, including
Heidegger's treatment of profound boredom. "Man," he claims, "is always
the place - and, at the same time, the result - of ceaseless divisions
and caesurae. ,,100 These divisions precede and implicate the articulations
that have been thought to define humanity, such as the articulation of
body and soul or the articulation of a natural with a social or
spiritual element. This is no small matter, as the western humanistic
tradition rests on some understanding of "the human," and a decision on
one understanding in preference to another is decisive for the selfrepresentation of culture and the imagination of ideal life. In each
case he examines, Agamben uncovers an effort to locate something to be
identified as the proper domain of humanity by virtue of its contrast
with something designated as animal. In each case, moreover, the effort
fails. The negative definition of the human as the not-animal always
already includes the animal within itself, in the form of an attempted
exclusion; it always ends with a demonstration that what is claimed as
most properly human fails to distinguish what is called human from what
is called animal.
The relationship of the human to the animal therefore takes the
form of what Agamben has identified elsewhere as a state of exception.
98. Ibid., 21.
99. Ibid., 29.
100. Ibid., 16.
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In political life, the bare life or zoe that Aristotle relegates to the
oikos, the household, remains included in the form of an exclusion in
the specific form of political life (the bios politikos) of the
political community, or polis. This inclusive exclusion or exclusive
inclusion is the point of entry in western politics for the lethal
biopolitics of the contemporary state. In The Open, Agamben identifies
the structurally analogous relationship between the animal's bare life
and the human life in which it is included. The anthropological machine
includes animal life within human life in the form of an exclusion;
humanity is its negation, the denial of animality that produces the
human's specificity in contrast. That relationship leaves this bare
life exposed at the center of human life. The humanity that claimed at
every point to be something essentially other than that merely bare
life can sustain this demand only by taking upon itself an essential
negativity or nullity. "Ontology .

. is not an innocuous academic

discipline, but in every sense the fundamental operation in which
anthropogenesis, the becoming human of the living being, is realized."lDl
That realization underwrites the nihilism of contemporary culture:

"

. because the world has been opened for man only by means of the

suspension and capture of animal life, being is always already
traversed by the

nothing."l~

Agamben sees a way past the alternatives donated by Heidegger's
thinking on this matter, which pose a choice between the technological
solution of biopolitics or the embrace of the abandonment of animal
immanence. This way entails a recourse to "a sort of Benjamin ex

machina. ,,103 Agamben analyzes a collection of Benjamin's statements as
proposing "an entirely different image of the relationship between man
101. Ibid., 79.
102. Ibid., 80.
103. Durantaye, Giorgio Agamben, 331.
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and nature and between nature and history" with which his investigation
is concerned. 104 While nature remains an area of "closedness" and
"night," it is not thereby deprived of knowledge and even redemption.
Nature for Benjamin appears as the "saved night," which maintains a
relationship with something unsavable, completing it, and thereby
disclosing itself as a "messianic nature" whose rhythm is happiness .105
Instead of humanity consisting in the mastery of an animality that
excludes knowledge and cultivation, Benjamin suggests that what needs
to be mastered is the very relationship itself between humanity and
animality or nature. This mastered relationship does not require an
articulation of "nature and man in order to produce the human through
the suspension and capture of the inhuman," but rather seems to put the
anthropological machine on hold, suspending both terms of the

polar~ty.

A different sort of being altogether, not yet named in language, takes
up residence "in between nature and humanity.,,106 In Benjamin's account,
"the woman" acts as a kind of maieutic eternal feminine, who does not
so much draw the man ever higher, but "cuts" his mysterious bonds to
his natural mothers and perhaps even life itself, permitting him to die
and be reborn. 107 Agamben's development of Benjamin's image takes the
form of an exegesis of Tit.ian's Nymph and Shepherd in the
Kunsthistorisches Museum of Vienna. He reads the painting as an image
of post-coital otium that provides a more intimate picture of something
like whatever being as "the supreme and unsavable figure of life. ,,108

104. Ibid., 8l.
105. Ibid., 82. Agamben here cites Walter Benjamin, Letter to F10rens
Christian Rang, December 9, 1923, trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Walter Benjamin,
Selected Writings, vol. 1, 1913-1926, ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W.
Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1996), 389.
106. Ibid., 83.
107. Ibid., 84.
108. Ibid., 87.
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Agamben's vision of completed in-humanity here is bound to corne as
a disappointment to some of Agamben's readers. It raises legitimate
suspicions with respect to his analysis, as well. This may have
something to do with Durantaye's careful avoidance of this element of
The Open. Catherine Mills notes that there is something old-fashioned
about this image of completed life, standing as it does in a long
tradition of "casting women as the privileged figures of ephemerality,"
unable to rise to the level of the universal themselves but able to
give men .the necessary boost, as well as women's "closer relation to
the physiological or biological," all of which seem operate in this
text. 109 Mills has less to say about the fundamentally romantic casting
of "the woman" as the figure of specifically "messianic" nature in this
fragment,

in what is difficult not to read simply as yet another

version of the eternal feminine.
It may be, however, that Agamben's thought is here operating at or
near the limit of the representations available to it in the system
with which we have to work. Agamben's - and Benjamin's - inadequate
resort to the metaphor of heterosexual fulfillment may be an effort to
aim for territory in the neighborhood of the place between-two staked
out by Irigaray. Agamben's particular limitation here is a failure to
treat explicitly the conflation of woman, animal, and nature that
complicates the "simultaneous division and articulation of the animal
and the human" of which "man has always been the result."llo That
conflation, as others have amply demonstrated, is every bit as old as
the one that forms the states of exception with which Agamben works; he
could continue to cite Aristotle's Politics. The life he tries to
imagine here, however, which will presumably require a suspension of

109. Mills, Philosophy of Giorgio Agamben, 115.
110. Agamben, The Open, 92.
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these metaphors as well, is in its own wayan effort to read the
surpassing of humanity's historical task as calling - as does Irigaray
- for "an unprecedented inquiry into the practico-political mystery of
separation."lll
Agamben on Messianic Time in The Time That Remains
Agamben's understanding of messianic or completed time is set out
most completely in The Time That Remains, a detailed exegesis of the
first verse of the Epistle to the Romans. According to Agamben,

Paul

recapitulates or sums up the entire contents of the much longer letter
to the Roman church in the words of the incipit contained in Romans 1:1.
"Understanding the incipit therefore entails an eventual understanding
of the text as a whole.,,1l2 Agamben reads this verse, in opposition to
most standard translations, as "Paul, called as a slave of Jesus the
Messiah, separated as apostle for the announcement of God.,,1l3 The text
of The Time That Remains is an exegesis of the meaning of each word and
phrase of this identification of the author of the letter to follow.
The letter to the Romans is significant, in Agamben's words,
because it is central to the Pauline letters; these in turn constitute
"the fundamental messianic text for the Western tradition.,,1l4 This
messianic message has been blunted across 2,000 years of Christian and
Jewish exegesis of the Pauline corpus, for reasons having to do with
the paradoxical position of "a messianic institution - or rather, a

111. Ibid.
112. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains, trans. Patricia Dailey
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) 6.
113. The Greek text, transliterated as PAULOS DOULOS CHRISTOU IESOU KLETOS
APOSTOLOS APHORISMENOS EIS EUAGGELION THEOU, permits this reading. More
familiar translations emphasize Paul's status as slave and the separation of
the gospel rather than the apostle, and leave "Christ" untranslated, as in Karl
Barth's "Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, separated
unto the gospel of God . . . " Ibid., 6; Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans,
trans. Edwin C. Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford UP,. 1968) 27.
114. Ibid., 1.
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messianic community that wants to present itself as an institution."us
The paradox Agarnben identifies here has to do with time, and the
peculiar challenges faced by a community that understands the Messiah
to be perennially "behind" or "ahead" of it in time. Agarnben's
statement here is particularly revealing, and worth quoting at length
for that reason.
In both cases, we are confronted with an aporia that concerns
the very structure of messianic time and the particular
conjunction of memory and hope, past and present, plenitude
and lack, origin and end that this implies. The possibility of
understanding the Pauline message coincides fully with the
experience of such a time; without this, it runs the risk of
remaining a dead letter. The restoration of Paul to his
messianic context therefore suggests, above all, that we
attempt to understand the meaning and internal form of the
time he defines as ho nyn kairos, the "time of the now." Only
after this can we raise the question of how something like a
messianic community is in fact possible.1l 6
Agarnben's concern with messianic time, and with the formation of a
messianic community, has surfaced already. Its impetus seems to corne
particularly from the relationship it has to the notion of an end to
history, a notion he derives once again from Benjamin. In the
Theological-Political Fragment, Benjamin identifies "the Messiah" as
the only one who completes history; precisely the completion of history
holds out the promise for an end to the dialectical operation by which
the desirable world is endlessly postponed. For Agarnben, as for
Benjamin, messianic time, the "time of the now," incorporates an effort
to employ thought itself as a spanner to throw into the works, and to
put a stop to the lethal machine that seems to be everywhere in
operation, not in a future opportune moment, but by seizing the
opportunity of this moment. For this reason, Agarnben identifies the
Pauline treatment of messianic time, at least his reading of this

115. Ibid.
116. Ibid., 1-2.

232

treatment, as being of central importance in facing the political
challenges of the present.
The question Agarnben seeks to address specifically is "What does it
mean to live in the Messiah, and what is the messianic life?

What is

the structure of messianic time?,,117 While presumably this is the
question perennially before the Christian community to which Paul
writes, it is also at this time, as becomes clear in the course of the
seminar of which The Time That Remains is a record, a pre-eminently
political question that is irrevocably before the global political
community. This political question remains on the agenda despite, even
perhaps because of, the "fall of communism," as Agarnben reads Marxism
as straightforwardly presenting a secularized form of messianism. lIB
The term kletos, klesis, "called," "calling," interests Agarnben.
His analysis of the verb "to call" involves a glance at the theory of
callings or Stande that was associated with the Pauline text. He
investigates the textual history that induced Luther to translate

klesis with the German Beruf, and which then obtained a "new ethical
meaning" among the Lutherans and Calvinists. Weber understood the term
calling to convey an attitude of "eschatological indifference." Agarnben,
however, concludes that Paul is not talking about an attitude of
eschatological indifference, nor of a command to steadfastly refuse to
leave the calling in which one first hears of Christ. Instead, his use
of this language "signifies the immobile anaphoric gesture of the
messianic calling, its being essentially and foremost a calling of the

calling.,,1l9 That is, in Agarnben's analysis, Paul understands the
messianic invocation as being one of calling all of the profane,

117. Ibid., 18.
118. Ibid., 72.
119. Ibid., 23.
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worldly callings, whatever their character, into an altered messianic
use.
Agamben's discussion of the term aphorismenos is also detailed.
Here, he finds that Paul has devised a way of thinking about division
that cancels or nullifies existing divisions. The term aphorismenos
stems from the same conceptual field as the term Pharisee, the group
set apart for special observance in 1 st century Palestine, the group
that appear throughout the gospel accounts of Jesus' ministry. In
following the meaning of this term, Agamben notes that 'the principle
of the law is thus division. ,,120 The people of the land are divided from
the pharisees, as the Ioudaioi or Jews are divided from the ethne or
"people".u1 Into this fundamental division of the law, between Jews and
non-Jews, Agamben sees Paul drawing another dividing line that renders
the initial division inoperative, null and void. By making further
distinctions, e.g., "Jew according to the breath" vs. "Jew according to
the flesh," he inserts a division into the pre-existing division, which
creates a new, neutralizing category, that of non-non-Jew. This
category exists beyond the existing divisions of identification, and
offers the possibility of uniting people in a way that does not depend
on any identification.
Here Agamben is explicitly setting his reading of Paul and Romans
in opposition to that of Alain Badiou in Saint Paul: The Foundation of
Universalism. 122 Agamben is specifically reading Paul not as a founder of
universalism, but as someone who destroyed universalism in favor of
something more particular, a particular category that sidestepped
identification, and in which dis-identified individuals could belong

120. Ibid., 47.
121. Ibid.
122. Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray
Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
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apart from any shared identification. This is precisely the opposite of
universalism, which unites by finding a transcendent shared
identification or that bridges gaps between competing identities. Far
from being a "producer of the Same," Paul is rather a producer of
strategic and effective difference, the specific difference of a
"remnant. ,,123
For Agamben, the remnant makes it impossible for any part of a
thing to correspond to any whole. It is relevant to notions of
democracy and people. The "people," for Agamben, has the structure of a
remnant, "that which can never coincide with itself, as all or as part,
that which infinitely remains or resists in each division" and which
"is the figure, or the substantiality assumed by a people in a decisive
moment, and as such is the only real political subject."u4 It is the
only real political subject because it is the subject that functions
for the sake of a specific transformation in the decisive moment of its
constitution. Agamben makes explicit note of the relationship of the
Pauline remnant to the Marxian proletariat, noting that more than one
analogy may be drawn. His sympathies seem to lie with an analysis of
the "pleb" offered by Foucault, to the effect that while the pleb
itself may not exist, something plebian characterizes many phenomena,
and represents, with respect to power relationships, "their limit,
their ruin, their consequence. ,,125
For the understanding of Agamben's political subject, then, this
Pauline understanding of the remnant is of first importance. Agamben's
remnant is a subdivided group, a non-non-participant with respect to
pre-defined identities, groups whose political interests and programs
are already defined by social position and historical agendas. It has a
123. Agamben, Time That Remains, 53.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid., 58.
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freedom of action provided by its non-coincidence with any of these
pre-established groups, and by its own non-status as the "all" of some
future, telic condition, which it may nevertheless also be free to
envision.
Agamben labors to clear up a number of misconceptions with respect
to this messianic time. First, it elucidates something about the
relationship of kairos, or "occasion," to chronos, or chronological
time, the time that passes in regular rhythm and whose passing can be
measured by clocks and calendars. He notes that any kairos always has
as its disposal chronos, in effect has no other time than chronos to
provide it with substance, making it something graspable. Messianic

kairos is, in the end, nothing other than "seized chronos," not some
additional or other kind of time. 126 Implicit in this analysis is that
all chronos is potentially kairos. Kairos consists, ultimately, of
ordinary time in the aspect of its having been seized in and for a use
specific to an occasion.
Similarly, the parousia involved in Paul's discussion is not
something supplemental that can be added on to the representation of
time. The messianic community might be depicted as living its life in
endless deferral, but such an endless deferral is not the Pauline
picture, according to Agamben. Rather, the parousia already establishes
a messianic time of the now. The time of the now lengthens out, not in
order to endlessly defer its fulfillment, but so that its instantaneous
present character can be grasped. Here Agamben has recourse to Kafka's
comment that the Messiah will not come on the last day, but on the very
last day. Agamben sees the same structure, of the stretching out of
time, at work in Paul's texts. Pauline messianic time is still "the
day," not the "very last day."
126. Ibid., 69.
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He focuses as well on the phrase "eis euaggelion theou." For
Agamben, a matter of first importance is that in the letter to the
Romans, the announcement of something is indistinguishable from the
something that is being announced. "The letter is thus the
impossibility of distinguishing between the announcement and its
content."U? This indistinguishability is particularly significant for
Agamben, whose interest in every question originates in its peculiar
illumination of the problem of language. In the gospel - that is, in
the announcement, the euaggelion, not in the literary genre of a
narrative of the life of Jesus - at every point the text of the letter,
the announcement of the message, and the good announced coincide. In
elucidating this problem, Agamben finds himself drawn into the
difficulties of Paul's critique of the law. 128
Here again Agamben discerns an internal division peculiar to Paul's
thought, and one that defines the nature of the messianic. Agamben's
presentation of this internal division will take the reader all the way
to what he describes as an experience of the pure event of language,
which for Agamben will serve to reinsert a specific encounter with
something other than language, something outside language, as an
outside that counters the pervasive nihilism of the critical moment
that makes for the legibility of the Pauline messianic text. How he
arrives at this denouement is significant, and hinges on a series of
articulations of linguistic and judicial theory. The themes that are
perennially important to Agamben, and that surface in all of his works
appear here as well:

inclusionary exclusions and exclusionary

inclusions, divisions of divisions, the significance of poetry as an
articulation of semantic and semiotic series, the relationship of Hegel

127. Ibid., 89.
128. Ibid., 92.
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to Heidegger, the fundamental role of potentiality, and the importance
of making things inoperative.
According to Agamben, the Pauline treatment of the law figures
prominently in the interpretation of the pure announcement that is
inseparable from its content and the good signified in that content and
announcement. This treatment does not simply oppose faith to law, as an
opposition of two things external to one another, but delves into an
area in which it becomes possible to understand that the law is
fulfilled in its being made inoperative (in Greek, katargein).
"Messianic katargesis does not merely abolish; it preserves and brings
to fulfillment."Ug Significantly, he notes that Luther translates the
Pauline verb katargein as aufheben, the verb associated with the key
process of the Hegelian dialectic, that which preserves in going beyond
or negating. He suggests that the characteristic double meaning of

aufheben picked up by Hegel owes its origin to the double meaning of
katergein encoded by Paul, and transmitted and bequeathed to German by
Luther and his influential translation of the Biblical text into the
vernacular.
Philosophically; "what is essentially messianic and historic is the
idea that fulfillment is possible by retrieving and revoking foundation,
by coming to terms with it."l3O This messianic fulfillment would provide
a response to the problem identified by Adorno of the perpetual,
however micrological, remainder left over in the passage of things into
concepts. The "conceptual utopia" that Adorno envisions and seeks to
elucidate in Negative Dialectics is here given a slightly different
formulation,

and a more promising outlook, in Agamben's formulation of

what is truly messianic.

129. Ibid., 99.
130. Ibid., 103-104.
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Utopia as "The Profane"
Agamben's repeated references to profanation almost certainly have
as one point of reference the quote from Ludwig Feuerbach that begins
Guy Debord's text The Society of the Spectacle:
But certainly for the present age, which prefers the sign to
the thing signified, the copy to the original, representation
to reality, the appearance to the essence
. illusion only
is sacred, truth profane. Nay, sacredness is held to be
enhanced in proportion as truth decreases and illusion
increases, so that the highest degree of illusion comes to be
the highest degree of sacredness. 131
As noted, Agamben states repeatedly his admiration for and concurrence
with Debord's analysis in this text, and his conviction that Debord's
assessment of the critical issues and tasks of his time is correct and
prescient. The appearance in the text, as a point of departure, of the
structural opposition between sacred and profane, and its association
with illusion and truth, resonates with emphases in Agamben's texts.
Agamben emphatically presents profanation as something to be pursued,
while sacredness is something to be interrogated and exposed in the
context of the state, the state based on the capture of "bare life" as
"sacred life." What might be worth noting is that the "bare life" that
is "sacred" is called in official discourse and political speech "human
life." This "human" life, however, is the "bare" life that the human
shares with all other forms of life, rather than anything specifically
human as to its form of life. That is, bare life is not some unique
form of life that distinguishes the human form from any other life form.
It is, rather, life without any particular quality other than its
situation of being organized within a state that claims or can claim,
and, according to Agamben's analysis, always claims in its foundation,

131. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, cited in Debord,
Spectacle, 11.

239

a state of exception in which it includes an outside and excludes an
inside.
Agamben's solution to the problem posed by bare life takes the form
"the form-of-life [bios] of the human must coincide with its bare [zoe]
life." The bare life that becomes profane rather than sacred - that is,
that reverts to common use - must designate human life. It must at the
same time coincide with that bare life that the state, in its state of
exception, attempts to claim as its own. This analysis suggests that
the stakes could not possibly be higher at the present moment for
humanity and for the globe. The life that human beings share with all
other living things, the "bare" life or nothing-but-a-live-being that
is at stake in contemporary politics and praxis, is that without which
there is no life at all, but only death.
The utopian moment, the only utopian possibility within the purview
of these texts, lies in the possible extrication of life itself from
its imprisonment in the core of the state, and its reversion to common
use, for whatever being and purpose.
Philosophy as Strategy and Intervention
Agamben is yet another thinker for whom philosophy itself is a
practice. From the perspective of utopian discourse, his thought
concerns the root obstacles and possibilities for utopia, in the sense
of a condition that ends practices and structures that produce
suffering. Agamben's work is political practice in the form of theory
that addresses the deep conceptual tap-roots of contemporary
understandings and practices. His work bespeaks the conviction that
seeing how ideas and associations arise, how they come to acquire their
hold on the collective imagination and how they trace their
trajectories of meaning and development matters. Homo Sacer offers a
particularly apt example of this line of thinking. It locates the roots
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of the state form in the theorization of the Greek polis, and locates
the treatment of "bare life" in the polis as the kernel of western
political thinking. His identification of the negativity of language,
and the analysis that roots contemporary nihilism in the functioning of
language itself, offer another example of this style of thinking.
Something akin to psychoanalysis in this method links Agamben's
work to that of Irigaray. This theory amounts to an elucidation of how
things came to be, as a result of choices made; this method then
indicates places where other choices could have been, and perhaps could
still be, made. Agamben's focus on original thinking underlying
institutions suggests that institutions themselves carry with them, in
their structures, the conceptual tendencies on which they have been
built. The "building" metaphor suggests that some institutions cannot
serve certain ends, by virtue of their original engineering. The task
of thinking through this original engineering or architecture, then,
becomes both vital and "strategic."
Durantaye notes that Agamben takes the issue of philosophy as
strategy fully seriously. This strategic conviction coincides with his
admiration for Debord and for Benjamin, both of whom he identifies as
strategic thinkers and writers. Moreover, the realm of this strategic
operation, in Agamben's view, includes the potentiality of the
intellect and the various powers of life that are implicated in
political ontology. Strategic choices cannot be narrowly political, but
have to be taken at the level of first philosophy. The idea that
political life involves simply pragmatic and superficial maneuvering is
both foreign, and counterproductive. Instead, "political thought and
political strategy have to reconnect with a lost ontological element,"
that takes them beyond immediate instrumental considerations, and makes
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political actors and thinkers aware of the stakes always already
involved in their political practice.l~
The impatience critics sometimes express with this style of
thinking contributes to its appearance as an impractical form of
utopianism. By calling such basic institutions and structures as
language and the state into question, his work seems to invalidate all
potential political activity. It is difficult to imagine political
activity that is not oriented towards state power, and that does not
function through the unexamined use of ordinary language. The
difficulty of imagining such political activity may in fact be one
index of its necessity. What emerges as the most profoundly utopian
feature of this utopian discourse is its effort to facilitate radically
different thinking, by means of calling into question categories and
forms that well-intentioned political actors typically take for granted.
Textual Form and Considerations of Language
Agamben's texts are conventionally academic on one level: they
address topics and make arguments. While they are not treatises of
systematic philosophy, and while they rely heavily on philological
methods which some critics question, they unfold conventionally,
compared to texts by Adorno or Irigaray. At the same time, however,
they embody methods of indirection, digression, illustration and
unanticipated juxtaposition that create a striking mood, more like that
of lyric poetry than the standard philosophical paper, and that
encourage reflection on their implicit meanings. This effect is most
evident in Idea of Prose, which consists of a series of fragments,
incorporates line drawings and woodcuts as illustrations, and
presumably aims to generate a response around what is not said as much
as around what is.
132. Durantaye, 196.
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The claim that Agamben's texts aim to generate a response around
what is not said as much as they do around what is requires extension.
The generation of effects that, in a less linguistic medium might be
labeled as employing "negative space," is a recurrent feature of
Agamben's texts. The argument of The Open, for instance, leaves spaces
around its presentation of facts and arguments for inference about the
message of the text. Similarly, the text of The Coming Community relies
heavily on intertextuality, resonance of one example with another, and
aura to create its mesmerizing effect on the reader. In this respect,
Agamben's texts resemble the medieval commentaries on sacred literature,
and the philological glosses of the 19 th century, both of which he has
expressed admiration for as creative forms. 133
Indirection in Agamben's texts is related to the theory of
representation he presents, and to his concern with a "pure potential
for representation. ,,134 The problem with representation in the integrated
spectacular situation is that representation feeds and supports the
spectacle's alienation of images from concrete possibilities.
Representations of positive states, as images for contemplation,
undermine what potential for activity might subsist. Readers who find
nothing directly represented in a text, and who persist in efforts to
engage with the text, are compelled to create their own solutions to
this representational problem. These readers thereby experience their
own potentiality for representation. Readers who undergo this
experience may then be able to contribute to the constitution of a
subject of utopian possibility.

133. Agamben, Infancy and History, 144; Durantaye, Agamben, 126.
134. Durantaye, Agamben, 121-147.
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The Problem of Language from a Utopian Perspective
Language is intrinsically alienating. To appear as a subject within
language, the speaker - the subject of the enunciation - must adopt a
universal position via one of the personal pronouns known as
"shifters." So, for instance, "I" does not refer exclusively to the
particular or singular person making a particular enunciation, but is a
universal position shared with all other speakers who are capable of
saying "I" under appropriate circumstances.

Perhaps paradoxically,

then,

the use of these shifters, which arguably helps form the psychological
subject, is in tension with the articulation of a radically singular
perception, history, or position. If by the subject someone might want
to denote the singular existence dealt with carefully in The Coming
Community, whatever being, language turns out to be a blunt instrument.
Language and Death, Infancy and History, and Remnants of Auschwitz
all point to a phenomenon of language that makes speech about or from
the place that would seem most immediately accessible to an individual
precisely least accessible, and indeed foreclosed. Agamben's texts
identify this foreclosure as central, definitive of the western
tradition, and deeply influential in the present context he identifies
as "nihilism."
The aporia or dilemma is that a person, to enter into speech and to
make a reference to a personal experiential existential subject, must
deny or alienate a portion of the truth of that subject, in order to
participate in the linguistic world that is that person's inheritance.
As far as any existing linguistic theory knows, the phenomenon of
personal foreclosure happens in every language, since every language
contains what Benveniste identified as "shifters," which make reference
only to the instance of discourse, and which can thus be seen to change
their meaning or rather not to have a stable meaning when they are
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decontextualized, as they inevitably are over time. Insofar as they
represent or point to the instance of discourse in its originary place,
time, and context they have one truth content; insofar as they
represent or point to the taking place of discourse in general, any
possible context of discourse, they mayor may not lack all truth
content. 135 Moreover, a speaker or writer, an individual practitioner of
enunciation, undergoes an unavoidable self-alienation in taking up the
position of the speaking subject, and simultaneously perpetrates an
unavoidable effacement of the specificity and concreteness of others in
taking up the position of the intersubjective references coded in a
language's personal pronouns.
The logic of the argument goes something like this:

"I", a

personal pronoun, refers not to a specific concrete subject, but to a
situation of discourse; it denotes "the specific concrete individual
uttering the given instance of discourse." As such, the word "I,"
viewed from one direction, is the most personal and specific of words.
But viewed from another angle is the most impersonal and general of
words. In taking up the use of the personal pronoun "I", a speaker or
writer identifies himself or herself as the "place of the taking place
of language," but as the place of the taking place of language, which
can be a condition shared with many, this place becomes a place where
the immediate, personal, specific, concrete predicates of the speaking
subject disappear, or are silenced in the taking place of language in
general. The phenomenon of silencing remains in effect, regardless of
the specific content of the discourse, even when the discourse

135. Whether a word "represents" a concept or function, or whether it
"points to" a concept or function makes a theoretical and practical difference,
and these terms signal the tension between a representational and a semiotic
understanding of language. The differences between representational and
semiotic theories of language are far beyond the scope of this work.
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describes a series of intensely or emphatically personal predicates, of
any kind.
In an everyday pragmatic register, such logic appears ridiculous. A
statement of the form "I've lost my car keys" or "I'm losing my
religion" is fairly clear and communicates something to a participant
in the original discourse, something concrete and fairly precise in
most contexts. Most people don't recognize, or feel, their intense
self-alienation in speech when they utter enunciations of that form. If
people did, very little of the ordinary business of living, from
functional to tender, would occur. The argument that the everyday
pragmatic context and its demands are exclusively inauthentic, the
realm of das Mann and so on, deserves to be questioned. Tucking
children into bed at night, for instance, is not the appropriate
context for confronting one's being-towards-death and its doubling in
language - not to say it does not become such an occasion rather
routinely - and is certainly not ordinarily the context for sharing
such reflections with the other as other. It is rather, normally, the
context for accepting the grace of immediacy and communicability.
But when the context for reflection and deeper consideration
presents itself, when the car keys have been found and the day's
calendar arranged and when the child is asleep, the logic presents
itself as more compelling. It reasserts itself in reading texts, and in
particular sacred texts, that make use of personal pronouns:

"Deliver

me according to my righteousness," "let not your right hand know what
your left hand does," "oh you of faith," and so on. The discourse goes
on, long after its context has altered. The specific addressees seem
interchangeable - and yet, are in other ways not interchangeable, and
in the distance between this interchangeability and this noninterchangeability, this sensed non-"fungibility" in the terms of
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Adorno, this "not same" in the terms of Irigaray, lies the concrete
individual's sense of the death of the self and the barrier of language
in the encounter with language and speaking. The communication of the
personal, specific, concrete, irreproducible individual subject, the
communication of the truth of this subject, and particularly of the
communication of its full truth, continues to elude those subjects,
even in language, whenever that truth is separated from its everyday
pragmatic context. Nevertheless, the sense that there exists some truth
that fails to enter or to be visible in that everyday pragmatic context
also bedevils these subjects.
In other words, the essential negativity of the foundation of
authentic being in "being the there" or "grasping the this" understood
as the "taking place of language," and the death of the existential or
phenomenological subject in a Voice that calls to the place of the
taking place of language, is what Agamben's study exposes for
consideration. What is exposed in that analysis is that the western
tradition seeks something like "the mystery of life," or the source of
individual consciousness, in the very moment of its loss in language, a
loss which can be perceived as a loss only at a remove from commonplace
life, a remove from the "prosaic," everyday pragmatic register into the
register of separated reflection.
In separation, moreover, is to be understood not a complete
separation but a shift of emphasis or focus, with a commensurate
forgetting of or de-emphasis on the concrete realities that enable and
necessitate the taking up of the everyday pragmatic register, which
cannot be done without even for a moment.
This logic underlies Agamben's "philosophy of witness" or "ethics
of witness." In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben identifies an
"experimentum linguae" (an experiment of language) that pertains to
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"bearing witness." Catherine Mills criticizes Agamben's philosophy of
witness, in her final analysis, for its "non-relationality." Whether
this criticism stands deserves careful consideration. It would seem
that inter-relationality, inter-subjectivity, would be one of the
presuppositions or prerequisites of something like "bearing witness,"
as the audience for the testimony would be required. The citation of
Nietzsche's discourse on the "last man" suggests as much, that the
relationship of self-referentiality and the splitting of the individual
subject into producer and consumer, sender and receiver, thought and
intellect, "it" and "I", continues even into the thoughts of the "last
man." Why does the text label this experiment an experiment of language?
The answer to the question arises from a consideration of the example,
or incident of Hurbinek, a "child of Auschwitz," who cannot speak
language although he is about three years old, and whose story is
related in Primo Levi's memoir The Drowned and the Saved. 136 At one point
Hurbinek begins to repeat a sequence of sounds that Levi and his fellow
prisoners think might be a word or a name, but which none recognize. It
seems to be an insistent effort to communicate. The word, or name,
remains forever unintelligible, however. Some days after this initial
effort at speech, the boy dies.
Agamben points out that "Hurbinek cannot bear witness, since he
does not have language," that is, the sounds that emerge from him do
not take the form of words known to the others who might relate to him.
The others recognize his word as a word, or something like a word, but
not its meaning. Levi says of him "he bears witness through these words
of mine. ,,137 Agamben's commentary identifies a double exclusion from
testimony, which bears witness "completely" through the vehicle of
136. Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New
York: Summit Books, 1988).
137. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 38.
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Levi's language. For Agamben, Hurbinek becomes the exemplar of the
complete witness, whose language of testimony

~no

longer signifies and

that, in not signifying, advances into what is without language, to the
point of taking on a different insignificance - that of the complete
witness, that of he who by definition cannot bear witness.,,13B The text
points us toward the recognition that what is at stake in the

~true

testimony" or the testimony from someone who could speak from
experience, someone who had both been there and had seen and
experienced the experience of the camps, it is not enough to be in the
presence of the non-sense of language itself, but rather

~that

this

senseless sound be, in turn, the voice of something or someone that,
for entirely other reasons, cannot bear witness."l"
The would-be witness cannot bear complete witness because that
witness has not seen everything there was to see, and has not
experienced everything that could have been experienced. So to the
reality of having seen all that could have been seen, or experienced
all that could have been experienced, no one can bear witness by
definition, because the possibility of a voice or speech arising from
that place is definitively exhausted. But for Agamben, this

~lacuna"

of

testimony, in which the witness cannot provide the adequate witness
because of the inadequacy of language, because of the foreclosure of
the personal in and through language, . must

~give

way" to the different

impossibility of bearing witness that arises from not having language.
On the other hand, what will be decisive for the inhabitants of the
coming community will be an appropriation of the being-in-language
Agamben depicts as that which is most common to humanity. His analysis
of the Platonic idea in The Coming Community indicates something of

138. Ibid., 39.
139. Ibid.
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what he is trying to accomplish through his meditations on language. He
encourages an appropriation of humans' own "being-in-language," which
amounts to an appropriation of humans' status as related both to the
concept of humanity and the idea - that is, the "thing itself" - of
humanity. "Only those who succeed in carrying it to completion without allowing what reveals to remain veiled in the nothingness that
reveals, but bringing language itself to language - will be the first
citizens of a community with neither presuppositions nor a
State .

,,140

His analysis here is reminiscent of Adorno's treatment of subject
and object, and of the problem of the "non-identity" between the object
and its covering concept. Agamben resorts to Aristotle's treatment of
synonymy and homonymy to make his argument. Individual instances of a
nominal class or category (e.g., "horse") are Aristotelian "synonyms"
wi th respect to tha.t class; they are "homonyms" with respect to the
"idea," or in Agamben's terms "having-name. ,,141 While it is possible to
point to this as "being-in-language," the idea itself has no name of
its own; it is hidden under the linguistic word, that is always welded
to its concept. Hovering around that word, however, is everything
discernible in the "whatever" being that remains non-linguistic while
being in language. 142 All those microscopic features that cannot solidify
as predicates of the concept are nevertheless the very essence of
"whatever being"; these are the "smallest intramundane traits" noted by
Adorno as being "of relevance to the absolute.,,143 At this point,
Agamben's analysis of whatever being and Adorno's analysis of the goal
of negative dialectics radically converge.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Agamben, Coming Community, 83.
Ibid., 75
Ibid., 76.
Adorno, Negative Dialectics,
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Treatment of Subject-Object Relationship
For Agarnben, in effect, the experience of language and whatever
being's being-in-language joins tongue in groove to the problem of the
relationship of subject to object, however it is conceived. What it
might mean concretely to appropriate one's own being-in-language is not
immediately clear. Agarnben's example, of Tiananrnen, leaves almost
everything to the imagination. What it does not leave to the
imagination is the prediction that whatever appropriation of being-inlanguage will be undertaken by these citizens of the corning community
will excite the opposition of the State. What forms this appropriation
of being-in-language might take, and how those forms of community are
to find ways to co-exist with, avoid, or deconstruct the State is left
as an exercise for the reader.
That exercise is, in fact,

far from incidental. Agarnben ultimately

poses a strongly autopoietic thesis of the subject, that emerges from
the ruin of the western philosophical effort to identify an objective
ground for this subject that gives it substance and direction. This
effort itself constitutes the objective historical foundation of
western nihilism. Its theoretical version culminates with Hegel and
Heidegger both announcing the negativity at the center of subjectivity,
and which is also reflected in the poetry of the stil novo and its
acknowledgement of talk about "nothing." Its translation into practice
is illustrated most decisively by the Nazi death camps, but has become
the paradigm of contemporary global politics. The triumph of the
integrated spectacle has stripped language of every substantive content,
rendering language itself discernible as an apparatus of noncommunication. 144

144. It seems necessary to recall at this point that language is also not
fully an apparatus of non-communication, even for Agamben.
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The exigency of coming to grips with this evident negativity has
been a theme in Agamben's work from his first book, The Man Without
Content. There, Agamben quotes Nietzsche, in the preface to the Gay
Science, saying "Ah, if you could really understand why we of all

people need art

" but "another kind of art .

an art for

artists, for artists only! "145 Agamben's thesis in The Man Without
Content is that the creative act faces the modern artist with a
profound threat, a terrorizing experience. What is supposed to be
"self-expression" becomes a profound realization of an absence of
content for expression. This confrontation with the absence of the
fixed human subject, along with the absolute dissolution of a tradition
that provides determinate content for the working out of human
subjectivity, underlies the problem of the artist, as well as that of
the arts, in the contemporary period.
Agamben's ties to the Situationist International, which endeavored
to transform society through a free creative use of what is available,
connects with the formlessness and absence of a determinate work to
which the human person is "called." That art, an art without
determinate contents, that is so urgently needed, then must be an art
for artists, in a world in which everyone is required to become an
artist. Here, his final meditation on Benjamin and the question of
tradition and transmissibility has to do with the resignification of
meaning. What emerges from Agamben's discussion of Benjamin's interest
in quotation, his comments on the collector, and his thoughts about the
past, is that the past can be an alien body. If for Adorno the extent
to which the past forms the present subject figures prominently as an

145. Agamben, The Man Without Content, 7. The first edition of The Man
Without Content, published in 1970, coincided with the original German
publication of Adorno's posthumous Aesthetic Theory, Adorno's last work thus
coinciding with Agamben's first.
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obstacle to action, for Agarnben the extent to which Benjamin "makes
alienation from the past into a value" signals the possibility of a
more revolutionary relationship to the past. 146
Agarnben draws a contrast between a traditional and a contemporary
culture. In contemporary culture, aesthetics is founded on the
destruction of the transmissibility of culture, of tradition. In a
traditional culture, "an absolute identity exists between the act of
transmission and the thing transmitted. ,,147 Culture is not a vehicle for
the transmission of something other than itself, some body of knowledge
or special truth. Rather, culture just is the flow of what people know,
are, and can be. "For it is the transmissiblity of culture that, by
endowing culture with an immediately perceptible meaning and value,
allows man to move freely toward the future without being hindered by
the burden of the past. ,,148 The past is not in those circumstances
something heavy and alien with which each person must come to terms in
some way. Rather, the past travels with the present, lightly, as
whatever continues to be of use. People today have lost this
relationship to culture.
Durantaye suggests that Agarnben sees the role of art as being to
guide people, show them who they are, and indicate to them what they
can do and become. Art no longer simply fulfills this function for
moderns and post-moderns. In this, Agarnben and Adorno see something
similar. Durantaye, however, may not take seriously enough Agarnben's
interest in and homage to the Situationist project, or its relationship
to Benjamin's notion of the constellation, or its relationship to his
own concept of "making use" of things in a profane way. Maybe everyone

146. Ibid., 105.
147. Ibid., 107.
148. Ibid., 108.

253

does not need to become a poet, as Durantaye worries .149 But the "art for
artists only" that Nietzsche calls for, a call that Agamben echoes,
does have something vital to do with the status of producer, the

technikes, that each person is required to assume. The reservation of
this humbie status to "the creative activity of the genius who is
burdened with the imperative to produce beauty" is the mark of the
destruction of culture as a place of human habitation. 150 What is called
for is an active reappropriation of this process not as a return but as
a new creatively technical endeavor. Durantaye's remarks on The Man
Without Content are perspicuous; the potential confusion involves the
extent to which the tradition and transmission of culture take place in
the oikos, the realm less of "art" than of "craft." That distinction,
which is itself a product of the rise of aesthetics, with its
segregation of "high art" and its relationship to a culture that could
not be transmitted organically, needs to be borne in mind. The humble

technikes was never an artist in the modern sense of that term, and the
anonymous detourniste who might be heir to that earlier function
similarly will not be "that kind of poet" even though she is in effect
reasserting humanity's "poetic dwelling.

,,151

The meditation on time and rhythm that Agamben begins in The Man
Without Content comes to fruition in The Time That Remains. Agamben
thus succeeds in linking religion and art or aesthetics, and in drawing
149. Durantaye, Agamben, 37.
150. Agamben, Man Without Content, 111.
151. "Poetically man dwells on earth," presumably the literary referent of
Agamben's statement of "man's poetic status on earth," comes from a poem by
Holderlin, "In lovely blueness." The line is taken up in a 1951 essay by
Heidegger, " . . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . " See Martin Heidegger, " . . .
Poetically Man Dwells . . . ", trans. Albert Hofstadter, in Philosophical and
Political Writings, ed. Manfred Stassen (New York: Continuum, 2006) 265-278.
Perhaps significantly, in this essay, Heidegger makes a comment on potential:
human beings can fail to dwell poetically on earth because they also can
succeed in dwelling in this way. If they had no potential to dwell poetically,
it would be pointless to say they do not do it. Agamben is more likely to
reverse this logic: if humanity dwells unpoetically, it could also not dwell
unpoetically.
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out what might be their messianic potential for contemporary human
beings. Contemporary human beings are those who, as Agamben notes, have
lost their standing in a secure present, who have lost control of their
gestures, who no longer have the capacity for experience, who, in
effect, are utterly lost in the face of an objective that is at hand
but to which there is no way, precisely because it is at hand. However,
while it remains true that human beings have no essential work, that is,
have nothing they must do, they have as a potential a kind of rhythmic
character, an ability to mix form with substance, and to effect a pause
between past and present, that can constitute the rhythmic, poetic
appropriation of time into meaning. The messianic is, it seems, one way
that people might take a new kind of hold on the past and occupy the
present as the caesura or epoche between past and future, in a manner
that does not leave the past as an oppressive and alien force hanging
threateningly over human life.
Recognizing this subjective potential, then, involves a
renegotiated understanding of space and time. It eliminates
presuppositions, but leaves what we might still want to call subjects,
or "whatever being," free to make a profane or playful use of the full
range of materials available to contemporary life. This subject would
have the potential to create, from the nothing that is human life, that
form that would be inseparable from life that constitutes ethics, and
to suggest and guide through formation into a world that would offer
the happiness, and end the suffering, that everywhere and always has
borne the name of utopia. In other words, the utopian chronotope is the
space-time that humanity in itself is - at least, potentially.
The Space and Time of Potentiality
As noted previously, subjects of utopian possibility need both
space and time that are sufficiently open to permit action. Space
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cannot be so dense, or so tightly controlled, as to prevent action that
challenges the unspeakable world that is. The structure of time must be
such that action can occur. What can take place in it cannot be
completely determined by what has taken place in the past, or abandoned
to an invisible telos presumably to arrive in the future. Agamben's
treatment of these two issues contributes to a distinctive
understanding of "whatever being" as that subject of possibility that
is in a position to undertake a messianic form of activity. That
activity makes use of the "time of the now" (the Pauline ho nyn kairos
that Agamben links to Benjamin's Jetztzeit) that is "shot through with
messianic time."
The Outside Inside
Agamben's approach to the space of action involves recognizing the
presence of an outside already inside, at the heart of the structures
of western life. The state of exception that is the rule of political
life in the contemporary period has the structure of a capture of an
exclusion, the incorporation of something - like bare life - in the
form of its exclusion, and the exclusion of something that is already
presupposed and within. The potentiality that resides in this structure
has to do with the exteriority that has already been set up as the
innermost cell of the state of exception.
The "whatever being" that is the core concern of The Coming
Community is particularly important here. First, whatever being
consti tutes "the event of an outside" in its relationship to humanity. 152
It does this in a precise and predictably singular way, by inhabiting a
relationship to an idea. This relationship makes "whatever being" a
"threshold," "a point of contact with an external space that must

152. Agarnben, The Coming Community, 67.

256

remain empty. ,,153 This outside, understood in terms of something like a
threshold or something that is "at the door," can also be thought of as
the passage that makes a determinate space accessible, its "face" or
its eidos - its form. 154 Agamben's statement on this point is worth
quoting at length:
The threshold is not, in this sense, another thing with
respect to the limit; it is, so to speak, the experience of
the limit itself, the experience of being-within an outside.
This ek-stasis is the gift that singularity gathers from the
empty hands of humanity.155
In other words, "whatever being," this event of an outside, is also an
experience of this outside as something whatever being inhabits or
stands within. This makes whatever being simultaneously an experience
of standing within - within the threshold and the "outside" which it is
in itself - and of standing "without" or "outside," in a Heideggerian

"ek-stasis" - outside the "empty and indeterminate totality," called
"humani ty," that delimits the space of belonging .156
Of note is that the structure of whatever being, which is the
experience of being-within an outside, is precisely counterposed to the
structure of the state of exception. The state of exception is
structured as the capture of an ex-clusion in the form of an in-clusion
or in-corporation. This ex-clusion is specifically an in-clusion, or
presupposition. This structure, which appears obsessively in Agamben's
work, perhaps because it appears obsessively in the structures of
western thought, is associated in Agamben's work in every case with the
threat of death. In the form of the anthropological machine, it is
deadly. In the form of the camp, the nomos of modern political life, it

153.
154.
155.
156.

Ibid.
The Platonic term appears in the text with dramatic emphasis.
Ibid., 68.
Ibid., 67.
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is the precondition for annihilation. In the form of the sovereign
state, it is the exposure of sacred life to death.
In State of Exception Agamben "speaks, in regard to the state of
exception, of a

'no-man's-land' he sees lying between 'civil law and

political fact'" that then opens the potential for a reversal of the
state of exception itself, or rather, for an institution of new
categories. 157 Agamben is taking his analysis of the state of exception
as is well-known from Walter Benjamin's 8 th thesis on history, which
calls for a real state of exception that would "better our position
against fascism," and which Agamben seems to believe has corne into its
own "now of legibility."
But we have seen the perception of a space between two positions
already, both in Adorno and in Irigaray. This is not the first time we
recognize a "between" that has been labeled utopian, for in Adorno the
"no-man's-land" is explicitly a potentially utopian space. In Irigaray,
the space between two, which is only barely perceptible and is indeed
imperceptible for those who refuse to recognize the subject position of
Woman, is the place where a utopian future might begin, in encounter.
Agamben also illustrates this space in the between "man and animal" of
"the open", and in fact this space between constitutes the open.
In the innermost cell of these structures of lethality, therefore,
a perpetual spaciousness abides. That spaciousness is intrinsic to the
ontological structure of the being, whatever being, these structures
have formed to contain, maintain, retain and restrain. Its potential,
which is always an exteriority, is inexhaustible. The task of the
coming community will be to open up this event of the outside,
constituted by the relation of "humanity" to its singularity. In an
alternative formulation,

it will be to transform the "biopolitical body

157. Durantaye, Agamben, 338.
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that is bare life . .

. into the site for the constitution and

installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life
and a bios that is only its own zoe.

,,158

That is, it seems, roughly

equivalent to finding a way to refuse the temptation to render abject
and expendable one or another specific singular manifestation of the
life that living beings share, and learn how simply to live, together.
The distance between this formulation and the classical description
of utopia as the ultimate reconciliation of humanity with nature is
micrological, as well as real and consequential. It is precisely the
difference, following Agamben's analysis, between a form that makes the
space accessible to the kind of thought that might be able to make use
of it, and the kind of thought that can only work obsessively to
abandon it to containment. In Agamben's sense the only available space
for practice is always already fully occupied by zoe. The good news is
that the space is always already accessible. The bad news is that the
singularities who will be in a position to make use of it are still
irreparably factical,

for better or worse. Moreover, they still need to

see the possibilities, and to cultivate the preference for not doing
otherwise than making use of them.
Time
A bios that is at every point its own zoe, equivalent to a form of
life that fully exhausts itself in life itself, will have a particular
relationship to time as well as to space. That time is always available,
and in Agamben's treatment seems to constitute the Jetztzeit, the

~time

of the now," or the ho nyn kairos of the Pauline formulation. In fact,
it bears an intimate relationship to the time that humans represent, in
whatever way, in the tenses of language and the turns of phrase that
create images and representations of time.
158. Agamben, Homo Sacer, 188.
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To elucidate this point, Agamben draws first on a linguistic
analysis that terms "operational time" as the time it takes for someone
to form a linguistic representation of time. He then makes the
connection between this "operational time" and the familiar theory of
shifters developed by Benveniste, pointing out that this operational
time is what opens the possibility for language to refer to its own
taking place. It also provides the basis for a striking note, regarding
the self-presence of consciousness, that points out that lapse and
delay, a dissynchrony, inhabits the core of the subject that is, as
Benveniste's theory goes, constituted linguistically. The experience of
self-presence, for this reason, takes the form of the experience of
time. Agamben then extends this discussion to the realm outside
linguistics and discourse.
"It is as though man [sic], insofar as he is a thinking and
speaking being, produced an additional time with regard to
chronological time, a time that prevented him from perfectly
coinciding with the time out of which he could make images and
representations. This ulterior time, nevertheless, is not
another time, it is not a supplementary time added on from
outside to chronological time. Rather, it is something like a
time within time . . . which . . . allows for the possibility
of my achieving and taking hold of it. ,,159
Agamben's designation of this intimate, operational time as time
humankind produces in its life as thinking and speaking beings is of
particular interest in the context of Agamben's theoretical
relationship to Debord. According to Debord, "By demanding to live the
historical time that it creates, the proletariat discovers the simple,
unforgettable core of its revolutionary project."lW The vehicle for
doing this may be the operational time that Agamben identifies here. He
defines "messianic time," in light of this operational time, as "the

159. Agarnben, The Time That Remains, 67.
160. Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 106.
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time that time takes to come to an end. ,,161 Messianic time can be
understood as the livable, usable time that affords an opportunity for
radical action, produced from within the seemingly seamless and closed
context of the spectacle.
Agamben labors to clear up a number of actual and still potential
misconceptions with respect to this messianic time. First, messianic
time elucidates something about the relationship of kairos, or
"occasion," to chronos, or chronological time, the time that passes in
regular rhythm and whose passing can be measured by clocks and
calendars. He notes that any kairos always has at its disposal chronos,
in effect has no other time than chronos to provide it with substance,
making it something graspable. Messianic kairos is, in the end, nothing
other than "seized chronos," not some additional or other kind of
time. 162 Implicit in this analysis is that all chronos is potentially
kairos. Kairos consists, ultimately, of ordinary time in the aspect of
its having been seized in and for a use specific to an occasion.
Similarly, the parousia involved in Paul's discussion is not
something supplemental that can be added on to the representation of
time. The messianic community might be depicted as living its life in
endless deferral, but this is not the Pauline picture, according to
Agamben. Rather, the parousia already establishes a time of the now,
which lengthens out, not in order to endlessly defer its fulfillment,
but so that its instantaneous present character can be grasped. Here
Agamben has recourse to Kafka's comment that the Messiah will not come
on the last day, but on the very last day. Agamben sees the same
structure, of the stretching out of time, at work in Paul's texts.

161. Agamben, Time That Remains,
162. Ibid., 69.

67.
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Agamben's discussion of the figures appropriate to messianic time
sheds additional light on this peculiar and vital structure of
possibility. Pauline typos, the relation of a figure in the past to a
figure of or in the future, is one of these structures. Recapitulation,
sometimes referred to as "summing up," is another. Messianic time
involves a "summary judgment" and fulfillment or fullness of time,
including in its historical dimension. In both these temporal and
discursive structures, there is an irreducible activity implied on the
part of the messianic community, the messianic actors who live in
messianic time. The typological relation is not eternal, but
specifically created or constructed, held together and realized in the
time of the now. The recapitulation of summary judgment, or of
recognizing how events in a present complete and modify events of the
past, is also a production of activity in the now time. For this reason,
Agamben emphasizes that messianic time is emphatically not oriented
solely, or even primarily, towards the future, but rather towards the
past and its relationship to the future, as well as to the present. It
represents a decisive settling of accounts and revelation of the
potential still locked up in memories and images of the past. 163
The Very Topia of Things
Agamben's work is both radically revolutionary, and profoundly
utopian, in the thoroughly obscure way that a blank page is thoroughly
obscure. He has been described as reactionary as well as utopian. Zizek
makes him the representative of the position, with respect to the "full
hegemony of global capitalism and its political supplement, liberal
democracy," of "acceptance of the futility of all struggle" and an
associated passive waiting for an outburst of "divine violence."lM The

163. Ibid., 77.
164. Zizek, ibid., 337-338.
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reading presented here does not support that assessment. Rather, it
sees Agamben's work as a radical rethinking of the political bases on
which current western forms of life rest. Implicitly, his work
continues to insist that a refusal to address the intrinsic lethality
of these forms, and a continued embrace of these forms, will continue
to undermine efforts to construct the messianic community that he would
stress needs to be brought into being. That community would have the
potential to seize the time of the now, the time that human beings
themselves create in their common lives and works, and make use of it
to bring the oppressive accumulation of historical time to an end.
This positive assessment of the core of Agamben's thought does not
mitigate the criticisms that, as noted, are legitimate foci of
attention. Practical questions remain. Chief among these are the
negotiation of the practical problem of how to make use of distinctions
and divisions that have a history of oppressive use in ways that
restage and neutralize their oppressive force. How, in other words, can
the distinctions involved in sexual difference, for instance, be made
use of for the purposes of creating new forms of subjectivity, while
pursuing a form of "messianic community" that eschews a foundation on
the basis of presupposition or identity, both of which generate
exclusion and abjection?
This reading of Agamben's work nevertheless discerns a potentiating
framework. That framework provides for the discernment and cultivation
of a subject of utopian possibility by means of a making use of what is
available to whatever being in the present circumstance, even the dire
circumstances of the integrated spectacle. That includes language,
relationships, and the space and time both of bare life and of a reengineered poetic dwelling. What might motivate such a free use could
be the promise of happiness contained in the announcement of the
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possibility of this form-of-life,

the form of which remains unspecified,

unrepresentable, and unforgettable.
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CHAPTER V
MESSIANIC LIGHTING

Introduction - The Subject of Utopia
Summary
This investigation of utopian discourse in the work of Theodor W.
Adorno, Luce Irigaray and Giorgio Agamben has observed that each of
these writers addresses what could be termed a

~subject

of utopian

possibility." This subject might be capable of thinking a vitally
necessary alternative to what presents itself as reality, and perhaps
even of undertaking the poetic task of fashioning that alternative.
Their shared address to this subject of possibility, and their shared
refusal to specify the contents of this alternative, signal a more
fundamental commonality. Each of these authors pursues a similar
direction in developing a minimally and sufficiently metaphysical
position that might maintain itself in a materialist, post-metaphysical
context. That is, each of these authors pursues a project that aims to
satisfy the metaphysical condition for utopian imagination, with the
possible effect of augmenting its practical import.
The Subject of Utopia
As rioted earlier, there are at least two ways to understand the
phrase

~the

subject of utopia" that are relevant to the study of

utopian discourse that has been pursued here.

~The

subject" can mean

the subject of a sentence: the word that does the action of the verb,
that undergoes the experience of something, or that bears the

265

description of a predicate. By extension, it can mean the occupant of
the subject position sketched by that grammar. Alternatively, the word
"subject" can point towards some matter under discussion, the main
theme of a conversation, work or course of study.
One conclusion of this comparison of utopian discourse in works by
Adorno, Irigaray and Agamben is that these three thinkers take similar
positions on the subject of utopia in both of these senses. With
respect to the subject of utopia in the first sense, they discourage
the idea that their readers are, or might at any moment become,
subjects of utopia. Their texts address fellow subjects of dystopia.
They refuse to delineate the as-yet-unmet subject of utopia. With
respect to the subject of utopia

~n

the second sense, they share the

"iconoclastic" mode identified by Russell Jacoby, that eschews detailed
representation of the utopian condition. 1 In the case of Agamben, this
avoidance of representation has even been labeled a formal "antiutopia.

,,2

A second conclusion is that despite these refusals of utopian
representation these three thinkers nevertheless participate in utopian
discourse. They do this by producing a specific form of utopian
discourse that works to cultivate the idea of possibility on which
utopian imagination depends. This cultivation includes the development
of an account of something like metaphysical experience that can be
tenable in a post-metaphysical context. This account, broadly similar
across the different writers' works, is addressed to a subject, in the
first sense, of utopian possibility. The subject of possibility is in a
position to exercise utopian imagination, and in time to consider
active participation in a utopian project. Utopian discourse here is

1. Jacoby, ibid.
2. Salzani, ibid.
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not a discourse that describes utopia, but one that constructs
sUbjectivity with respect to an open horizon of utopian possibility.
That effort at utopian imagination may be arduous; that utopian
project may be miniscule. The texts' invitation can certainly be
refused or ignored; these texts are neither coercive nor invariably
persuasive. In fact, as previously noted, they have earned their
reputation for repelling readers as much as for enticing them. However,
people call these writers "utopian" for a reason. That reason includes
their insistent recruitment of a subject of utopian possibility.
A final conclusion is that what makes this discourse utopian is how
it engages in and encourages further talk about "possibility" in the
sense of "subject matter." Utopian discourse is metaphysical discourse;
in a post-metaphysical age, it is impossible discourse. Each of these
authors nevertheless pursues this impossible, but imperative,
synchronization of a tenable metaphysical position with a strictly
material, post-metaphysical world. Each finally locates this utopian
possibility in solidarity with the matter of suffering. The subject of
possibility takes place, where and when it takes place, in close
proximity to a subject matter which transcends the discursive subject,
even though the discursive subject could also be said to transcend that
particular suffering. The "messianic light" these authors glimpse is
material. Suffering matter itself constitutes the metaphysical
substance that might make, and may suffer, the promise of utopian
happiness. The suffering of this promise may, furthermore,

lead to a

practice of oppositional thinking and acting that could yet materially
alter the dystopian context.
This chapter lays out the case for these conclusions. It first
discusses how the address to subjects of dystopia works to constitute
the subject of possibility. This discussion summarizes structural
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similarities across the three authors, noting significant differences.
It then turns more specifically to the way these texts delineate the
subject of possibility as subject matter. Here, it argues, these
writers share an approach that locates in the subject matter of
suffering itself the persistent conditions for utopian possibility.
This material constitutes the potential for collaboration in the
creation of the indispensable event of an "outside" or "other." This
exteriority, in turn, is the critical event on which the possibility of
utopian imagination depends. By recognizing suffering matter as the
location of this minimally but sufficiently metaphysical difference,
these thinkers identify an alternative and largely overlooked place
from which to pursue the "negation of suffering" that is the
constitutive content of utopia. The negation of suffering that proceeds
from this place proceeds differently from those approaches to utopia
that have relied on the domination of "nature;" it promises to create a
different form of negation. A response to suffering from this place
proposes, though not without ongoing risk, to elude the dystopian
consequences of more properly metaphysical approaches on one hand, and
of "anti-metaphysical" materialisms on the other.
In the end, the "messianic light" associated with utopia is a
material, and for that reason promising, semblance - or poetic practice
- of transcendence. This insight situates the "weak messianic" moment
in this utopian discourse in relation to the "subject of utopian
possibility" which the discourse addresses and discursively constitutes.
Critical Comparisons
One Dystopian Assessment in Three Parts
Each of these authors pronounces a dire dystopian assessment. The
specific assessments differ, but are nonetheless compatible with one
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another. A single account could be pieced together from these singular
dystopian assessments.
This emergent account would not be a scholastic variation on one of
the familiar critical themes of the late 20 th century. Although it
suggests the presence of something like a root oppression, it does not
lend itself to the idea that resolving this root oppression will tidily
revolutionize reality. Nor is the root a familiar one, already
thematized by critical theorists of one stripe or another. None of
these accounts would satisfy partisans of Marxian class analysis, for
instance. Class is not the fundamental variable in these dystopian
assessments, and the active participation of the revolutionary subject
in the dystopian state of affairs is one of the problems. None would
fully satisfy the demands of feminists, multiculturalists, or postmodernist linguistic analysts.
Instead, these accounts identify systemic practices as the central
problems that become the core obstacles to utopian happiness. Adorno
targets a complex of instrumental reason, reification and fetishized
commodity exchange that acts out the dynamics of an approach to logic
that imposes equivalence on unlike phenomena, a reliance on abstraction
that disregards its ineluctable inaccuracies, and an acceptance of the
alienation of consciousness from its contents. In effect, he sees a
need to rewrite the western script for the production of knowledge.
Irigaray identifies the dystopian problem as the ongoing repression of
sexual difference, which is cause and consequence of a foreclosure of
feminine insight, language, and subjectivity, as a pervasive culturewide practice with psychological and linguistic underpinnings and
systemic socio-economic, political and ethical consequences. Agamben
returns again and again to the recurrent structure of the state of
exception as the culprit in a structural bind in which western
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civilization finds itself, but investigates the way it plays itself out
across a range of phenomena, from the politics of the sovereign state
to the conceptualization of the relationship of human and animal to the
importance of the contemporary relationship between artist and audience.
If there is a single thing that could be changed, which would
realign the forces of society, for these authors, it is not as simple
and concrete as money was for Thomas More. And yet, it can be argued
that there is a single thing, and that the compatibility of the
different accounts is secured by the fact that the thing is the same
for each of these theorists. The root problem they each identify is the
ineradicable participation of physical or material life in every moment
of human transcendence, whether individual or collective, along with
the persistent denial and suppression of this participation by the
dominant accounts of reality.
The Enlightenment rationality Adorno and Horkheimer identify in
Dialectics of Enlightenment, which strives to dominate nature while
denying its own participation in nature, can be explicated further by
Irigaray's analysis of the foreclosure of the feminine precisely
because of the fundamental similarity of the process involved. The
foreclosure of the feminine would be explicated further by Agamben's
identification of the structure of the state of exception, which is
paradigmatically that of an exclusion that is an inclusion, an
inclusion that is an exclusion, although Agamben himself does not make
the move of reading the state of exception in relation to gender. 3 These
different analyses do not simply reduce to "the same thing;" they are
saying different things, and focusing on different aspects of the
dystopian problem. The specific dynamics they identify, however, mesh

3. That he does not has been one source of criticism of Agamben's treatment
of his material. See Mills, ibid., 114-115.
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with one another in time and space. In effect, they demonstrate
themselves to be different aspects or coordinates of the same dystopian
constellation.
The significant similarity in these accounts has to do with the
role of inarticulate matter, which linguistic or ideological
consciousness presents as "nature," "woman," "bare life," or "the
given." Inarticulate matter, which conventional wisdom sometimes
regards as the stuff of objective reality, is also the very site of
dystopian suffering. It is related to consciousness as its consciousness's - place and time of possibility, and as its source for
alternative realities. It is only "given reality" from one, narrow,
point of view, the point of view according to which "nothing changes."
It is also, perpetually, the concrete site of possibility. Because of
this, the cultivation of a form of consciousness that attends to and
respects this source of intelligence, both in its difference from the
abstractions in which it may be apprehended linguistically and
conceptually, and in its struggle to surpass the restrictions it
experiences in "reality," is central to the cultivation of utopian
imagination.
Dystopian Suffering
The suffering of inarticulate matter, however conceptualized, is
the ultimate dystopian index for these theorists. The dystopian
situation effectively denies and forecloses a reality or a portion of
reality that depends on a perduring material substrate. That reality whether thematized as the Adornian concrete, Irigarayan Woman,
Agamben's radical singularity of whatever being, or something else dwells constitutively and intimately within human life, and suffers
from its relegation to mute obscurity and the consequent
misapprehension or denial of its needs. Whether that mute obscurity
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derives from the inability of identity thinking to recognize
significant differences between an exemplar of a concept and its norm,
or from the systematic distortion of experience and self-constitution
shaped by a phallogocentric symbolic order, or from spectacular
redirection of desire away from use and toward illusion, the
consequences are suffering.
These differing accounts all problematize the existence of
suffering as an artificial and avoidable consequence of the dystopian
way of life, theorize its increase and its assumption of specific forms
in contemporary society, and recognize the need to orient ethical life
towards the trans formative negation of suffering. Their dire dystopian
diagnoses respond to a condition of pervasive suffering imposed by the
system that organizes the late modern way of life. The problem they see
is not that happiness is impossible in the dystopian world. The more
serious problem is that some happiness is possible, but only in a
partial and compromised form, and one which requires ignoring or
acquiescing to the suffering of others. This is the situation Adorno
terms the "universal guilt context." Agamben sees in it the
perpetuation of the infamous soccer game outside the crematoria of
Auschwitz, described by Primo Levi. Pursuit of the compromised
happiness available on dystopian terms actively blocks the approach to
a transformed context in which dystopian suffering would be negated.
Critical Assessments of These Dystopian Accounts
These individual dystopian accounts, as well as the single account
that could be constructed from them, are still not fully adequate to
the symptoms of the contemporary dystopian situation. The refinements
that are most needed lie with the treatment of the categories of gender
and race, and with a more nuanced treatment of the dystopian problem of
human cruelty. That assessment itself implies that the problem of class
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and the role of control of the means of production has been adequately
treated by these accounts. In fact, each of these authors' dystopian
assessments builds loosely on a Marxist chassis, and accepts the
fundamental validity of a core class analysis. None, however, gives
class division, or the structural position of the working class, the
status of root oppression. On this point, their shared ability to see
class dynamics and processes inflected by other variables, in
particular (for Irigaray) the reality of sexual difference and its
thematization in contemporary society, and (for Adorno and for Agamben)
the operation of cultural-industrial or spectacular influences, is a
mark of these theorists' perspicacity.
Their perspicacity also has its limits. Adorno and Agamben are, as
we have seen, far from feminist. Adorno's language in Minima Moralia,
for instance, has been analyzed as displaying a treatment of women, and
working class women in particular, as primarily objects of possible
enjoyment for men. 4 His relatively simple use of the concept of
"nature," commonplace within the tradition he critiques, but also a
problem with that tradition, signals the limitation of Adorno's views.
This limitation underscores one of Adorno's own insights, namely the
deep conditioning of knowledge by its circumstances. To be fair,
however, Adorno and Horkeheimer are also capable of recognizing the
patriarchal character of the tradition they criticize. 5 Agamben does not
rise to this standard. Agamben's uncritical incorporation of Benjamin's
romanticist treatment of woman, nature, and the animal is one instance
of his failure to address the issue of gender in his work. If not

4. Claudia Leeb, "Desires and Fears: Women, Class and Adorno." Theory and
Event. 11:1 (February, 2008).
----5-. "The 'happy match' between human understanding and the nature of things
that [Bacon] envisaged is a patriarchal one: the mind, conquering superstition,
is to rule over disenchanted nature." Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of
Enlightenment, 2.
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feminist, however, Adorno's and Agamben's analyses lend themselves to
critical feminist readings, and leave open significant possibilities
for explicitly feminist extensions.

6

Irigaray's relationship to feminist analysis is more complex.
Feminist theorists have been among Irigaray's most outspoken critics,
based on understandings of her early work that read it as grounded in a
traditional and essentialist treatment of the female body, and of some
of her later work that blanch at her advocacy of sexuately-specific
civil rights. Sympathetic readers of Irigaray, however, find her
treatment of excluded differences fruitful for the development of
ethical political models that extend beyond identity politics to
suggest ways of appreciating whatever form of difference is most
vulnerable to exclusion in the relevant political context. 7
These readings of Irigaray also constitute one answer to the
objection that none of these theorists deals explicitly or emphatically
with the problem of race, at least not in the sense in which race has
come to be a problem for analysis and for dystopian concern in the
United States. Adorno and Agamben do discuss race in the context of the
status of Jewishness vis-a-vis European nationalities, its salience in
Nazi Germany, and racism in the form of anti-Semitism. Irigaray does
not address herself explicitly to racial matters at all, despite her
increasing emphasis on questions of multi-cultural communication in her
later work, in particular Sharing the World. Implicitly, she makes
sexual difference a model for all other forms of difference. This model
does not address itself to the specifics of any national case, or to
the way gender is taken up and intersected by and made to intersect
6. See Ziarek, "Feminine 'I can'''; Lee, ibid.; Patrice Haynes, "'To rescue
means to love things': Adorno and the Re-enchantment of Bodies." Critical
Quarterly 47:3 64-78.
7. Chanter, ibid.; Deutscher, Politics of Impossible Difference; Ziarek,
Ethics of Dissensus.
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with race and class. None of these dystopian accounts are fully,
concretely adequate to the problems of a dystopian situation
characterized by racial division, inequality and oppression. Again,
arguably, the challenge to scholarship is to extend the relevant lines
of analysis to the most relevant forms of exclusion. Where race matters
as much as it does in the US, an illuminating critique of the operation
of racial ideology in exclusionary, spectacular society is necessary.s
The dystopian problem of human cruelty seems less amenable to
critical repair. None of these accounts offers a convincing account of
its genesis, or an approach to its resolution. Adorno comes closest in
his analysis of the hatred of weakness in Dialectic of Enlightenment
and of rage as ideology in Negative Dialectics. 9 Agamben's treatment of
evil as "the decision to remain in a deficit of existence" and to
suppress constitutive potentiality as a fault falls far short. 10 That
Adorno and Agamben take the dystopian problem of human cruelty
seriously, however, is indicated by their explicit engagement with the
phenomenon of the Nazi death camps. That trauma establishes the
stringency of the demands a promising response to the recurrent
phenomenon of human cruelty must meet. If, in the end, they fail to
make cruelty inconceivable outside the dystopian situation, it is not
for want of their recognition of the problem.
Irigaray's omission here is correspondingly unsatisfying. Her
utopian scenarios are promising and persuasive only to the extent that
mutual cooperation and communication, unmarred by cruelty or motives

8. With respect to Irigaray in particular, Patricia Huntington's critical
appraisal of Irigaray's textual practices and Ewa Ziarek's appreciative reading
of Irigaray's "labor of the negative" converge in the direction of an ethical
attitude of asymmetrical reciprocity and persistent dis sensus substantially
informed by Irigaray's insights. Huntington, ibid.; Ziarek, Ethics of Dissensus.
9. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 88-89; Adorno,
Negative Dialectics, 349.
10. Agarnben, Coming Community, 44.
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towards domination, is an imaginable alternative reality. She offers
nothing, however, in the way of a propaedeutic against cruelty. That
she also simply fails to engage the phenomenon of the death camps may
be significant. It suggests that, despite her respect for the death
drives, she may place unwarranted confidence in a paradigm of original
good will than is consistent with historical and sociological realism.
The problem is illustrated acutely in her own work by her reappropriation of Christian symbolism and the language of redemption.
Her use of this language ignores the problems associated with the way
Christian narratives have served in western history as supports for
domination. Irigaray also avoids developing an analysis of violence
against women, one direction in which the focus on sexual difference
might reach to an analysis of forms of cruelty and violence, and the
threats they pose to utopia.
Developing a critique and assessment of the role of violence from
an Irigarayan perspective on the foreclosure of the feminine or womanas-subject, along with its conflation with nature and the unconscious,
would be both interesting and helpful. One line of development here
could be to focus on the obliteration of sUbjectivity effected by the
structure and organization of the camp, which would bring Irigaray's
analysis close to that of Agarnben. To this could be added Irigaray's
distinctive recognition that the potential subject's development of her
own subjectivity is necessary for her minimal well-being, such that
this initial effacement itself constitutes a first cruelty, and a
precondition for all subsequent cruelties.
An Irigarayan analysis of violence,

however, would not resolve the

threat to utopian imagination posed by the problem of human cruelty,
especially in its traumatic late-20 th century forms. That threat is the
peculiar asymmetry that lies between the dystopian assessment, which
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demonstrates the existence of systemic cruelties as well as systemic
inducements to extraordinary and idiosyncratic acts of cruelty, and any
utopian possibility. Whatever utopian possibility might be thought
seems to be without the protection of powerful interests, and
vulnerable to the wanton exercise of power. These theorists, in the end,
address a subject of utopian possibility who lacks even the illusion of
shelter from the eruption of dystopian cruelty.
Common Calls for Disruption and Resistance
The critique advanced by each of these thinkers encourages critical
readerly engagement as a response to the immediate dystopian situation.
Each of their dystopian assessments asserts that something is deeply
wrong with the way of life the reader shares with the writer. The first
thing that has to change is what people do automatically without
thinking about it. The situation demands disruption of and resistance
to the dystopian context.
Drawing on an observation by Walter Benjamin, this change could be
characterized as an "architectural" project. l l

Benjamin claims that

people absorb architecture, and the lessons of architecture, in a state
of distraction. That claim is particularly suggestive when architecture
is taken as a metaphor for the mind, the habitation of the human
spirit.12 People absorb the lessons of their spiritual architecture in a
state of distraction as well, accepting the form of life to which they
are educated. Often they do so without stopping to orient themselves,
or to ask whether what they are doing is what they want to or should be
doing. Habitual patterns of thought influence and reinforce habitual
patterns of action, and shape the quest for truth. This large, rigid
complex must be disrupted so that it can be called into question,
11. Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction."
12. See also Alain de Botton, The Architecture of Happiness (New York:
Vintage International, 2008).
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resisted, and changed. These texts all advocate this response; they all
function disruptively and critically, by calling attention to the
contradictions of accepted wisdom and condemning easy acquiescence in
comfortable routines.
Texts with this shared critical orientation lead their readers to
anticipate programmatic recommendations. These texts, along with
prophetic denunciations and political manifestoes, two genres which
fulfill their form by enunciating specific behavioral prescriptions,
participate in a radical rhetorical tradition. The texts studied here,
however, deny their readers the closure of prescriptions for change.
The absence of programmatic recommendations in the works of these
authors may have been more acutely missed by their readers to the
extent that their association with radical rhetoric raises this
expectation. That absence may be one more reason why these authors have
sometimes been labeled "utopian" in the pejorative sense. In fact,
however, the absence of programmatic recommendations should suggest to
the reader that the task of constructing adequate concrete responses to
the situations described by these authors will not be simple or easy;
its demands exceed the possibilities open to the texts that place it on
the agenda.
The form of these authors' texts participates in the resistance and
disruption they advocate. The hermeneutical operation of understanding
these texts inaugurates a trans formative process. The subject position
of having read and begun to understand these texts is already a
transformed subject position, and is to a degree already distanced from
the situation the texts critique. The act of reading these texts, and
struggling to understand them, effects this distancing of the reader
from the object of the text's critique. In Agamben's terms, the subject
who has read the text does not fully coincide with the subject who has
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not yet read it. The act of reading effects a determinate, even if
slight, change in consciousness. Even if the reader rejects the texts'
analyses, and does not go on to cultivate a differently motivated form
of subjectivity, a dent or chink in the smooth armor of the spectacle,
or of phallogocentric patriarchy, or of the fully administered society,
remains.
The transformative impact of these texts resides in the reasons
they are notoriously difficult to understand. Their difficulty is an
intentional part of their project. Accessible texts do not disrupt
established patterns of reading and understanding. Disruptive texts,
which do, are less accessible. When Judith Butler, another formally
dissident writer, argued this point she cited Adorno's Minima Moralia,
which advanced the same position in the 1940s, as her authority.13
Irigaray has also taken the same position explicitly. Agamben takes the
position more implicitly, perhaps most notably in The Idea of Prose.
These texts are not difficult simply for the sake of difficulty.
Their inaccessibility is specific to their strategies. Adorno's
arachnid weavings embody a dialectical mentality that circles the
central point. His writing amounts to dialectics in action, mediation,
or "unweaving." That is, the text encourages or exhorts the reader to
look at a topic from multiple angles and to perceive non-identity or
difference. Adorno's commentators have identified this form as one of
the keys to understanding of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory in particular. 14
The work is best conceived as intellectual motion around an idea,
conducting a painstaking comparison of features, gauging the extent to
which this or that property characterizes a phenomenon, noting where
and how generalizations fall short, a method which according to Adorno
13. Judith Butler, A 'Bad Writer' Bites Back. New York Times. March 20, 1999.
14. Bernstein, ibid.; Finlayson, "Work of Art and the Promise of Happiness";

Hullot-Kentor, Introduction to Aesthetic Theory.
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gives the best knowledge of the truth, and the falsehood, that lies
buried in an idea. The difficulty of the procedure is measured by its
distance from a text that lays out its conclusions in a linear,
systematic way. Such a text purports to fit its material, when in fact
such a form can only be imposed on the material, disregarding that
material's specific contours.
Irigaray's mimetic texts, according to Whitford, provide a way to
incorporate, as well as critique, the philosophers with whom she is in
dialogue. is Her challenge, of getting at the substantive presence of
something typically seen as absence and lack, or nonexistence, is
extreme. Irigaray's vision is, if correct, debarred; according to her,
it is impossible to articulate directly in existing language. While
Irigaray's readers sometimes long for her to "just say it," she cannot.
Moreover, even if she could, and did, such direct expression would fall
short of its purpose. Her goal is to evoke the recognition, and the
objective context for symbolization, of ideas that have systematically
been denied expression. The ideas, then, are not already in her readers
vocabulary or repertoire. They cannot simply be referred to. Instead,
they have to be generated, caused to emerge from the reader's
engagement with the text.
Agamben's indirect and significantly negative non-arguments require
the reader to struggle to fill in the blanks. His texts are open rather
than closed. They meander through fields of suggestive prose rather
than arrive swiftly at a predetermined argumentative point. They slow
the reader down with deliberate digression or circumlocution, which is
clearly neither merely decorative nor dispensable. Consistent with
Agamben's persistent concern with potentiality, the absence of a single

15. Whitford, ibid., 71-72.
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governing imperative comes through these texts, perhaps discomfiting
readers.
Every text, even a conventional one, has some potential to alter
its readers. These writers' texts, it is claimed, are substantially
transformative, and accomplish their effects with additional intensity.
Because these are disruptive texts, they work against accustomed
methods of understanding. They do not esteem logic as usual, though
they arguably employ logic. They call accustomed methods of argument
into question, challenging those methods' contribution to rigid
thinking. Whatever understanding of these texts the reader gains can be
gained only at the price of an adoption of their alternative logic and
rhetoric. The act of understanding them entails seeing the point of
view of the text, or at least adopting a point of view closer to that
of the text's. Since that point of view is catastrophic, it is
difficult for a reader to remain unmoved. In each case, then, the
struggle and engagement with the text disrupts and effects a
transformation in the reader.
The disruptive effect at which these different texts aim, moreover,
is a substantially similar one. That effect includes an awareness of
the limits of language, and the reader's own entanglement in what
exceeds those limits. This trans formative effect depends on readers'
refusal to give up on these texts when their difficulties are
encountered. Nothing guarantees this engaged response. Texts are
passive, not coercive, however much readers of these texts sometimes
report feeling oppressed. They reach only as far as the willingness of
their audience. For that reason, the actual

~interventions"

texts of

this sort can effect are restricted in advance. While the effectiveness
of the utopian discourse undertaken in these texts has not been a
primary issue for this study, the question of what will become of these
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ideas does assert itself. The ultimate impact of this form of utopian
discourse may depend on whether it can sustain itself in some form
beyond the narrow boundaries of the texts in which it has been
developed.
A Shared Critique of Language
A critique of language shared by these writers plays a role in the
disruptive impact of their texts. To a large extent, contemporary
linguistic theory operates with a sign theory of language. Words are
more or less arbitrary signs, attached by convention and perhaps
history to concepts that are adjustible and re-specifiable. Since
Saussurian linguistics, their meanings are understood to reside in the
conventionally-established system of differences between one sign and
another. The idea that there might be a "true" or "just" expression of
an idea, or that there might be more than an arbitrary connection
between the physical housing of an idea, its word or name, and the idea
the word signifies, is difficult to take seriously. These authors do
not fully share this view, familiar to contemporary readers. Readers
who approach their texts with the sign-language view commonplace today
will encounter difficulties understanding them.
Instead, words or names for these authors retain an intimate
connection with personal experience and extra-conceptual reality. Words
are more than empty signs, and meaning is more than a system of
differences, although the value of the insight that meaning depends to
some degree on such a system is not lost on Agamben and Irigaray. Words
also have positive contents. Words and their contents are affected by
the way their users use them. Words also have a physical presence,
which works with or against their conceptual function. They are
themselves things, and as things they have something like a life of
their own. These authors share an appreciation for the raw material of
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language, its "body" or "silva," that sets their reflections on
language, presentation, and communication apart from other contemporary
thinkers. 16
The linguistic insight here seems to go back to the denominative
function of language, and in particular to notions of "enchantment." A
recognition of the potentially enchanted quality of language is
consistent with an approach to the world that would not be intent on
domination. Enchanted language is no longer the language of science.
Rather, it seems to be a more original language of things, something
approaching a language of nature, which would of necessity also be a
language human beings, who continue to embody nature, could share.
The form this respect for the materiality of language takes differs
from author to author. Adorno is explicitly careful about the use of
words that have, by virtue of their history, content that can no longer
be used to communicate the ideas that need to be discussed. This care
informs his gesture of reaching back into the past of aesthetic theory
to resuscitate Kantian terminology to accomplish his purpose in
Aesthetic.Theory. Agamben pays more explicit attention to the
distinction between body and spirit that is embodied in language itself,
although this distinction is noted by Adorno as well. Both Adorno and
Agamben, in fact, echo the notion that ideal language would correspond
to things in themselves, a picture of ideal language they both derive
from Walter Benjamin's image of Adamic language.
Irigaray seems to share a similar understanding, since in The Way
of Love she paints a picture of new language that would proceed from
the self-experience of the sexually different subject, and would
reflect this experience. This new language would be able to communicate
sufficiently without a pre-established meaning; this implies that it
16. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 56; Agarnben, Idea of Prose, 37.
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can convey something intelligible outside of its participation in a
pre-developed system of differences. Instead, Irigaray's new words must
have manifestly variable content, since they cannot be taken always to
mean "the same thing," but have a mobile relationship to the experience
of their users. They cannot, then, function as conventional signs; they
do not exchange information; they are, rather, vehicles for communion.
All these authors thus suggest that renewed attention to language,
along with new practices with respect to language, playa role in the
reconstitution of subjects, or subjectivities, of utopian possibility.
Where language is a vehicle for the sharing of experience, as distinct
from the exchange of information, an adoption of a changed relationship
to language becomes part of the cultivation of an alternative
subjectivity encouraged by these texts. What this would mean might be
suggested by certain fugitive experiences with language in which many
people share, at least from time to time: in participating in
children's acquisition of language, in occasional intimate negotiations
over the meaning of a word or phrase, or in the spontaneous invention
of metaphor. Indeed, this understanding of language substantiates
Irigaray's claim that what is needed for the complete thinking-through
of the meaning of sexual difference is a "new poetics," since this
understanding of language takes the matter of language, which furnishes
the possibility of poetry, as having a more general significance.
A Subject Capable of Transformation
We have seen that each of these theorists places a significant
emphasis on a renewed understanding of the subject of knowledge and
action, and its relation to its object or objects. A central common
feature of this subject is that she is - or could, and ought to be
actively "under construction." This feature of autopoietic human
subjectivity provides one of the core conditions for the development of
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a subject of utopian possibility, although as Adorno notes, it is also
the source of the persistent problem of dystopian distortion.
For Adorno, the subject is always already constituted by the forces
of society and history, nature (inner and outer), and culture, as well
as by the operation of reason. The exercise of reason, which
contributes to the development of the subject as separated-from its
object, and which is called upon to resist the forces of unreason, is
not historically innocent. It has also contributed to the domination of
a nature in which humanity itself is thoroughly enmeshed. A relentless
question for Adorno is whether this conditioned subject can realize any
independence from the circumstances which construct it, or whether its
perceptions are entirely prescribed by its history and circumstances.
This concern explains his insistence on the method of negative
dialectics, which confronts the concepts through which things are known
and through which the knowing subject comes into being with
contradictory signs and indications. The tenacious refusal to ignore
even the microscopic differences between things as conceptualized and
things as they present themselves to experiential encounter preserves
the possibility for influences "external" to the system devised by a
subject bent on domination. The method of negative dialectics offers a
slim hope for a subjective solidarity with the concrete, and for the
fashioning of perspectives that "displace and estrange the world" in a
prefiguration of "messianic light.,,17
Irigaray devotes much of her textual effort to laying out
conditions for the development of woman-as-subject. Woman as subject
appears in her work as the creation of a complex process requiring
communication across the lines of sexual difference, communication
within the boundaries established by sexual difference across other
17. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 247.
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lines of difference, and processes of "return to self." Return to self
entails the development of "auto-affection," self-influence or selfconstruction. Her treatment, as we saw, seems to require critical,
iterative reflection and possibly group process. iS Key to understanding
all of these different bodies of work is the recognition that the
woman-as-subject occupies the position of a messianic figure. Perhaps
more precisely, woman-as-subject is a quasi-messianic figure. That is,
woman-as-subject does not accomplish the work of the traditional
messiah of messianic religions, ushering in an age that fully redeems
past history. The advent of 'woman-as-subject does, however, announce
the beginning of a new relationship of humanity to nature. She ushers
in the objective conditions for cultivation of a new form of culture
that recognizes human nature for the first historical time, and permits
the construction of a new form of politics and ethics. This collective
life is now based on the distinctive, and no longer repressed, needs of
the fully human and always not fully "representative", that is
incomplete in themselves, subjects of sexual difference. The
cultivation of this subjectivity itself provides the avenue for the
cultivation of a more adequate utopian vision.
Agamben sets out again and again to come to terms with a subject
which is constitutionally uncalled for, lacking a determinate or
determining "nature" or purpose. His reflections on potentiality, and
its relationship to a community of "whatever being" that is purposely
conceived independently of specific identifications or criteria for
belonging, recognize and require a self-constituting subject capable of
far greater freedom than it may yet realize. The specific potential
subjects of the coming community, for whom each particular predicate

18. How much group process seems to depend upon how we think about autoaffection.
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"always matters," can only become what they are through their practice
of ethics and politics. If they have an urgent task at present, it is
the development of a form of life inseparable from life itself.
Agamben's self-constitutive subject remains in a position to choose
which practices to engage in and which directions to pursue. This
inexhaustible potential is consistent with the radical break Agamben
associates with an authentically "messianic" community.
In each case, then, the current subject of dystopia is identified
as the site for the recognition and innervation of a subject of utopian
possibility. The subject of possibility, in turn, becomes the threshold
for messianic or utopian transformation. These texts leave open the
question of whether the subject under construction is an individual
conscious human subject, a "psychological subject," or a collective and
communal one. Presumably the transformation of even a small area of
society calls for the development of a collective subject. The
psychological subject, which is the subject of suffering most people
care deeply about, however, remains stubbornly singular. Ultimately, a
promising subject of utopian possibility probably needs to be
conceivable on both of these levels.
What the subject clearly is not for these thinkers, however, is
that transcendental subject of being, knowledge, and reason familiar
from its autobiographical reflections in the history of western
philosophy. The delusions of that subject are part of the problem for
these authors. Part of the solution is a concrete subject of
possibility, one who both transcends and is transcended by a material
reality which urges it in the direction of utopian transformation.
Review and Commentary
This discourse, then, evokes the need for a response to the
dystopian problem, described by these authors as having broadly similar
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features, and in particular the feature of excluding or invalidating
forms of consciousness that would pose utopian alternatives to the
prevailing situation. It sketches and enacts a possible response of
discursive disruption of and resistance to this dystopian. It thereby
asserts the inadequacy of conventional language to the task of
communicating a utopian alternative, and evokes a repertoire of
corrective possibilities. In so doing, it begins to construct the
desire for, the idea of, and the discursive reality of a subject of
utopian possibility. Such a subject of possibility differs from the
ideal subject cultivated in and by the dystopian situation.
Margaret Whitford has noted that Luce Irigaray's work combines a
"critical moment" with an indispensable "utopian moment.,,19 Her comment
could be extended to the work of Adorno and Agamben as well, even
though Adorno and Agamben develop the utopian moment less fully than
does Irigaray.2o Whitford's insight identifies a feature that allows
this utopian discourse to create a compelling dynamic interaction
between texts and reader. The texts address themselves to the subject
of a dire present situation, which urgently demands transformation, and
whose condition the text shares. The chances of transformation are
small. The text offers no grounds for hope for any built-in tendencies
towards transformation. It does, however, offer its repertoire of
disruptive and resistant perceptions, positions and practices, which
the reader is encouraged to appropriate insofar as she adopts the
perspective of the text, seeing the danger and agreeing that the danger
is real. In so doing, additional self-creative dynamics

that is,

dynamics that create a self - are brought into play which could,
19. Whitford, ibid., 135-136.
20. As noted earlier, this discrepancy stems directly from Irigaray's
identification of the foreclosure of the development of woman-as-subject, and
the need to challenge the phallogocentric structure of language itself, as the
central focus of her critical and transformative work.
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however slightly, destabilize the dystopian situation. Where the
dynamics of the dystopian situation work to make the present appear as
a universal, rational, and unquestionable set of givens for human life,
these counter-dynamics challenge the system's pretensions. The subject
of such counter-dynamics experiences the imperative of thinking an
alternative to the dystopian situation. In so doing, that subject is
always already participating in becoming a subject of possibility.
There is a negative aspect to this self-creative practice. These
self-created subjects of possibility likely will experience a
heightened and more acute discontent within the dystopian situation.
Subjects who are better adjusted to that situation presumably have a
different experience, more contented if not necessarily happier.
Heeding the call of utopian discourse may actually increase unhappiness,
and whether or not that unhappiness will be repaid by subsequent
personal happiness, or will even prove to have been in the service of
happiness of any kind, is uncertain. The subjectivity of utopian
possibility is for this reason, ironically, an alienated one that is
deeply disturbed by its own dystopian location. But its characteristic
dissatisfaction sterns from its intuition of a form of happiness not
accessible to the undisturbed subject of dystopia.
It remains to show how this subject of possibility, as it takes
shape in space and time, constitutes a promising site from which to
imagine, and perhaps to pursue, that negation of suffering for which
one name is utopia. The reason for this promise has to do with the
conjunction of the discursively constructed subject of possibility with
the subject matter of suffering. That conjunction involves the
participation of space and time in the formation of the subject of
possibility.

289

The Chronotopic Subject of Possibility
Human subjects, singular or collective, are in a root sense "made
of time." They are not only made of time, however. In these discourses
time merges with the space that human subjects also are, to effect the
particular kind of space required for the imaginative projection of
utopia. This recalls Bakhtin's concept of the chronotope. For Bakhtin,
a chronotope is a four-dimensional concept that solidifies time
spatially, or that expands space temporally. Space and time become
interchangeable, or exchange characteristic properties. Examples given
by Bakhtin include the "encounter time" of the "threshold," or the
"adventure time" of the homogeneously exotic world of the Greek
adventure novel. 21 Utopia itself, as noted earlier, is chronotopic,
uniting a not-now with a not-here.
For these authors, the time that makes up the subject of
possibility also constitutes the opening-up of a threshold for utopian
space. More precisely, the possibility that gives rise to this subject
erupts as potentially utopian space, within the dense and unmappable
space of late capitalism, from an "outside" that has not been fully
captured in that system. It remains "outside" because it has been
specifically excluded or foreclosed by the system: Adorno's nonidentity, Irigaray's "woman," Agamben's "bare life." The time lived by
the self-created subject of utopian possibility constitutes space
cleared for what as yet has no recognized place. This u-topic space is
not an actual existential phenomenon. It comes into being as something
inserted from without, in the act of making visible and meaningful the
differences between official reality and an alternative in which the
suffering imposed under that official reality would be negated by its
transformation into happiness.
21. Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel," 87, 248.
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Arguably, then, the subject of possibility constitutes a
strategically important space-time within a dense form of life which
represents itself ideologically as a totality without alternative. That
dense form of life, whether conceptualized as late capitalism, the
society of the spectacle, or phallogocentric discourse, is inimical to
the cultivation of utopian possibility precisely because of its
objectively pervasive scope and its persuasive characterization of
choices that disrupt or resist its operation as futile, objectively
irrational, or ultimately inconceivable. The space-time of the subject
of possibility is physical space and temporal consciousness in which to
cultivate the initially minute discrepancies that belie the absence of
an alternative to the existing order. These include the non-identity
between death and reconciliation, the difference between the prevailing
concept of "woman" and what "woman-as-subject" might incorporate, and
the non-coincidence between a community erected around some determinate
identity and a community of whatever-being. The discernment of those
gaps or discrepancies is itself a sign of the critical taking-place of
a micrological non-dystopian possibility. That possibility is the
vehicle for the characteristic mode of influence of the "messianic
light" named in this utopian discourse.
The Event of an Outside as Potentially Utopian Space
The subject of utopian possibility depends upon the credible event
of an outside. The subject's relationship to this event varies from
writer to writer.
Adorno does not envision the subject of possibility as being
situated outside, but as being attuned to or with something like an
outside and able to discern its traces through the operation of
dialectical reflection. In effect, the thinking subject, in the
practice of a consistently negative dialectics, is able to formalize
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the negation of suffering implicit in aesthetic expressions of
suffering and artistic efforts at its transformation. The flesh and
blood philosopher can reflectively connect these formal negations to
grateful memories of happiness that constitute the material base of
something like metaphysical experience. This prismatic thought
struggles to separate the genuine flickers of happiness, which bear
witness to a persistent "undisfigured" concrete, from ideological
resignation to dystopian existence or pleasure taken in its prescribed
exercises of domination. Adorno's subject perceives, communicates with
and mediates the possibility of an "outside" to the dystopian context
indirectly, reflectively and cautiously, suspicious of that subject's
own indiscernible inner distortions.
For Agamben and Irigaray, the subject of possibility incorporates
or is the threshold for the event of an outside. Irigaray's lengthy
discussions of the sexually different subject's construction of a
separate dwelling, which she furnishes with a threshold, and orients
towards a space of encounter from which a return to self has already
been secured, speak to the intentional cultivation of a subjectivity
for which the preconditions already exist. Agamben focuses attention on
the pure event of an outside most explicitly in The Coming Community,
in his discussion of the relationship of singularity to the whateverquality of whatever being. -For Agamben, in explicit contrast to Adorno,
the singular subject of thought and experience always has available to
it, by virtue of its exemplarity of whatever being, the ecstasy of "the
experience of being-wi thin an outside. ,,22
In each case, however, the extra-dystopian outside in question
shares important features. It occupies a realm that is concretely
material. For Adorno, it embraces the discernibly extra-conceptual core
22. Agamben, Coming Community, 68.
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of every concept and the mute, uncomprehending witness of the object of
aesthetics. For Irigaray it is the source of the centuries-long
conflation of "woman" with "nature" and "matter." For Agamben, it is
the substrate that makes possible the characteristic exclusion of an
inclusion, or inclusion of an exclusion, that structures the various
states of exception that haunt the communal structures of western
culture.
As may already be clear, this concrete realm bears the relationship
of an "outside" to the dystopian context precisely because of its
exclusion and inadequate thematization within that context. On one hand,
this exclusion and inadequate thematization is just what makes the
dystopian context dystopic. On the other, however, it is what permits
the concrete to appear as the "undisfigured" and corrective alternative
to that context, rather than as one of its thoroughly conditioned prefabricated eiements.
Finally, chief among the contents of this outside is the concrete
matter of suffering. The outside includes the insistent registration of
emptiness that belies the spectacular representation of reality as
characterized by plenty, the sensed muscular tension or chronic
inflammation that asserts the nonidentity of human fulfillment and
"having a good job," the fatigue that is beyond speech, and every other
concrete indicator of not-yet-negated suffering. As such, it
constitutes the raw material of utopia, insofar as utopia is suffering,
in the form of its negation as happiness.
This discourse, then, evokes its subject of utopian possibility as
the observer or threshold of an eruptive event of an outside. The
grasping of this outside, or rather its potential, occurs in time. But
the pregnant symbol for the kind of eruption of a trans formative
outside is that of a messianic event. The time that the subject of
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possibility makes and lives out of this potentially utopian space is
messianic time.
The Auto-Poietic Subject of Possibility as Messianic Time
The time that emerges in these thinkers' works is explicitly
"messianic" in their terms. Irigaray's use of the annunciation as a
figure for the communication across lines of sexual difference she
envisions indicates an appropriation of available messianic symbols for
a new use. Agamben's time that remains is once again explicitly focused
on a kind of messianic expectation. Adorno remains agnostic on this
point, referring instead to the wish for a divine redemption, which
while unacceptable indicates for him the limit of the desired and
desirable utopia.
Agamben's analysis of the poetic structure of the outside, and its
associated subjectivity, is probably most illuminating. Poetry,
philologically speaking, is the activity of making something from
nothing. It is, in essence, what the practice of humanity entails. The
ethical and political practice of humanity is formally poetic. This
follows from the identification of humanity as an intrinsically empty
condition, one without a work that gives humanity an imperative set of
practices or behaviors. The practice of humanity, of human life,
entails ethical and political choices because of its poetic character.
For Agamben, the definition of poetry further entails the
recognition of the divergence or potential divergence of physical form
and human (cultural, linguistic) meaning. The possibility of enjambment
calls attention to this always-at-least-potential divergence.
Enjambment registers and renders discernible the non-coincidence of the
material features of poetic language, the features of sound embodied in
rhyme and of touch embodied in meter, with its less material features
of meaning by way of denotation, connotation, implication, association.
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In prose there is no corresponding possibility of enjambment, which
does not necessarily mean that there is no divergence, but rather it
may mean that there is no possibility of its recognition. A prosaic
situation could be one in which the physical form is entirely plastic,
or the human meaning is entirely transparent, or it could be one in
which the potential divergence and source of creative tension between
the two has been fully suppressed, rendered imperceptible.
Dwelling prosaically, then, may be a figure for dystopian existence.
Dwelling poetically may be an alternative figure for messianic
anticipation, in which attending to and bearing witness to this noncoincidence of elements, within language and within ourselves, is a way
of mobilizing the inexhaustible potential incorporated in humanity.
Agamben's analysis of the Pauline messianic message further emphasizes
his perception of the active accessibility of messianic time, which is
consistent with the notion of the self-creation of the messianic
subjects. The subjects of the messianic event have, first of all, to be
those who cultivate messianic anticipation, and who prepare themselves
for participation in the messianic moment. These subjects create
differences, first of all within themselves, which in turn make a
difference in practical living.
The messianism these authors share is not the messianism of the
messianic religious traditions, or even the messianism of artists who
have the idea that art can single-handedly change the world. However,
it is compatible with the structure of an influence that is awaited and
prepared, an influence that breaks in from outside, or that erupts from
within the structures of immanence. In all this work there is the
conviction that within this context of immanence forces are present,
available, and still accessible that have the potential to transform
this dystopian context into something else. A different way of life
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remains possible, although saying so directly and simply would
constitute an illegitimate reassurance offered to the dystopian context,
in which that simple statement remains, in many important respects,
false.
The essence of messianic symbolism and language for these authors
is the way relation to it constitutes resistance, and breeds further
resistance. Even for Adorno, whom Agarnben decries as absolutely
unmessianic, there is more resistance going on than at first meets the
eye. It is the vital resistance of renaming, puncturing "identity." For
Irigaray, the effort to articulate different temporalities across the
line of sexual difference emerges as a messianic task. Agarnben, as we
have seen, sees the enactment of messianic anticipation as an everpresent potential. For Agarnben, the ideal, exemplified in the Pauline
kerygma, is an announcement which enacts itself and constitutes itself
as the good announced. In any case, however, messianic resistance is a
refusal of premature announcements of salvation, and of non-messianic
faith, that is, faith in anything that is not yet the advent of the
messianic time.
Minimal Material Metaphysics
This discourse asserts itself as utopian in its struggle to sustain
solidarity with something like metaphysics. Its success in this
struggle is, in fact,

indispensable. Utopian thinking depends upon a

source of metaphysical ideas, upon a credible unknown outside. That
metaphysical reality also has to be communicable. It has to have one or
more points of contiguity, shared reality, with what is to be
transformed.
The theories of an event of an outside developed across this
discourse might be called minimally metaphysical. They are an effort to
respect the constraints of the critiques of metaphysics, and to avoid
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something that cannot be credible, while preserving the difference from
the current context that is a prerequisite for utopian thought and
discourse. "This," whatever "this" is, cannot be everything. "What is
must be changeable, lest it be all.,,23
Philosophy is serious, but then again, it is not all that serious,
as Adorno noted. Other things matter more; some people's real suffering,
for instance. The practical question of how to go about pursuing the
elimination of suffering, while remaining in and cultivating solidarity
with those who face and undergo suffering, is ultimately central, and
remains central to the basic enterprise of utopian thinking. That
practical question becomes a serious philosophical question to the
extent that the philosophy involved in historically earlier efforts to
solve that problem have imposed additional suffering, and blocked
efforts to relieve suffering. These philosophers contend that it has.
The solution to the question of what the negation of suffering would
look like and feel like - the utopian solution - cannot take the form
of the domination of nature sketched out in Bacon's New Atlantis - or,
according to Irigaray and Agamben, even earlier: in Plato's Cave and
Aristotle's polis.
These thinkers pursue the possibility of metaphysical thinking in a
post-metaphysical age. They respect the impossibility of any "future,"
or traditional, metaphysics. But they also seek to secure for the
benefit of the subjects of dystopia the good that metaphysics once
seemed to secure, namely the potential for an effective form of utopian
imagination.
We are not the subjects of utopia. We are not even, yet, the
subjects of utopian striving. Utopian images that would motivate us
would be manifestly unjust and would fail to represent adequately the
23. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 398.
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utopian condition that might be achievable from here. But as cosubjects of dystopia, along with these authors, their readers are well
situated to undertake the practices that bring subjects of possibility
into being.
A Preliminary, Transformative Mode of Utopian Discourse
The effort to construct the subject of utopian possibility is the
genuinely "weak messianic" task, or rather practice, of our day. Its
transformative discourse links utopia with art and religion, which are
similarly practical, transformative, and regulated by ideals. That is,
these enterprises take place through practice; they operate to
transform their specific materials; and they orient their
trans formative practices towards a criterion related to an
understanding of the good. Insofar as the point of contact between
religion and art lies in the orientation of these two different bodies
of practice towards the transformation of material life, the
trans formative practice associated with the subject of utopian
possibility, which takes place at the point of intersection and
imagination of a renewed poeisis and a reimagined completion of human
life, aims at something both religious and artistic, though also other
than either. This renewed practice is at the same time political
(having to do with personal and communal decision, in particular about
values; with what values will be put into practice, with the hierarchy
of values) and ethical (having to do with the pursuit of the happy
life). These cannot in the end be separated from one another, which is
why under the aspect of a system in which the value spheres have been
separated from one another they appear to deal with similar issues in
isolation from one another.
The task of utopia ultimately remains that of the elimination of
suffering. The effort to eliminate suffering by eliminating that which
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suffers - Nature-as-Object, e.g., along with its designated human
carriers - has been shown up as a dismal failure in the west. The task
could still be pursued differently, in solidarity with that which
suffers. This different pursuit of the negation of suffering will
entail a new curriculum, based on the cUltivation of a different kind
of subject, the "weak messianic" subject of utopian practice, which is
simply happiness as a way of life.
The subject of utopia is clearly not "the messiah" in a traditional
religious sense, however much these authors make use of messianic
language and messianic terminology in talking about him, her, or it.
While Irigaray uses the language of parousia, Agamben talks about the
construction of a messianic community, and Adorno draws out the
messianic metaphor from time to time, the subject of utopia is not a
magical figure to be awaited, while the active context of life plays
out unresisted. A more general understanding of "messiah" as a figure
designated for a redemptive task might fit the subject of possibility,
rather loosely. The subject of possibility does incorporate that
eruption of an outside into the space-time of the here and now, and
does speak on behalf of someone or something: on behalf of suffering
concrete material life.
The subject of possibility does not, however, usher in sweeping
change, except perhaps in a micrological and preliminary way. In the
process of searching for and remaining alert to traces of what lies
beyond the dystopian context, in cultivating skepticism about the lack
of alternatives to an ideological totality, in practicing fugitive
forms of change, the subject of possibility undertakes a trans formative
discursive practice. This sUbjectivity may contribute most by refusing
to relinquish its unreasonable demands for patently impossible results.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

It is customary to think of utopia as a particular form of
representation. But the idea of utopia requires the idea of
transformation. Even the representation of utopia is, as Fredric
Jameson notes, something that purports to force people to "think the
break." That is, it is a representation of a wish that pushes its
readers to think the processes of transformation, and perhaps to engage
in the practices of transformation that might feed in to the utopian
condition. Even if' those practices do not bring about utopia, they
might at least render the present dystopian moment more like the utopia
of the imagination. Utopia, utopian thinking, occurs in solidarity with
reflection on what in the world needs to change, and on the conditions
for its change, unfettered at least temporarily by the a priori
dictates of what is reasonable within the givens of the moment. In
practice this imagination is never as radical as it could be or needs
to be. There are things that the imagination from the present cannot
anticipate. The transformation of character that would be required to
envision the real utopian change has never yet taken place. While it is
possible to argue that the ultimate transformation of character does
not take place until the advent of the utopia, it is equally true that
the advent of the utopia can only be prepared by the cultivation of a
new form of human life. This insight, which is one of the insights
shared by the world's religions as well as by Aristotelian ethics,
continually returns to the insight that the way forward is built on
efforts in the present.
It is these potential efforts in the present, which cut against the
grain of the present culture, which make demands that are impossible to
fulfill, and which forego the complete happiness possible in the
present for the sake of holding on to the vision of something that
would be superior, that endow humanity in each generation with the
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"weak Messianic power" noted by Benjamin in the second thesis on
history. The weak messianic power does not effect the redemption of the
world. To the extent that it is made effective, however, it does change
the world, and its responsibility both to the past and the future is to
pursue a direction of change that heads towards the "messianic light"
that would be shed upon things from the point of view of the longed-for
redemption. This requires the cultivation of new people, such as
Irigaray's woman-as-subject, who have never yet voiced their desires,
because they have never yet appeared on the earth. When their voices
are heard at last, they, too, will - as the voice of suffering - point
in the direction of something like redemption.
Utopia in this discourse makes a particular quality of life
together its ultimate aim, and projects less a form than a way of being.
Transformative practice cannot proceed without a criterion or set of
criteria for remaining true to the good or goods at which it aims. The
criterion implicit in the utopian discourse considered here at last
offers a candidate for the substance to the metaphor of "messianic
light."
"Messianic Light" as Practical Criterion
If "messianic light" is more than an empty metaphor, its content
seems to be that of a criterion for the efforts of the subject of
possibility. That criterion is not encoded in an image; one of the
insights of this discourse, along with all "iconoclastic utopianism,"
is that imagistically encoded criteria for utopia become obsolete, and
then lend themselves to oppressive appropriation. That criterion is
also not encoded in a formal procedure, such as the use of reason.
Indeed, this discourse makes its aim to demonstrate that the use of
reason as the procedural criterion in western civilization has
contributed to the specific dystopia facing that civilization today.

301

Instead, the criterion is something that might be called, less
metaphorically, the well-being of the subject matter. The animal body.
Woman. Whatever being and its mute but expressive face. The criterion
of messianic light is that the suffering people continue to care about
is mitigated, not by suppression or repression or denial, but by
transformation into happiness.
We would establish our understanding of it by reflection, according
to Adorno. It would make itself felt in art, and philosophy as art's
reflective partner would articulate the direction in which the negation
of suffering would be available. We would experience it as radiation,
according to Irigaray, the radiation of the formation of a subjectivity
of its own, based on difference, but not reduced to symbolizing that
difference, but cultivating its own content. We would carry it with us,
halo-like, in the enfleshed faces of whatever linguistic being we would
cultivate, and would bear witness to it more conscientiously, with
greater awareness of our constitutive continuity with that material. In
each case, messianic light is not unproblematically equivalent to an
immersion in immanence, as if an unmediated knowledge of the utopian
criterion were available. Nor is it an assertion that the desires and
preferences accessible to our linguistically-shaped reflection or
consciousness are in any way "pure" or perfectly reliable indicators of
the direction of a utopian true north. Nevertheless, the premise is
that there is a corrective already available. That corrective
stubbornly perdures in the failures of this source of messianic light
to conform to cultural expectations; its stubborn discrepancies from
what is expected. In the way matter transcends spirit, remaining
outside and beyond its dominating reach, insisting on revealing its
true character and identity regardless of the names given it by spirit,
the "metaphysical" possibility that makes possible utopian discourse
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persists, and stupidly and unreasonably insists on not being satisfied
with something other than whatever constitutes its satisfaction.
Developing the skills and the language necessary to pursue that
satisfaction then becomes the task of the subject of possibility, a
development which finds its orientation in what has been called here
"messianic light."
Post Script: The Work of Messianic Lighting
Terminology
The words "jargon" and "argot" each refer to a specialized and
\

generally unintelligible practice of language. "Argot" denotes the
specialized vocabulary of any class or group, and has nuances of
criminality or "the underworld." It is unintelligible, when it is, on
purpose. Argot permits the members of a small gang or "coquille" to
communicate with one another without tipping off the potential objects
of their predatory actions. "Jargon" derives from a word which in Old
French denoted "a chattering," as of animals or birds. It now
frequently refers to the specialized language of an occupational group,
but retains its earlier meaning of unintelligible or confused - and for
that reason, confusing - speech. Specialized professional language is
both jargon and argot: jargon to outsiders who experience it as
unintelligible and confusing, therefore seemingly confused; argot to
the cognoscenti.
Instances of specialized language have a strategic political and
philosophical importance, according to Giorgio Agamben.24 They serve to
break the romantic conflation of people, language, nation and state.
Since the imaginary order that continues to structure global political
life is based on this obscure conflation, and since finding ways to
make this order inoperative is an urgent and important political and
24. Agamben, Means Without End, 63-70.
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philosophical task, jargon and argot should excite more than simply
linguistic or literary interest. They embody issues of communicability,
belonging, exclusion and presupposition that are enmeshed in the
practice of language.
Jargon's relationship to a specialized form of life, such as an
occupation, makes it a sociological phenomenon. The practice of an
occupation and the use of its jargon synchronize practical lines of
difference between practitioners and non-practitioners, and produce
experiences of belonging and exclusion, communicability and
incommunicability, presupposition and ignorance. Learning and using
professional jargon or argot comes with occupational practice. At the
same time, it constructs the learners and users as conscious and selfconscious participants in the roles for which the jargon or argot is
the common parlance, while symmetrically constructing non-users of the
jargon as outsiders or incompetents. 25 It exemplifies the role of
language in the fabrication of a specifically constituted sUbjectivity.
In the jargon or argot of the world of professional theatrical and
photographic lighting, the words

~grip"

and

~throw"

have specific uses

that differ from their more general associations with grasping by hand
and hurling through the air, so as to produce a turning or twisting
motion. 26 In that specialized parlance, a

~grip"

is

~the

crew member who

hangs lights, pushes dollies, hefts cases, and, on the West Coast,
handles Reflectors."

~Throw"

is the

~distance

light travels from Source

25. Beth A. Bechky, ~Gaffers, Gofers, and Grips: Role-Based Coordination in
Temporary Organizations," Organization Science 17:1 (January-February, 2006) 32l.
26. Both "grip" and "throw" derive from Old English, "grip" from gripe,
grasp and gripa, handful, "throw" from thrawan, to turn, twist or curl.
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to Subject." In this special context, the "Source" is anything that
produces light, while the "Subject" is whatever needs to be lighted. 27
A "grip" is not a "gaffer."28 The province of the gaffer - also
named the electrician, or "juicer" - extends to everything connected
with or to the electrical power, or "juice," required to produce
artificial light. "Gaffers and electricians make light; and key grips
and grips control light.,,29 This division of technical labor explains
why "exterior days" in a project schedule, for instance a film shoot,
"are often called Grip Days, since usually a single massive nuclear
lighting source is used instead of electrically powered lights.,,3o
Whatever the source of light, grips construct and place the
apparatus of reflectors and diffusers that shape and direct its throw,
to produce specific lighting effects. Ideally, these effects will be
those desired by the projects' participants, and will also please
important others, like producers or clients. In essence, grips are the
crew members who handle the mechanics of the project that calls for
professional lighting. The exigencies of these mechanics also give the
key grip the final say on various matters of technical feasibility,
like whether a camera can or cannot be placed - without excessive risk
to life and limb - in a particular location. 31
Grips, then, are neither the primary "Subject" of a lighting
project, nor the generators or sources of the lighting for the project.
They are, however, subjects whose involvement in matters of lighting

27. See Ross Lowell, Matters of Light and Depth: Creating memorable images
for video, film and stills through lighting (New York: Lowel-Light
Manufacturing, Inc., 1992); glossary online at http://www.lowel.com/glossary.
May 1, 2010.
28. A "gaffer" is lexically "an old man," or in British English a "foreman"
and an alternative to "godfather," a term with argotic connotations of its own.
29. Jeffrey M. Hamel, "Lighting vs. Illuminating," at
http://www.studentfilmmakers.com/news/printer 1610.shtml, accessed June 1, 2010.
30. Anonymous, "The Art of Grippage," online at
http://everything2.com/user/fugduP/writeups/Grip, accessed June 1, 2010.
31. Bechky, 12.
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can make the difference between satisfactory and unsatisfactory results.
Their understanding of the results to be obtained, their grasp of their
craft, and their creative ability to work with the elements of a
situation and devise solutions to problems as they arise all play a
role in the success or failure of the project. These subjects mediate
the throw of light, without being either the lighted subject, or the
light that lights it. Their work determines whether, for instance, the
subject emerges as discernibly different from its surroundings, or
recedes imperceptibly into their shadows.
The relationship of the grip, who mediates the throw of light, to
the subject of a lighting project is in some ways analogous to the
relationship of the subject of utopian possibility who has surfaced in
the preceding chapters to the subject of utopia itself. One conclusion
of this study is that the discourse of the three authors considered
here speaks to a subject of utopian possibility, and works to bring
that subject of possibility to awareness and possibly to action. This
subject does not possess utopian subjectivity; being outside utopia,
this subject can have neither an experience of utopia, nor a clear and
precise sense of its contours - at least, not a positive one. Instead,
the subject of utopian possibility is a subject who can form the stillabstract idea of utopia, take it seriously, and undertake to illuminate
its possible contents. It is a subject capable of imagining an
alternative to what presents itself as reality. If it is true, as
Adorno claims, that perspectives must be found that permit

~messianic

light" to reach the dystopian scene, it is the subject of utopian
possibility who will have to act as the grip.
Working with Available Light
All light is energetic matter. Light in the act of lighting up a
leaf, or a face, is an example of matter affecting itself. This is no
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less true of messianic light. While the name "messianic light" suggests
something that emanates from elsewhere, the light it casts is always
already available. As the discourse considered here makes plain,
messianic light comes from the material world.
The idea of messianic light is, finally, a tenaciously this-worldly
idea. Not only is there no other world, it implies, another world is
not what people really want. Utopia, perversely, is this very world with a little difference.
Presumably, this tiny messianic difference is what mobilizes, not
impossible energies and alternatives, but ever-present ones that are
temporarily blocked, ineffective. It appears to be akin to the thought
of the impossible made possible, a reverse enchantment which frees the
possibilities frozen in the situation. It works the way the name of
stone soup works, to put perfectly ordinary soup into the mouths of the
hungry and to make doing what was always perfectly possible an occasion
for celebration. Stone soup, after all, differs from soup only by a
word. But the word matters. It is stone soup whose name makes it seem
inconceivable, and whose aura of impossibility is the condition for its
possibility.
As the story goes, the little difference between dystopia and
eutopia is so precise and fine, it awaits the coming of the messiah to
make it. It remains to learn whether the weak messianic power with
which our generation is said to be endowed could, or will, make as
little difference as that.
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